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Stalin's War: A New History of World War II Hardcover – April 20, 2021
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World War II endures in the popular imagination as a heroic struggle between good and evil, with villainous Hitler driving its events. But Hitler was not in power when the conflict erupted in Asia—and he was certainly dead before it ended. His armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not span the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit any of the spoils of war. That central role belonged to Joseph Stalin. The Second World War was not Hitler’s war; it was Stalin’s war.
Drawing on ambitious new research in Soviet, European, and US archives, Stalin’s War revolutionizes our understanding of this global conflict by moving its epicenter to the east. Hitler’s genocidal ambition may have helped unleash Armageddon, but as McMeekin shows, the war which emerged in Europe in September 1939 was the one Stalin wanted, not Hitler. So, too, did the Pacific war of 1941–1945 fulfill Stalin’s goal of unleashing a devastating war of attrition between Japan and the “Anglo-Saxon” capitalist powers he viewed as his ultimate adversary.
McMeekin also reveals the extent to which Soviet Communism was rescued by the US and Britain’s self-defeating strategic moves, beginning with Lend-Lease aid, as American and British supply boards agreed almost blindly to every Soviet demand. Stalin’s war machine, McMeekin shows, was substantially reliant on American materiél from warplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps, motorcycles, fuel, ammunition, and explosives, to industrial inputs and technology transfer, to the foodstuffs which fed the Red Army.
This unreciprocated American generosity gave Stalin’s armies the mobile striking power to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for Communism.
A groundbreaking reassessment of the Second World War, Stalin’s War is essential reading for anyone looking to understand the current world order.
- Print length864 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherBasic Books
- Publication dateApril 20, 2021
- Dimensions6.5 x 2.5 x 9.6 inches
- ISBN-101541672798
- ISBN-13978-1541672796
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Explore the Works of Sean McMeekin | A “powerful revisionist history” (Times UK) illuminating the tensions and transformations of the Russian Revolution. | Blending historical narrative with cutting-edge scholarship, To Overthrow the World revolutionizes our understanding of the evolution of Communism—an idea that seemingly cannot die. | A revolutionary account of the genesis of World War I, July 1914 tells the gripping story of Europe’s countdown to war from the bloody opening act on June 28th to Britain’s final plunge on August 4th. |
Editorial Reviews
Review
“McMeekin is a superb writer. There isn’t a boring page in the book. His familiarity with the archives of several countries is extraordinary.”―The Times (UK)
“This remarkable book… meticulously researched, elegantly written… Stalin’s War is that rare thing: a book that forces us to think again, and to challenge our narrative of that most well-trodden subject.”―BBC History Magazine
“In considering the war from a global perspective and shifting the focus from a Eurocentric view, he [McMeekin] provides a refreshing corrective that takes in areas of the war often overlooked by westerners.” ―The Spectator (UK)
“A provocative revisionist take on the Second World War...an accomplished, fearless, and enthusiastic ‘myth buster’...McMeekin is a formidable researcher, working in several languages, and he is prepared to pose the big questions and make judgments….The story of the war itself is well told and impressive in its scope, ranging as it does from the domestic politics of small states such as Yugoslavia and Finland to the global context. It reminds us, too, of what Soviet ‘liberation’ actually meant for eastern Europe….McMeekin is right that we have for too long cast the second world war as the good one. His book will, as he must hope, make us re-evaluate the war and its consequences.”―Financial Times
“Brilliantly inquisitive.”―National Review
“Criticisms of the British for living in a Second World War past are frequent. Sean McMeekin, professor of history at Bard College and a talented scholar of the First World War, takes an alternative view by arguing that we are generally living in the wrong war. Drawing on an impressive array of international archives, McMeekin…directs attention to Soviet activity….The book is pertinent because of the extent to which modern cultural wars draw on historicised identities and historical controversies.”―The Critic (UK)
“Impressively researched and well-written.”―Washington Examiner
“Indispensable… There are new books every year that promise ‘a new history’ of such a well-studied subject as World War II, but McMeekin actually delivers on that promise.”―Christian Science Monitor
“McMeekin writes well and has the language skills to comb through a huge amount of archival material… There is much interesting detail about allied supplies to Russia, the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, the Soviet plunder of Germany in 1945, and the war with Japan.”
―Irish Times
“Based on a vast amount of research.”―Prospect (UK)
“Fast-paced and well-written … A gifted writer and a talented polemicist.”
―Inside Story
“Historian McMeekin (The Russian Revolution) draws from recently opened Soviet archives to shed light on Stalin’s dark reasoning and shady tactics....Packed with incisive character sketches and illuminating analyses of military and diplomatic maneuvers, this is a skillful and persuasive reframing of the causes, developments, and repercussions of WWII.”―Publishers Weekly
“Often thought of as 'Hitler's War,' the Second World War is here reexamined with Russian documents that only recently became available....The book pulls no punches in describing the many atrocities, including those against Poles and Germans, that Soviet troops committed....Thoroughly researched.”―Library Journal
“[A] well-written book…the product of massive research involving every detail of the war. Stalin is intimately painted in all his colours.”―Eurasia Review
“A sweeping reassessment of World War II seeking to ‘illuminate critical matters long obscured by the obsessively German-centric literature’ on the subject....Yet another winner for McMeekin, this also serves as a worthy companion to Niall Ferguson’s The Pity of War, which argued that Britain should not have entered World War I. Brilliantly contrarian history.”―Kirkus
“Sean McMeekin’s revisionist Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II isn’t just one of the most compelling histories written about the war this year, it’s one of the best ever. I doubt anyone who reads it will think about the Second World War in the same way.”―David Harsanyi, The Federalist's Notable Books of 2021
“The ambitious sweep of Hastings, Roberts and Beevor, but much else besides… McMeekin chooses to see Stalin as the central figure in the conflict, rather than Hitler.”―Ian Thomson, The Tablet
“McMeekin’s book is, on top of making for great reading, a timely reminder that victory in a war does not end geopolitical competition and international conflict.”―Jakub Grygiel, Law & Liberty
“Stalin’s War is a magnificent book and everyone interested in the causes and consequences of World War II—and what reasonable person could not be?—should read it.”―David Gordon, Mises Wire
“An independent-minded and immensely learned historian, McMeekin demonstrates the extent of Soviet brutality and treachery before and during WWII.”―Paul Gottfried, Chronicles
"McMeekin’s Stalin’s War is such a mind-blowing assault on the conventional narrative that I’m fairly certain it’s not even legal."―Austin Bramwell, former trustee of the National Review
“In the eyes of many Russians today, the Soviet Union’s victory in World War Two still legitimizes Josef Stalin’s bloody dictatorship. In this brilliant and provocative history, Sean McMeekin takes on Stalin’s legend, demonstrating, among other things, that the Western allies, and especially the United States, were far more critical to Stalin’s victory than Soviet propaganda then or later would ever acknowledge. This book will change the way readers understand Stalin’s War.”―Walter Russell Mead, Global View Columnist, Wall Street Journal
“Gripping, authoritative, accessible, and always bracingly revisionist.”―Simon Sebag Montefiore, author of Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar
“Stalin’s War is above all about strategy: the failure of Roosevelt and Churchill to make shrewd choices as World War II played out. McMeekin brilliantly argues that instead of weighting the European and Pacific theaters to favor their own interests—and to weaken the inevitably antagonistic Soviet Union—FDR and Churchill left the most critical parts of Asia unguarded while they ground down the German army, a decision that favored Stalin's interests far more than their own. Roosevelt’s ‘Germany first’ strategy and the trillion dollars of Lend Lease aid he poured into Stalin's treasury would underwrite Soviet control of China and East Central Europe after 1945 and hatch a Cold War whose dire effects are with us still.”―Geoffrey Wawro, author of Sons of Freedom and director of the University of North Texas Military History Center
“Sean McMeekin’s approach in Stalin’s War is both original and refreshing, written as it is with a wonderful clarity.”―Antony Beevor, author of Stalingrad
“Sean McMeekin’s new book fills a massive gap in the historiography of World War II. Based on exhaustive research in Russian and other archives, this examination of Stalin’s foreign policy explores fresh avenues and explodes many myths, perhaps the most significant being that of unwittingly exaggerated emphasis on ‘Hitler’s war.’ McMeekin shows conclusively that the two tyrants were equally responsible, both for the outbreak of war in 1939 and the appalling slaughter which ensued.”
―Nikolai Tolstoy
About the Author
Product details
- Publisher : Basic Books
- Publication date : April 20, 2021
- Edition : 2nd printing
- Language : English
- Print length : 864 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1541672798
- ISBN-13 : 978-1541672796
- Item Weight : 2.52 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.5 x 2.5 x 9.6 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #127,387 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #12 in Russian History (Books)
- #47 in German History (Books)
- #94 in World War II History (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

Sean McMeekin was born in Idaho, raised in Rochester NY, and educated at Stanford and UC Berkeley. He has been fascinated by modern history ever since playing Winston Churchill in a high school reenactment of the Yalta Conference. He pursued this interest to American and European and Middle Eastern battlefields, libraries, and archives, venturing as far east as Russia, before settling down to teach for some years in Turkey. Since 2014, he has taught at Bard College in the Hudson Valley. He is the author of eight award-winning books. McMeekin lives in Clermont, New York.
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Customers praise the book's enormous research and detailed content, making it a must-read for serious World War II students. The book provides an extraordinary historical account of World War Two, and customers find it well written and easy to read.
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"Historian Sean McMeekin’s Stalin’s War is a riveting, revisionist history of World War 2, drawing on previously-classified Soviet archives...." Read more
"...This book is engaging and well-written (boring lists of materials aside) and is an excellent overview of a neglected facet of the Second World War,..." Read more
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Customers find the book highly readable, describing it as a joy to read and a must-read for serious students of World War II.
"...Stalin’s War is a compelling read and offers invaluable and timeless lessons on bringing moral clarity and realism to statecraft and war." Read more
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"Historian Sean McMeekin’s Stalin’s War is a riveting, revisionist history of World War 2, drawing on previously-classified Soviet archives...." Read more
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- Reviewed in the United States on March 20, 2022Historian Sean McMeekin’s Stalin’s War is a riveting, revisionist history of World War 2, drawing on previously-classified Soviet archives. It’s Stalin- rather than Hitler-centric and takes some of the luster off the Big Three.
McMeekin makes a persuasive case the Soviet Union won WW2, takes the lionized Churchill down a peg, and reveals FDR’s conduct as cringeworthy.
Stalin was cut from a different cloth. He bifocally and ruthlessly pursued current and post-war objectives. Russia under the cloak of the USSR finished the war a superpower and was the only major belligerent that gained territory and vassal states. And, the Soviets amassed enormous industrial assets and technology from US Lend-Lease gifts and by looting occupied lands. While the Soviet Union suffered horrendous losses, Stalin, hailed as the Vozhd (leader), who’d murdered millions of his own countrymen and conquered subjects, didn’t lose a wink of sleep over it.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain observed the Soviets didn’t share Western values, were “afraid of Germany and Japan, and would be delighted to see other people fight them.” Stalin said it was in the USSR’s interests that “war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc,” noting “everything should be done so that (the war) drags out as long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides.”
Stalin’s philosophy of weakening countries viewed as foes, prey, or situational and temporary allies, informed his policies.
Under the 1939 Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact, Europe’s two great evil-doers Hitler and Stalin agreed to carve up Eastern Europe. The Vozhd thought it would entice the Führer to attack Poland and provoke war with Britain and France.
Lenin’s successor got his wish.
Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany on the principle that it had invaded Poland. But after letting the Wehrmacht devastate Poland’s armed forces, jackal-like, the Red Army rushed in to seize more than half the country. Stalin was no less guilty of ending Poland’s sovereignty than the Führer. The Vozhd promptly shipped thousands of Poles off to camps, many for execution. He harbored a visceral hatred for the Poles which McMeekin speculates stemmed from their besting the Red Army in the 1919-20 Russo-Polish War. By June, 1941 the Soviets had murdered 500,000 in occupied Poland. Neither Britain nor France, however, declared war on the USSR.
After Poland’s fall, Stalin garrisoned, and later occupied, the Baltic States. In June, 1940 the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Romanian Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. By August 300,000 Romanians had been shipped off to the Gulag.
Before the Führer attacked the USSR, the Vozhd’s armies had seized territory from or swallowed whole Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and Manchuria.
McMeekin notes Hitler refused Stalin’s demands for more territorial concessions from still independent countries between the jaws of the totalitarian rivals, while the US and UK acceded to his enslaving Eastern Europe.
After the Soviets invaded Finland in November, 1939, Britain considered bombing the Baku oil fields to deny Hitler’s and Stalin’s war machines oil. There’s an eerie parallel between 21st-century Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s attempt to conquer Ukraine, and the Vozhd’s invasion of Finland.
McMeekin comments wistfully that “the Finnish cause had the potential to transform the so-far desultory and hypocritical British-French resistance to Hitler alone into a principled war against armed aggression by both totalitarian regimes,” with the possibility of pulling Italy, Spain, and Japan in, with US support.
It was not to be.
Stalin overestimated the Anglo-French bloc’s armed forces and underestimated the Germans’ military prowess and elan. While the French army had more mobilized soldiers, tanks – many qualitatively superior, and artillery, Hitler’s generals steamrollered it in six weeks. Two days before France’s surrender Mussolini opportunistically declared war on France and Britain. That changed the calculus. Standing alone, Britain wasn’t in a position to take on the two great totalitarian powers and Fascist Italy.
Of Europe’s two great 20th-century monsters, Stalin was the more calculating, cautious, intellectual, and, ultimately, the more consequential. He and his malign protégées killed and subjugated far more people than Hitler.
The USSR’s enslavement of Eastern Europe lasted 46 years after the stake was driven into the heart of Hitlerism. With Putin’s panzers rolling over Ukraine, Eastern Europe is again at risk. In contrast, today Germany is a pacifistic – for its allies too pacifistic, democratic member of the West.
Stalin’s ambitions were global.
In the Far East when Imperial Japan gained ground against the Nationalist Chinese, he intervened to balance the contest, looking to put Mao in the pole position after the war. In 1939 in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Red Army bloodied the Japanese Kwantung Army, effectively ending its plans to invade Siberia.
In April, 1941 the Vozhd persuaded Tokyo to sign the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, and encouraged it to strike south against Britain and America. Influenced by Soviet agents like Harry Dexter White, the US pushed Japan toward war, a war which might not otherwise have been inevitable. He was far from the only Soviet agent and sympathizer influencing Anglo-American policies to Stalin’s benefit.
Before WW2 FDR sought improved relations with the Vozhd. In 1936 he replaced his Moscow ambassador and Stalin realist William Bullit with “a Soviet sympathizer” Joseph Davies. At Davies’ urging FDR purged the State Department’s Eastern European affairs division of hard-nosed Soviet experts.
The alliance of convenience between Nazi Germany and the Communist USSR was never going to last. The question was always who would strike first. In June, 1941 the Führer launched Operation Barbarossa. While the USSR had vastly more soldiers, and tanks, artillery, and aircraft, many qualitatively superior, the Wehrmacht blitzkrieg advanced rapidly on a broad front, inflicting massively-disproportionate casualties, captured millions of Red Army soldiers, and, but for winter and Western aid might have finished Stalin that year.
The Vozhd had assumed his eventual war would be with the weakened the victor of the struggle between Nazi Germany and the Anglo-French bloc.
McMeekin describes Churchill and FDR as intoxicated with Stalin. Roosevelt’s intoxication was more acute. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Churchill’s relief overcame his hostility to Bolshevism. FDR courted Stalin, adopting a see-no-evil, hear-no-evil mindset toward him, and denying him nothing. The Vozhd relentlessly pressed Roosevelt for and received ever-increasing aid, treated him roughly, and refused his meek requests.
After Pearl Harbor the US declared war on Japan. To Churchill’s and Stalin’s delight, the Führer promptly declared war on the sleeping giant America, notwithstanding that Japan refused to wage war on the USSR, with which he was engaged in a war of annihilation. It is inconceivable the Vozhd would have made such a rash monumental strategic blunder.
In Eastern Europe and China, the Vozhd supported his proxies, with the Red Army, arms, and by undermining Anglo-American support for competing anti-Communist anti-Axis forces.
Influenced by Soviet-sympathizing advisers and agents Churchill betrayed Serb royalist Draza Mihailovic and the Chetniks, who’d organized the initial resistance to the German occupation, for Stalin’s man Tito. Churchill and FDR pulled the rug out from under Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and the London Poles. Other than worrying about upsetting millions of Polish-American voters, Roosevelt was willing to feed Poland into the maw of Stalinism. Heroic Poles fought the Nazis and Soviets – the Soviets during and for several years after WW2. Poland lost a greater percent of its population than any other country, only to be crushed under the Bolshevik boot of oppression.
FDR hagiography paints him as the president who saved America from the Great Depression and the free world from Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy.
Burton Folsom Jr in New Deal or Raw Deal, Amity Shlaes in the Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression, and Jim Powell in FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression persuasively contend contrary to popular history, that he prolonged and deepened the Great Depression.
McMeekin draws back the curtain on FDR the war leader. His feckless and fawning treatment of Stalin and decisions cost millions of lives, resulted in hundreds of millions of people being enslaved by Stalin, and ushered in the Cold War.
Anglo-American aid to Stalin was never conditioned on behavior. The Soviets were a cobelligerent only because of a shared enemy, not shared values or post-war objectives. Stalin’s naked imperial aggressions, atrocities, and interning US airmen as POWs, were clarion warnings.
The time to condition aid to Stalin to ensure a better post-war world was early, in 1942 or 1943, at the latest in 1944, always bearing in mind he was completely untrustworthy.
With Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger’s quip about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq’s war with the Islamic Republic of Iran, it’s too bad they both can’t lose, is apropos. Then Senator Harry Truman expressed that sentiment on the Senate floor in 1941.
Hitler lost WW2. Perhaps there was no scenario where Stalin too would have lost WW2. However, he didn’t have to win. He didn’t have to be permitted to enslave Eastern Europe and install Communist regimes in China and North Korea.
While threatening to deny aid to Churchill if he didn’t bend the knee on policy, FDR refused to condition aid to Stalin.
He childishly, stubbornly, and against the advice of his military advisors and allies, demanded unconditional surrender. McMeekin speculates this may have been driven by an impulsive desire to prove his bona fides to the Vozhd.
From 1943 senior German military officers made multiple approaches to the West to negotiate surrendering. Allied victory was inevitable, but a negotiated surrender, which let Anglo-American armies advance to the Eastern Front, would have saved lives, as well as giving liberal Western-oriented governments a chance up to the Soviet border. FDR, however, rejected all peace entreaties. Allied and Axis soldiers and civilians died needlessly.
During this period Stalin approached Hitler about a separate peace, which the Führer rejected.
In contrast with the noble principles embodied by the Atlantic Charter, FDR stubbornly demanded the punitive Morgenthau Plan and executing captured Germany soldiers, which stiffened Germany resistance in the West, which was in nobody’s interest but Stalin’s.
FDR turned a blind eye to Stalin’s butchery, greenlighted his subjugation of Poland, and waxed about an independent “Sovietized” India.
Roosevelt also rejected proposals to put Anglo-American troops as far east as possible, to save as much of Eastern Europe and the Balkans as possible from Stalin’s tender mercies.
While FDR professed affection for the Nationalist Chinese, he prioritized sending tanks, trucks, jeeps, artillery, guns, aircraft, oil, whole factories, and even uranium, to Stalin. The Vozhd wanted the Chiang’s army, which tied down the bulk of Japan’s army, bled so it would be easy pickings for Mao’s Communists. Stalin always and everywhere aimed to maximize the Soviets’ post-war position and power. Roosevelt seemed to give it nary a thought. Churchill saw Britain as dependent on FDR and Stalin. His idée fixe was to sustain the Grand Alliance against Hitler.
Even after VE Day accommodating Stalin continued. Under morally-repugnant “Operation Keelhaul” Anglo-American troops handed over 2.3 million “Soviet subjects,” to Stalin, knowingly sending them to almost-certain deaths.
One can only wonder how differently WW2 might have played out with a different leader in the White House. If America had been led by a hard-nosed strategic president thinking to win the war(s) on terms most adv
Stalin’s War is a compelling read and offers invaluable and timeless lessons on bringing moral clarity and realism to statecraft and war.
- Reviewed in the United States on March 7, 2025Want to read something that will make your blood boil? Sean McMeekin’s account of how the Roosevelt administration sold out our world to the forces of global communism embodied by Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union will do just that. McMeekin brings the receipts as he describes the utter prostration of administration officials before their Soviet handlers, as America (and to a lesser extent, Britain) mortgaged their future in the face of constant Soviet lies and double-dealing.
Most people are unaware of the extent to which Roosevelt’s administrations were riddled with Soviet agents and sympathizers. Of course, we all know that Soviet influence over American public life was significant throughout the 1930’s and well into the 1950’s, but I didn’t know the power that Soviet agents had over American military policy in the run-up to and throughout the Second World War.
When you consider that American lend-lease aid to Britain essentially mortgaged Britain’s entire overseas military empire to the United States, and that the aid supplied (especially at first) was second- and third-rate military hardware that was almost not worth giving away; while at the same time, millions of tons of valuable military equipment, foodstuffs, and raw materials were literally given to the Soviet Union for nothing, America’s allies could be forgiven for wondering “with friends like these….”
McMeekin gives a very important overview of the pre-war situation in Europe, and documents clearly the close ties between the Soviets and Hitler during the run-up to Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The extent to which Stalin, following Hitler’s lead, gobbled up territory all over the periphery of the Soviet empire is breathtaking to behold, especially in light of the utter lack of complaint or even notice of these unprovoked invasions in London or Washington. Even before Barbarossa, elite opinion among the political class in America and Britain was utterly corrupted by the influence of dozens of paid Soviet agents and unpaid “fellow travelers” of communism whose main goal was the transfer of technology, wealth, and material supplies from the democratic nations of the west to the communist Soviets.
The picture McMeekin draws is of Roosevelt and his Soviet-influenced handlers utterly smitten with Stalin and his government, cravenly and abjectly groveling for recognition, praise, and approval from the communist dictator and his flunkies. Figures like Harry Dexter White (senior treasury department official given complete control over American largesse handed to the Soviets, and a known communist spy in the pay of the Soviet NKDV), Harry Hopkins (special assistant to Roosevelt and another paid Soviet spy) and others were given massive influence over American foreign policy and clearly favored Soviet needs, aims, and war effort over even the arming, training, and supply of American military forces.
Stalin himself enjoyed immense influence over both Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s strategic decisions in prosecuting the war. Soviet claims of “standing alone” after Barbarossa (despite millions of tons of American aid) were apparently a political coup that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill could figure out how to defuse; therefore, they simply piled largesse upon largesse in arming the Soviets to an unimaginable extent.
This abject submission to Soviet needs went far beyond simply supplying mountains of material for free: Soviet malfeasance and malign influence all over the periphery of the Soviet empire were not only ignored but positively abetted by Western policy, plunging millions of people into communist misery for decades after the war. The shameful treatment of Serbian, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Polish, and Baltic patriots, fighting basically alone against first nazism and then communism, is a black stain on American honor, particularly when paired with our abject appeasement of Stalin and his murderous regime. American and British leadership knowingly looked the other way as Soviet atrocity piled on top of atrocity and the body count of murders and executions of civilians and captured soldiers reached the millions. It is a disgusting display of moral cowardice and should permanently blacken Roosevelt’s (and to a much lesser extent, as his position to influence events was significantly weaker, Churchill’s) reputation in history.
If there’s one weakness in McMeekin’s account, it involves the repeated lists of quantities of this or that armament, this or that metal or ore, this or that foodstuff, etc. These mind-numbing lists are frequently employed without context (for example, what does it mean that in a given month of a given year America sent 100,000 tons of sorghum to the Soviets? Is that a lot? what portion of American production does it represent? There’s no context to understand the gravity, enormity, or lack thereof of lists like this). Occasionally the items are portrayed as percent of American manufacturing (e.g. in one month America sent X% of domestic manufacture of Product A to the Soviet Union). This characterization is much more helpful in understanding the context of the aid; unfortunately, those examples are very few and far between and instead we get raw lists of tonnages and quantities that are almost impossible to contextualize for the lay reader.
Small gripes aside, McMeekin’s account should put paid to the notion, popularized in academic circles in the 1990’s, that the Soviet Union “stood alone” against German aggression, saving the entire world from global nazism, while the western powers dithered and did basically nothing. This is an utterly untrue mischaracterization of the facts, as McMeekin’s well-researched account of the mind-bogglingly huge material aid supplied to Stalin conclusively demonstrates.
There is a very real sense in which America supplied and armed the Soviet Union and literally birthed their empire that we then spent 40 years locked in a titanic Cold War struggle with. It certainly does put a new light on the influence of the “military industrial complex” over every aspect of American life for over half a century. This book is engaging and well-written (boring lists of materials aside) and is an excellent overview of a neglected facet of the Second World War, without which it is impossible to understand the second half of the 20th century accurately. Well done.
Top reviews from other countries
- John FerngroveReviewed in the United Kingdom on January 8, 2025
5.0 out of 5 stars Another nail in the coffin of the Good War myth
Having been reading history over many decades now, it is lifelong lesson to see how the historiography of a titanic war from seventy years ago can continue to evolve so much, so apparently long after the event. Ten years ago the WW1 centenary came and went. In Britain there was some mild controversy over causes and consequences; Should Britain have entered the war at all? Were the lions really led by donkeys? Haig - hero or butcher? But looking back, our understanding of that conflict was little changed. Ultimately it was a war of entitled aristocrats still able to exploit the ignorance of their toiling masses, much the same as wars had been going back to the beginnings of mass conscripted armies.
As a British citizen I grew up being told that 'we won the war'. Once Britain became too broke to make its own black and white Sunday afternoon war movies the American versions of the same made us realise that actually, the Americans won the war, with plucky little Britain, always punching above its weight, assisting, but in an ever diminishing role. Then in the nineties increasingly detailed histories of the Eastern Front emerged that forced us Westerners to acknowledge that most of WW2 was fought between fascism and communism on its Eastern Front, involving forces, distances and casualties almost impossible to comprehend. Soviet Russia, it seemed had, after a terribly bad start, actually won the war.
McMeekin's book is another, excellent, and in its own way epic, account that asks questions that might move the historiography of WWII forward once again. While the skeleton of the military conflict is described in brief and familiar terms the book wraps around that skeleton a highly detailed account of the diplomatic manoeuvrings, first between the Eastern European capitals and then between the Big Three allies. Consequential to that is the description of the war in terms of resources and logistics. In particular, it focusses on the quantities and the procurement policies of US lend-lease, which it argues had a far greater contribution to the Soviet recovery from the initial debacle and ultimate transformation into victory than was ever acknowledged by the Soviets.
Against this background McMeekin frames the bleak moral assessment that any claim the Western Allies could make to having 'won' the war can only be made by turning a blind eye to Stalin's 1939 depredations that were entirely symmetric with Hitler's. Britain took its 'principled' stand on Hitler's attack on Poland, but remained mute on Stalin's occupation of Eastern Poland or his annexations in Finland, the Baltics and Eastern Romania. In my case McMeekin was, to some extent, preaching to the converted, having concluded sometime back that Stalin personally won WWII and that everybody else lost, and continues to do so to this day.
So the book argues for a reconceptualisation of the War; on its causes and consequences. It also a makes grim assessment of the role of Western leaders. Britain's lend-lease aid was paid for with all its gold reserves and then a debt that wasn't finally paid off until 2006 (this was insisted upon as Britain had defaulted on its WW1 debts during the depression). Russia's lend-lease was provided with only the vaguest expectation of any repayment. No one expected Stalin to pay for anything, but the US, by which we literally mean by act of Congress, Roosevelt, was so determined to get Russia to do the main share of the fighting and dying, that Russian lend-lease procurement was evidently given a higher priority than that of its own armed forces. McMeekin gives support to the notion that Roosevelt quite deliberately used lend-lease as a long term weapon with which to dismantle the British Empire, but that Churchill was too desperate to emerge from denial of the long term cost of his alliance. In his turn, Roosevelt was so emotionally invested in his dream of a United Nations that he was unable to acknowledge the depths of Stalin's ruthlessness and cynicism. When Stalin suggested at Yalta a quota of 50,000 German officers to be executed after surrender Churchill became incensed, but Roosevelt assured him that Stalin must be joking. This was the extent of Roosevelt's misreading of the 'other' worst tyrant of the 20th Century. (But we must not forget Mao).
There is much more. The role of Soviet mole Harry Dexter White and others in moving US defence policy in pro-Soviet directions; the crude fixer roles of Roosevelt's special lend-lease envoy, Harry Hopkins and sidekick Edward Stettinius; Stalin's refusal to hand over crash-landed American air crews despite the huge flow of lend-lease goods; the open-endedness of Russian lend-lease requests, up to and including women's lingerie and bomb grade Uranium (it was felt that refusing this request would tip the Soviets off to its bomb-making potential), and so on.
So a magnificent and indeed truly eye-opening book. The question for a lay reader like myself is how accurate is this portrayal of events. This is a remarkable story arguing for a reinterpretation of a body of largely known historical facts. It is however, an argument made with a very large body of documents and statistics, but many stories can be told from the same set of documents and statistics. Whether this story is 'true' or in what ways it might turn out to be true can only be determined, I suspect, after a great deal of scholarly research and debate. Only time will tell if McMeekin's interpretation will be absorbed into the historiographical consensus. In the meantime, this book gives the lay history reader a great deal on which to ponder.
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recluseReviewed in Japan on July 1, 2022
5.0 out of 5 stars 一読を勧めます
久しぶりに読んだ第二次大戦史。この作品を読む経緯はすでにblogに挙げた。前評判にたがわぬ面白さ、あっという間に完了。
全体で800ページ。本文は670ページの大著。
本書の類書との違いは以下の点だろうか。これらの点は従来の正統史観では無視されていた論点だ。
まず、独ソ不可侵条約締結後のスターリンのやりたい放題の侵略行為が詳しく分析されている。資本主義国の間での戦争を利用して、ポーランド分割、バルト併合、フィンランド侵攻、ルーマニアからの領土割譲など、スターリンはヒトラーと並ぶ侵略の「共犯者」なのだ。決してヒトラーの侵略の一方的な被害者ではない。特に1941年の6月以前には。「侵略のパートナー」から「被害者」へのイメージ変更が巧みに行われているのだ。ソ連側の対戦準備は着実に進められており、遅かれ早かれ、どちらが先に手を出すかは別にして、独ソの間に戦争は起きていた。
次に、巨大な米国の対ソLend lease programe (一種の武器貸与計画:LLP)の役割と実態が詳細に解き明かされている。従来は、もっぱら対英支援の観点からのみ語られていたこのLLPだが、本書では、ソ連の戦争遂行を支えたという観点から、詳しく語られれている。
武器(飛行機、戦車、弾薬)だけでなく、戦略物資(鉄、アルミや金属資源)、科学技術さらには衣類、食糧(バターや肉の缶詰)にまで範囲がか含めた巨大なLLPの規模は驚くほどだ。これほどの援助が、米国の参戦以前に秘密裏の内にソ連に供給され始めたのだ。特に初期の時点では英国への供与部分がソ連に回されて(regift)いるほどだ。また対英LLPには厳しい供与や返済条件が付けられたにもかかわらず、対ソLLPはほとんどスターリンの言いなり。決定的な時点(モスクワ、スターリングラード、クルスク)でのこのLLPのmarginalな、しかし決定的だった貢献が本書では指摘されている。さらには本来は独ソ戦でのソ連の巻き返しに伴い縮小されるべきだったこの対ソLLPだが、ソ連の対日参戦を支える形で1945年まで継続しているのだ。結局のところ、アメリカの経済力(Capitalist rope)を通じてソ連というモンスターの誕生とその東欧占領を助けたという結果になっているのだ。あれ、これは米国の対中関与政策の帰結と同じじゃないか。
この奇妙なほどまでのソ連への入れ込み。類書では、ハリー・デクスター・ホワイト(HDW)などに代表される米政権内部のソ連のスパイの暗躍が強調される。本書でも、その浸透度合いについてはもちろん言及されるが、むしろ強調されるのは、最高指導者ルーズヴェルト大統領(FDR)とチャーチルの対ソ宥和への変貌ぶりだ。
特に突出しているのが、FDRの奇妙なまでの対ソ宥和政策。ここに絡んでくるのが、FDRの個人的なアドヴァイザーとしてスターリンに接近したハリー・ホプキンス。この両人の奇妙なまでの対ソ宥和政策ぶりがこれでもかというほど全編を通して語られる。「カチンの森」などのソ連の虐殺事件の露呈などにもかかわらず、ほとんど見返りなしの援助をずるずると続けていく。FDRの死まで変わらないまま継続される。このFDRという人物の頭の中とその謎はいまだよくわからない。ところで、英国へのLLPの返済は2000年代まで続くのに対し、ソ連へのLLPはそのほとんどが返済されないまま1951年に処理されているようなのだ。
戦後ドイツ経済の壊滅を狙いとしたグロテスクなMorgenthau planと「無条件降伏」ドクトリンの導入へのFDRの決定的な関わりも問題だ。特に後者はドイツや日本の抗戦意欲の枯渇を遅らせることにより、結果としては、ソ連の東欧占領、さらには東アジアでの共産主義の浸透を助けることになったというわけだ。
スターリンの戦争は1945年の時点では終了しない。その後も、戦火の終了にもかかわらず、大量の敵国捕虜(独伊日)の強制的な労働への動員、ソ連の帰還捕虜の収容所送り、国内での諸民族の強制移住など、ソ連の経済は一種の「奴隷労働」を前提としたまま継続しいていく。奴隷労働に依拠する異形の経済なのだ。
さて、本書の弱点はというと、日本への言及がかなり限定的な点。日ソ中立条約、南進への決定やゾルゲ、尾崎秀実などの暗躍、HDWなどによるハルノートへの関わりさらにはソ連の対日参戦への言及はあるが、全体でのウェイトはかなり小さい。そう米国はあくまでもヨーロッパ戦線を第一とした戦略を取っており、対日戦はあくまでもその次の優先順位しか与えられていなかった。欧州以上に交渉では解決できない大きな論点はここにはなかったのだが、その内実が詳しく扱われることはない。
さて、最後に読後感として残ったのは、いったい「15年戦争」などと言う「共同謀議」に基づく長期戦を遂行したのはどこの国だったのかという素朴な疑問。資本主義諸国間の矛盾を利用して戦わせ、漁夫の利を狙う、そして領土を拡大し、資本主義国の援助(capitalist rope)と敗戦国からの資産の現物徴収(booty)と人的資源の徴用で、経済を成り立たせる、これこそが一貫したスターリンの戦略だったのだ。
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Stefano NovelloReviewed in Germany on August 5, 2024
5.0 out of 5 stars Must-Read!
Zusammenfassung: Hier wird der zweite Weltkrieg auf allen Ebenen sehr gut dargestellt:
Von der Vorkriegszeit über die ersten 2 Jahre des Krieges und den Anfang von Barbarossa geht es dann über Lend-Lease zur internationalen Politik der Alliierten. Es gibt sehr viele Details und noch andere Themen aber das ist der grobe Überblick.
Positiv:
- guter Schreibstil
- viele Details (manchmal zu viele)
- häufige Einblicke in Stalins, Roosevelts und Churchills Sicht
- mögliche Erklärungen für Ereignisse
- neutraler Blick, keine Vorliebe für ein Land/ eine Person
- wichtige Personen werden genau betrachtet
- sehr ausführlich (alle Länder und Kriegsschauplätze)
Negativ:
- einige seltene Ungenauigkeiten
Fazit: Man ist um einiges schlauer nachdem man das Buch gelesen hat. Der Einblick in die internationale Politik ist vor allem sehr interessant und informativ
- Ed StantonReviewed in Australia on March 19, 2022
1.0 out of 5 stars Disappointing
It’s long but short on new material or interpretations. There are better works that show a superior handling of the historiography especially German-sourced such as Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East by Stahel. This is brilliant in exposing the German weaknesses manifest in the first weeks after the start of the invasion. Nothing like that in Stalin’s War, I was sad to discover.
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No bike, no funReviewed in Spain on March 6, 2025
5.0 out of 5 stars Imprescindible para entender el muno de hoy.
Un gran libro sobre uno de los mayores asesinos de masas de todos los tiempos.