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The University Center for Human Values Series
Why Trust Science?
Why the social character of scientific knowledge makes it trustworthy
Do doctors really know what they are talking about when they tell us vaccines are safe? Should we take climate experts at their word when they warn us about the perils of global warming? Why should we trust science when our own politicians don't? In this landmark book, Naomi Oreskes offers a bold and compelling defense of science, revealing why the social character of scientific knowledge is its greatest strength--and the greatest reason we can trust it.
Tracing the history and philosophy of science from the late nineteenth century to today, Oreskes explains that, contrary to popular belief, there is no single scientific method. Rather, the trustworthiness of scientific claims derives from the social process by which they are rigorously vetted. This process is not perfect--nothing ever is when humans are involved--but she draws vital lessons from cases where scientists got it wrong. Oreskes shows how consensus is a crucial indicator of when a scientific matter has been settled, and when the knowledge produced is likely to be trustworthy.
Based on the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University, this timely and provocative book features critical responses by climate experts Ottmar Edenhofer and Martin Kowarsch, political scientist Jon Krosnick, philosopher of science Marc Lange, and science historian Susan Lindee, as well as a foreword by political theorist Stephen Macedo.
Do doctors really know what they are talking about when they tell us vaccines are safe? Should we take climate experts at their word when they warn us about the perils of global warming? Why should we trust science when our own politicians don't? In this landmark book, Naomi Oreskes offers a bold and compelling defense of science, revealing why the social character of scientific knowledge is its greatest strength--and the greatest reason we can trust it.
Tracing the history and philosophy of science from the late nineteenth century to today, Oreskes explains that, contrary to popular belief, there is no single scientific method. Rather, the trustworthiness of scientific claims derives from the social process by which they are rigorously vetted. This process is not perfect--nothing ever is when humans are involved--but she draws vital lessons from cases where scientists got it wrong. Oreskes shows how consensus is a crucial indicator of when a scientific matter has been settled, and when the knowledge produced is likely to be trustworthy.
Based on the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University, this timely and provocative book features critical responses by climate experts Ottmar Edenhofer and Martin Kowarsch, political scientist Jon Krosnick, philosopher of science Marc Lange, and science historian Susan Lindee, as well as a foreword by political theorist Stephen Macedo.
376 pages, Hardcover
First published October 21, 2019
183 people are currently reading
2591 people want to read
About the author
Naomi Oreskes
20 books360 followersNaomi Oreskes is an American historian of science. She became Professor of the History of Science and Affiliated Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Harvard University in 2013, after 15 years as Professor of History and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 102 reviews
November 1, 2019
I'm giving this book three stars for the topic and content - if I went on readability alone, I'd only give it two. I wanted to mention this upfront. It might seem a little unfair of me to expect an academic book to be readable but a) there's no reason why they shouldn't be and b) there's no point writing a book like this unless it is approachable by those outside academia, otherwise you're just preaching to the converted. Also the blurb does not suggest it is being aimed at an academic audience.
The book has a strange format. We get two chapters from Naomi Oreskes (based on lectures), then several chapters by other people commenting on what Oreskes wrote, then Oreskes returns to respond to the comments. In those opening chapters, there was a lot to like. It was good to gain a more detailed view of philosophy and sociology of science, as mine had been what is probably the typical view of a scientist who has read a little on the topic but not enough. I tended to think: Popper - good but too simple, Kuhn - interesting but a lot weirder than most scientists think, and the weirdos - anything goes. Here there was far more gradation and some thought-provoking material on subjectivity in science.
I was disappointed there wasn't more on reproducibility, p-hacking, small sample sizes, poor studies and the way that the media picks up on poor studies as if they were facts, giving the public the idea that science flip-flops, but this was discussed at length, if rather oddly in one of the commentaries. There were also a couple of oddities in the main text. It gave the wrong date for a book by Galton, and there was a very worrying statement in support of 'traditional medicine' that seemed to confuses medicine - which is more like engineering - with medical science. Traditional medicine may have some successes (just as medieval architects with no scientific knowledge) but has no scientific validity. Note that this is quite distinct from the problematic distinction between science and technology that Oreskes later describes. Technology here is based on science, but traditional medicine is not.
The book got harder to read once we reached the commentaries. It was partly my fault, as to start with I totally missed that from chapter 3 onwards each chapter was written by someone else. The result was that, for a while, it seemed the author was unnervingly agreeing with herself in the third person: ‘Oreskes shows how much science now needs defenders, and defenses… This kind of argument is utterly persuasive to me.’ It was also the case that some of the authors had less writing ability than Oreskes. I rest my case here with the phrase 'everyday technologies make visible the imbrication of science in quotidian life.' Right.
Much of the response to the commentaries was also distinctly dull, often comprising of two academics patting each other on the back, though it did get mildly entertaining when Oreskes tore the arguments of one of her fellow professors apart.
This is a very important topic, and there are good points hidden amongst the unnecessary academic language - it's just a shame it's not a better-written book.
The book has a strange format. We get two chapters from Naomi Oreskes (based on lectures), then several chapters by other people commenting on what Oreskes wrote, then Oreskes returns to respond to the comments. In those opening chapters, there was a lot to like. It was good to gain a more detailed view of philosophy and sociology of science, as mine had been what is probably the typical view of a scientist who has read a little on the topic but not enough. I tended to think: Popper - good but too simple, Kuhn - interesting but a lot weirder than most scientists think, and the weirdos - anything goes. Here there was far more gradation and some thought-provoking material on subjectivity in science.
I was disappointed there wasn't more on reproducibility, p-hacking, small sample sizes, poor studies and the way that the media picks up on poor studies as if they were facts, giving the public the idea that science flip-flops, but this was discussed at length, if rather oddly in one of the commentaries. There were also a couple of oddities in the main text. It gave the wrong date for a book by Galton, and there was a very worrying statement in support of 'traditional medicine' that seemed to confuses medicine - which is more like engineering - with medical science. Traditional medicine may have some successes (just as medieval architects with no scientific knowledge) but has no scientific validity. Note that this is quite distinct from the problematic distinction between science and technology that Oreskes later describes. Technology here is based on science, but traditional medicine is not.
The book got harder to read once we reached the commentaries. It was partly my fault, as to start with I totally missed that from chapter 3 onwards each chapter was written by someone else. The result was that, for a while, it seemed the author was unnervingly agreeing with herself in the third person: ‘Oreskes shows how much science now needs defenders, and defenses… This kind of argument is utterly persuasive to me.’ It was also the case that some of the authors had less writing ability than Oreskes. I rest my case here with the phrase 'everyday technologies make visible the imbrication of science in quotidian life.' Right.
Much of the response to the commentaries was also distinctly dull, often comprising of two academics patting each other on the back, though it did get mildly entertaining when Oreskes tore the arguments of one of her fellow professors apart.
This is a very important topic, and there are good points hidden amongst the unnecessary academic language - it's just a shame it's not a better-written book.
November 17, 2020
There have been increasing doubts about the practices and results of science, the worst of which have taken the form of climate change denial, the anti-vaccination movement and popular belief in the flat earth theory. In Why Trust Science, Naomi Oreskes examines the history of science and current scientific methods and makes a persuasive case for trust in science. She explains that scientific results are trustworthy not because of the methodologies or the qualities of scientists, but because science, by its very nature, is a collective enterprise and its findings are always verified through vetting and peer reviews.
Oreskes supports the "sociological view of science" and argues that scientific communities rely on collective institutions and peer consensus to accept or reject research results, and this makes science as a whole reliable even if a few individual scientists sometimes stray outside their domains of expertise and make mistakes. Oreskes also advocates the feminist theory of science whose central argument is that a diverse scientific community is more likely to identify biases and faulty practices than a more homogeneous one.
What's unique about this book is that it has an entire section dedicated to commentaries by other experts of the field on the presented arguments, and in a good demonstration of the value of peer review and consensus in science, in the last section, Professor Oreskes addresses the concerns and issues raised by her colleagues. This book is a must-read for everyone, but especially for students and practitioners of science.
Oreskes supports the "sociological view of science" and argues that scientific communities rely on collective institutions and peer consensus to accept or reject research results, and this makes science as a whole reliable even if a few individual scientists sometimes stray outside their domains of expertise and make mistakes. Oreskes also advocates the feminist theory of science whose central argument is that a diverse scientific community is more likely to identify biases and faulty practices than a more homogeneous one.
What's unique about this book is that it has an entire section dedicated to commentaries by other experts of the field on the presented arguments, and in a good demonstration of the value of peer review and consensus in science, in the last section, Professor Oreskes addresses the concerns and issues raised by her colleagues. This book is a must-read for everyone, but especially for students and practitioners of science.
June 8, 2024
اورسکیز در این کتاب دفاعی قاطع از علم می کند و روشن می سازد که چرا ماهیت اجتماعی معرفت علمی بزرگترین نقطه قوت آن و مهمترین دلیلی است که می توانیم به علم اعتماد کنیم. او با دنبال کردن تاریخ و فلسفه علم توضیح می دهد که هیچ روش علمی واحدی وجود ندارد و قابل اعتماد بودن ادعاهای علمی ناشی از فرآیندهای اجتماعی است که از طریق آنها این ادعاها با دقت فراوان بررسی و ارزیابی می شوند. البته نویسنده از به خطا رفتن دانشمندان هم می گوید و نظرات برخی منتقدان را بیان کرده و به آنها پاسخ می دهد.
کتاب مطالب خوبی دارد ولی اصلا ترجمه خوبی ندارد و ویراستاری نشده (کتاب ویراستار ندارد). از نظر حجم مطالب هم می توانست بسیار خلاصه تر باشد بدون اینکه چیزی از موضوعات مهم حذف شود.
کتاب مطالب خوبی دارد ولی اصلا ترجمه خوبی ندارد و ویراستاری نشده (کتاب ویراستار ندارد). از نظر حجم مطالب هم می توانست بسیار خلاصه تر باشد بدون اینکه چیزی از موضوعات مهم حذف شود.
May 29, 2022
در ادامه مطالعه تاریخ و فلسفهی علم به این کتاب رسیدم که به تازگی چاپ شده است و مسائل روز مواجهه مردم با علم و دانشمندان را مطالعه کرده است. از گرم شدن کرهی زمین و سیاستهای جهانی جلوگیری از آن گرفته، تا علت نیاز به تزریق واکسن کووید در کتاب شرح داده شده
کتاب ابتدا با شرحی دربارهی روشهای تفکر علمی و روش تحقیق شروع میشود و در ادامه موضوعات جنجالی حوزهی علم را از نقطه نظر تفکر علمی بررسی میکند. به عنوان مثال چرا باید نگران گرم شدن زمین باشیم و به چه علت مردم باید به دانشمندان با همهی کاستیهایی که دارند اعتماد کنند. و چرا بسیاری از سیاستمداران و افراد قدرتمند مخالف بررسی پدیدهی گرم شدن زمین هستند
در این دوره و زمانه که علم از شبه علم و حتی خرافات قابل تشخیص نیست و به همین دلیل بسیاری از مردم نسبت به علم بی اعتماد شدند خواندن کتابهایی از این دست ضروری است. خانم ارسکس به خوبی دلایلی که چرا باید به علم اعتماد کنیم را شرح داده و در انتهای کتاب نیز به سوالات همکاران خود در حوزه فلسفه علم پاسخ داده است تا خوانندگان به درک بهتری از موضوع اعتماد به علم برسند.
پانوشت: فرهنگ نشر نو به تازگی کتاب را ترجمه کرده است ولی ترجمه کاستیهای زیادی دارد و توصیه میکنم حتما کتاب به زبان اصلی خوانده شود زیرا متن بسیار سادهای دارد.
کتاب ابتدا با شرحی دربارهی روشهای تفکر علمی و روش تحقیق شروع میشود و در ادامه موضوعات جنجالی حوزهی علم را از نقطه نظر تفکر علمی بررسی میکند. به عنوان مثال چرا باید نگران گرم شدن زمین باشیم و به چه علت مردم باید به دانشمندان با همهی کاستیهایی که دارند اعتماد کنند. و چرا بسیاری از سیاستمداران و افراد قدرتمند مخالف بررسی پدیدهی گرم شدن زمین هستند
در این دوره و زمانه که علم از شبه علم و حتی خرافات قابل تشخیص نیست و به همین دلیل بسیاری از مردم نسبت به علم بی اعتماد شدند خواندن کتابهایی از این دست ضروری است. خانم ارسکس به خوبی دلایلی که چرا باید به علم اعتماد کنیم را شرح داده و در انتهای کتاب نیز به سوالات همکاران خود در حوزه فلسفه علم پاسخ داده است تا خوانندگان به درک بهتری از موضوع اعتماد به علم برسند.
پانوشت: فرهنگ نشر نو به تازگی کتاب را ترجمه کرده است ولی ترجمه کاستیهای زیادی دارد و توصیه میکنم حتما کتاب به زبان اصلی خوانده شود زیرا متن بسیار سادهای دارد.
January 30, 2021
Why Trust Science is not an encouragement to blindly trust the claims of scientists but rather an affirmation of the reliability of scientific claims if they emerge from a healthy scientific ecosystem. This work is an academic account of why neck beard shit posters, your social media brainwashed uncle and financially motivated lobbyists do not have equal claims to the truth as the consensus of honest experts properly trained to uncover facts about the natural world.
Oreskes comes at this problem from two directions. The first being an abstract philosophical account of what science ought to be and the second is grounded in the practical application of science in the real world.
Oreskes lays out a brief and interesting history of the philosophy of science pointing out the flaws of various arguments until her arrival at her own nuanced philosophical conclusion. She then uses specific stories from the scientific literature to support her arguments. I found Oreskes’ portions of this book well written and compelling to listen to.
The book also includes essays in rebuttal of her claims and ultimately her response to those rebuttals. This portion of the book is a performative example of healthy discourse and in that sense is laudable. On the other hand it makes the book feel disjointed and caused me to lose steam. Should you listen to it? Maybe!
Oreskes comes at this problem from two directions. The first being an abstract philosophical account of what science ought to be and the second is grounded in the practical application of science in the real world.
Oreskes lays out a brief and interesting history of the philosophy of science pointing out the flaws of various arguments until her arrival at her own nuanced philosophical conclusion. She then uses specific stories from the scientific literature to support her arguments. I found Oreskes’ portions of this book well written and compelling to listen to.
The book also includes essays in rebuttal of her claims and ultimately her response to those rebuttals. This portion of the book is a performative example of healthy discourse and in that sense is laudable. On the other hand it makes the book feel disjointed and caused me to lose steam. Should you listen to it? Maybe!
December 16, 2019
An interesting, timely book covering various debates in philosophy of science, the public understanding of science, feminist and social epistemology, and some extended discussion of specific examples e.g. debates about climate science and nutrition. The book is derived from lectures presented at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values in 2016 at Princeton University, along with various replies. This a vast topic and the lectures manage to have considerable depth despite the book being relatively short, and as such this seems like a great introduction for those wishing to learn more about the philosophy of science in a contemporary context. I look forward to reading more work by the same author.
“Feminist epistemology soundly refutes the claim that the social character of science makes it subjective. On the contrary, we can now see that scientists who were offended by the social turn in science studies – as well as science studies scholars who thought they could debunk science by exposing its social character – got it wrong. The feminist account of the social character of science can make a stronger case for the objectivity of scientific knowledge than previous accounts by identifying both sources of bias and remedies to it.”
“The processes of critical interrogation rely on an assumption of good faith: that participants are interested in learning and have a shared interest in truth. It assumes that the participants do not have an intellectually compromising conflict of interest. When these assumptions are violated – when people use skepticism to undermine and discredit science rather than to revise and strengthen it, and to confuse audiences rather than to inform them – the entire process is disabled.”
“If the history of science teaches anything, it is humility. Smart, hard-working, and well-intentioned scientists in the past have drawn conclusions that we now view as incorrect. They have allowed crude social prejudice to inform their scientific thinking. They have ignored or neglected evidence that was readily available. They have become fetishists about method. And they have successfully persuaded their colleagues to take positions that in hindsight we see as incorrect, immoral, or both.”
“In evaluating a scientific claim that has social, political, or personal consequences there is one more question that needs to be considered: What are the stakes of being wrong in either direction? What is the risk of accepting a claim that turns out to be false versus the risk of rejecting a claim that turns out to be true?”
“Our perspectives depend to a great extent on our life experience, so a community of all men – or all women for that matter – is likely to have a narrower range of experience and therefore a narrower range of perspectives than a mixed one. Evidence from the commercial world supports this point. Studies of gender diversity in the workplace show that adding women in leadership positions increases company profitability – but only up to a point. That point is about 60%. If a company's leadership becomes all or nearly female, then the “diversity bonus” begins to decline, as indeed, if the argument here is correct, it should.”
“Some people worry that overconfidence in the findings of science or the views of scientists can lead to bad public policy. I agree: overemphasizing technical considerations at the expense of social, moral, or economic ones can lead to bad decisions. But this does not bear on the question of whether the science involved is right or wrong. If a scientific matter is settled and the scientific community that has settled on it is open and diverse, then it behooves us to accept that science and then decide what (if anything) to do about its implications.
This, at least, is what nearly every scientist I know would say. It is something that in the past I have said. It actualizes the classic fact/value distinction: the idea that we can identify facts and then (separately) decide what if anything to do about them based on our values. But as an empirical matter this strategy is no longer working (if it ever did), because most people do not separate science from its implications. Many people reject climate science, for example, not because there is anything wrong with that science, qua science, but because it conflicts – or is seen as conflicting – with their values, their religious views, their political ideology, and/or their economic interests. There are many reasons people may reject or be critical of scientific findings, but often it involves the perception that these findings contradict their values or threaten their way of life.”
“Feminist epistemology soundly refutes the claim that the social character of science makes it subjective. On the contrary, we can now see that scientists who were offended by the social turn in science studies – as well as science studies scholars who thought they could debunk science by exposing its social character – got it wrong. The feminist account of the social character of science can make a stronger case for the objectivity of scientific knowledge than previous accounts by identifying both sources of bias and remedies to it.”
“The processes of critical interrogation rely on an assumption of good faith: that participants are interested in learning and have a shared interest in truth. It assumes that the participants do not have an intellectually compromising conflict of interest. When these assumptions are violated – when people use skepticism to undermine and discredit science rather than to revise and strengthen it, and to confuse audiences rather than to inform them – the entire process is disabled.”
“If the history of science teaches anything, it is humility. Smart, hard-working, and well-intentioned scientists in the past have drawn conclusions that we now view as incorrect. They have allowed crude social prejudice to inform their scientific thinking. They have ignored or neglected evidence that was readily available. They have become fetishists about method. And they have successfully persuaded their colleagues to take positions that in hindsight we see as incorrect, immoral, or both.”
“In evaluating a scientific claim that has social, political, or personal consequences there is one more question that needs to be considered: What are the stakes of being wrong in either direction? What is the risk of accepting a claim that turns out to be false versus the risk of rejecting a claim that turns out to be true?”
“Our perspectives depend to a great extent on our life experience, so a community of all men – or all women for that matter – is likely to have a narrower range of experience and therefore a narrower range of perspectives than a mixed one. Evidence from the commercial world supports this point. Studies of gender diversity in the workplace show that adding women in leadership positions increases company profitability – but only up to a point. That point is about 60%. If a company's leadership becomes all or nearly female, then the “diversity bonus” begins to decline, as indeed, if the argument here is correct, it should.”
“Some people worry that overconfidence in the findings of science or the views of scientists can lead to bad public policy. I agree: overemphasizing technical considerations at the expense of social, moral, or economic ones can lead to bad decisions. But this does not bear on the question of whether the science involved is right or wrong. If a scientific matter is settled and the scientific community that has settled on it is open and diverse, then it behooves us to accept that science and then decide what (if anything) to do about its implications.
This, at least, is what nearly every scientist I know would say. It is something that in the past I have said. It actualizes the classic fact/value distinction: the idea that we can identify facts and then (separately) decide what if anything to do about them based on our values. But as an empirical matter this strategy is no longer working (if it ever did), because most people do not separate science from its implications. Many people reject climate science, for example, not because there is anything wrong with that science, qua science, but because it conflicts – or is seen as conflicting – with their values, their religious views, their political ideology, and/or their economic interests. There are many reasons people may reject or be critical of scientific findings, but often it involves the perception that these findings contradict their values or threaten their way of life.”
December 4, 2020
A somewhat disjointed text. Oreskes opens with chapters answering the title question against the backdrop of science denialism. However, the audience is unclear: the answer appears tailored neither to philosophers of science (though there is a lot of philosophy of science in the chapters) nor to science denialists (I suspect few would be moved by her arguments). Responses to her account in the middle of the book seemed to be at cross-purposes, largely irrelevant to her arguments. At the end of the day, I'm more worried about how to *convince* denialists or lessen the impact of industry funded sci. Oreskes's abstract account of the trustworthiness of science doesn't seem particularly persuasive for those that deny vax efficacy, climate change, etc.
September 14, 2024
This was a frustrating book, and not one I can recommend. Oreskes thinks she’s championing science, but she’s doing it in such an inept and problematic way that I think she’s actually hurting trust in science.
Overview:
Oreskes would have done well to listen better to Steven Weinberg. As he said in “Reductionism Redux”, “Science can't even justify science; the decision to explore the world as it is shown to us by reason and experiment is a moral one, not a scientific one.” This would have saved her a lot of wasted words.
Oreskes concludes that science is purely socially constructed. She intends this claim in a good way, as a way we can identify truly scientific activity (given that she thinks there is no such thing as a scientific method). But if you go this route, you have placed science on equal footing with religion and other approaches. A social construct identifiable only by experts who get expertise by training from other experts who all exist within the same tradition? Sounds the same for a shaman or a scientist.
Is there a specific, detailed, step-by-step “scientific method” that we all follow in every scientific endeavor? No. But is there broadly a scientific method? Certainly, and we know this because many activities clearly do not qualify as science, even as judged by non-experts.
Science is defined by logical, rational theory informing and informed by careful observation and controlled experimentation. There is more, for example consilience between alternative approaches (including from different disciplines), but that’s the core.
What I liked:
Perspectives on Kuhn:
Oreskes adds nuance to the picture that scientists have about Kuhn. I thought he was a crank, but also that his ideas had been gobbled up as gospel by many social scientists. Oreskes points out that Kuhn had some good points regarding the social nature of science, but she also notes that historians “tended to find the incommensurability claim to be overblown” (p. 41).
Perspectives on the sociology of science:
Oreskes stresses that some key figures like Sandra Harding and Helen Longino were in support of science and were trying to bolster its standing by grounding it in social activity rather than method (since the method approach is one that they—and Oreskes—think was not fruitful). Social construction was not implying lack of objectivity, in their conception. Longino says “socializing cognition is not a corruption or displacement of the rational but a vehicle of its performance” (p. 57). (Unfortunately, if rationality is defined only by social consensus, this leaves us entirely vulnerable to claims like Alioto declaring that the identification of gods as explanations for physical phenomena is “good science” A History of Western Science.)
Something similar is true for some of the Edinburgh school of social scientists, particularly David Bloor and Steven Shapin. Scientists often think the Strong Programme in the sociology of science was radically relativist and abandoned all notions of truth, but Oreskes argues that these scholars actually supported science. Do note that this is not a view shared by all historians of science (e.g., Wootton’s The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution).
Emphasis on consensus:
As Oreskes notes, “scientific consensus is hard to come by. This is an underappreciated fact” (p. 128). She discusses several prominent examples of science “gone wrong” and points out that in none of these cases was there a scientific consensus for the wrong idea. When people dismiss science because “it’s been wrong before”, that’s almost always a flawed argument because it generally hasn’t been.
What I found frustrating:
Lots!
Lack of any understanding of probability:
One of the most frustrating things was complete omission of Bayes’ theorem or indeed any discussion of probability. Oreskes discusses the logical positivists and the eventual rejection of the idea that scientific claims could be definitively proved. “The dream of positive knowledge has truly ended” (p. 49) and “we can never be entirely positive” (p. 249). She then discussion Popper and the eventual rejection of the idea that scientific claims could be definitively disproved. This is the perfect opening to discuss Bayesianism, where additional evidence can raise or lower credences in ideas, but never reach p=0 or p=1.
At times Oreskes wants to include a Bayesian approach, but she appears completely ignorant of its existence. When discussing the effect of birth control on mood, she wants to include evidence from patient reports and physically plausible mechanisms in a way that would lower the statistical evidence needed to believe a claim (p. 115). She claims that “under currently prevailing norms” such things can’t be included, but that’s simply wrong.
It’s not like this is an obscure topic. It’s taught in introductory classes, and discussed in popular books like Steven Pinker’s Rationality. But maybe Oreskes doesn’t actually want to consider physical plausibility, because if she did she’d need to discard her beliefs in “alternative” medicine.
This book doesn’t know what it is:
Is it an argument for everyday people to trust science? No. It delves far too much into abstract philosophy for that, and Oreskes rejects Susan Lindee’s serious attempt to move in this direction in her commentary. Oreskes asserts that Lindee is making a logical fallacy by arguing that the success of technology is support for science being correct (p. 219), even though this is actually the best argument for most people.
Is it pure philosophy? No, as she has little engagement with any philosophy of science in the past 50 years, and only sketchy engagement with its philosophy before then.
Is it about the sociology of science? No. Oreskes has no training in that field, and feels content citing fewer than a half dozen scholars coming from just two particular camps.
So what is this book? I’m not sure, and neither is Oreskes.
Oreskes doesn’t understand science:
Or, to be more generous, she’s insisting on combining together everything we call “science” (physical, biological, and even social), and she’s trying to describe all of it in ways that only apply to some of it.
To give a concrete example, Oreskes describes “classical mechanics” as “rejected as wrong” and “on the scrap heap of history” (p. 19). She has superficial knowledge that this isn’t true—she later says “Newtonian mechanics still works when the objects under consideration are not moving very quickly” (p. 73). But she clearly doesn’t really understand what this means. We still teach classical mechanics to engineers and physicists, and moreover we still use it professionally. Indeed for many applications it’s all we need.
This is a consequential mistake for Oreskes. It’s very easy to fall into the mistake of Kuhnian paradigm shifts and subjective truth if you believe that well-established scientific theories have indeed been entirely discarded, but it’s simply not true. To her credit Oreskes avoids these extreme positions, but it’s frankly not entirely clear to me why.
It’s thus infuriating how she dismisses Steven Weinberg as someone going wrong when stepping outside his area of expertise (pp. 263, 269). He made crucial points about stability and advancement in physics—his area of expertise—that Oreskes just dismisses without any understanding of the point. A key point is that Oreskes believes “the contributions of science cannot be viewed as permanent” (p. 49), which she claims in specific opposition to Weinberg’s view, but she says this with no understanding of physics. From the continued utility of Newtonian mechanics to the relatively recent result that quantum field theory is the effective field theory for any high-energy theory, there are things in physics that are really, truly, firmly established for all time. They’re not the final answers, but they are correct approximations in useful domains, and thus will continue to be used.
It’s also strange that she’s so harsh in her criticism that “we should trust Weinberg about physics, but not about its history” (p. 263), when Weinberg wrote a fairly comprehensive book on the history, with substantial engagement with both primary sources and analysis To Explain the World: The Discovery of Modern Science. It would be one thing if Weinberg were demonstrably wrong when stepping outside his original discipline, but the only places Oreskes claims he went wrong are in fact places she has gone wrong. Given that, she comes across as merely engaging in a turf war.
Given her intense insistence that we not trust experts outside their areas of expertise, and her strong implication that you can’t acquire expertise outside formal training, it’s odd that Oreskes feels it’s appropriate for her to write and talk extensively about philosophy, given that her only formal training is in geology and history. By her own standards, she’s entirely unqualified to discuss philosophy.
Worse, Oreskes is inconsistent on this point. When convenient for her, she says “developing expertise outside conventional avenues of credentialism is certainly possible” (p. 131), certainly a contrast with her insistence that people shouldn’t be trusted outside their areas of expertise (expertise that she claims can only be determined by social consensus, that is, “conventional avenues of credentialism”). It’s absurd that when she says “the track record of scientists outside their specialties is not particularly impressive” (p. 60), she supports this only with three brief anecdotes with no context. She cites no statistical evidence or indeed any other evidence at all, citing only a single paper that she herself notes does not make the claim she thinks it should have.
Oreskes may not even understand what science is:
At times her description of science sounds quite like mine, and it seems like she would agree with the famous dictum that we can’t derive “ought” from “is”. That is, science describes how the world is and models how it will be, but asking questions like what should be done is not the domain of science at all. She explicitly acknowledges this in the context of climate change. However, her discussion of eugenics completely goes against this. The primary question in eugenics is not whether or not humans could be selectively bred for traits some consider desirable—the answer is obviously yes, since humans are animals just like dogs and sheep, which can be bred for physical traits but also intelligence and broad personality. The primary issue of eugenics is asking if humans should be selectively bred in this way, to which modern people give a resounding “no” because of moral opinions on human rights and self determination.
When Oreskes asks “was there a scientific consensus on eugenics?” (p. 95), this is a category error, not a sensible question. Eugenics, as it was practiced, was a moral issue, not a scientific one. It’s analogous to atomic weapons. They were based on scientific theory, but the decision to build (and use!) them was not scientific.
Flawed compression of all science into one thing:
Oreskes argues that diversity in participants is necessary for all science, because, for example, “when scientists were almost exclusively white men, they developed theories about women and African Americans that were at best incomplete and at times pernicious—theories that have now been rejected” (p. 53). While this was true for social sciences like anthropology and psychology (although it’s arguable whether these fields should have counted as science at the time), she offers no evidence that this observation applies elsewhere. It is notable that in physics, as participation from women and from non-white and non-European people massively expanded, the theories… didn’t change at all. Turns out those white European men had figured out some good approximations of objective truth.
Fracturing truth:
Oreskes refers to “what we conventionally call ‘Western science’” (p. 62). There is no such thing as “Western science”. There is just science, the roots of which one might trace to Greek settlements to modern-day Turkey, but whose origins range from modern day Britain (e.g., Newton) to north Africa (e.g., Archimedes) to Uzbekistan (Ulugh Beg Observatory). It’s a historical accident that when science finally took real form in the 1600s that happened in Europe.
Today everyone in the world participates in the same scientific approach. The “civilizational knowledge” from other parts of the world fares no better than traditional “civilizational knowledge” from Europe (which would be everything from ancient Greek and Norse religions to Santa Claus and homeopathy). Fun stories, but not accurate ways of determining knowledge.
Inappropriately supporting non-science:
Oreskes falls prey to the trap of treating other cultures with more respect than her own. In the past few decades this has been a common problem for academics who aren’t scientists, presumably an overcorrection to the earlier tendency of Western writers to treat other cultures with less respect than their own. But neither is a good approach.
To give an example, she claims acupuncture, “Traditional Chinese Medicine”, and Ayurvedic medicine “can be efficacious in treating certain diseases and conditions for which Western medicine has little to offer” (p. 62). This is false. The unified idea of so-called “traditional” Chinese medicine (TCM) is largely a modern construct under Mao Zedong, because it was cheap (although Mao himself didn’t believe it worked). Neither TCM, acupuncture, nor Ayurveda have efficacy for diseases, let alone diseases modern medicine can’t treat. Amazingly Oreskes cites an early piece by Edzard Ernst in support, apparently in complete ignorance that Ernst himself started subjecting alternative medicine to real scientific scrutiny and has since published works like SCAM: So-Called Alternative Medicine. Should I bring up once again Oreskes’s dictum to not trust experts outside their domain of expertise, and note that we shouldn’t take medical advice from a historian?
But Oreskes graces such nonsense with the title of “civilization knowledge traditions”, although somehow she fails to mention that the four humors theory, leeches and bloodletting, and sympathetic unguents (putting salve on the weapon to cure a wound) would also be civilization knowledge traditions and “traditional European medicine”. She contrasts her precious “indigenous” medical views with “popular claims that are ignorant, erroneous” (p. 62), but here she can only bring herself to criticize the idea that vaccines cause autism, a claim most prominently supported by white people, and therefore one where criticism is allowable.
She talks a good game, including saying that “respecting alternative knowledge traditions does not mean that we suspend judgement, either about those traditions or our own” (p. 63), but she provides no examples where she’s willing to put this into practice when considering non-European traditions. In fact, as detailed above, she provides ample evidence that she does indeed suspend judgement when it comes to such traditions.
This failure echoes loudly when Oreskes says “when we know something about relevant mechanisms, there is no reason to play dumb” (p. 135). Indeed there is not, and this is why much of “alternative” medicine can be rejected without even performing RCTs. If qi and meridians do not exist, and there is no known mechanism whereby a needle in one’s arm can affect allergies or menstrual cramps, maybe we should trust evidence from underpowered studies in trash Chinese journals run by true believers. “It seems obvious to say, but scientific theories should be based on evidence” (p. 135). No shit, Oreskes. Try applying this uniformly.
Motivated reasoning:
Let’s contrast how she treats the link between birth control and depression and how she treats the link between vaccination and autism.
Oreskes experienced depression when taking hormonal birth control. She says “my experience can be dismissed as ‘just anecdote,’ but I prefer to view it as a clinical study in which n=1” (p. 107). She thinks that doctors shouldn’t have dismissed “iffy” case reports about this issue (p. 117) and “there is a mechanism that explains why hormonal contraceptives have this effect” (p. 113). In Bayesian terms, we should modify our priors based on bench science, before even interpreting the human trial data.
Contrast this with how she treats other claims.
Should we treat a personal anecdote as a “clinical study”? Not when it comes to vaccination and autism! She claims parents of autistic children can’t judge what caused it (p. 132) even though they’re very close to the issue. How is this different from women observing depression when starting birth control? Many women start birth control in late adolescence, which is also a common time to be diagnosed with depression even if not on birth control (Fruzzetti & Fidecicchi 2020, Clinical Drug Investigation, 40, 12, 1097). Is this not similar to the fact that autism is often diagnosed around the same age that childhood vaccinations are done?
Is key difference plausible mechanism? Anti-vax advocates claim plausible mechanisms too. Also, the claim of plausible mechanism for birth control was raised and assessed but didn’t have obvious validity (e.g., Glick & Bennet 1981, Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 1, 6, 350). And if we’re taking plausible physical mechanism into account, Oreskes couldn’t maintain her belief in “Traditional” Chinese Medicine.
There are differences between the vaccination case and the birth control case. An absolutely crucial one is the fact that birth control can be started and stopped multiple times, thus allowing the effect to be be observed repeatedly in one person. But does Oreskes mention this at all? Nope!
She doesn’t even seem competent in her supposed area of expertise:
Oreskes is, above all else, a historian of science. Maybe it’s too much to expect her to be solid on philosophy or indeed science itself, but surely she’s solid on the history? Nope! She approvingly quotes Longino claiming that Einstein “could provide an alternative explanation of the Michelson-Morely interferometer experiment” (p. 53), although Einstein in fact came up with his special theory of relativity while entirely unaware of Michelson–Morely.
Overview:
Oreskes would have done well to listen better to Steven Weinberg. As he said in “Reductionism Redux”, “Science can't even justify science; the decision to explore the world as it is shown to us by reason and experiment is a moral one, not a scientific one.” This would have saved her a lot of wasted words.
Oreskes concludes that science is purely socially constructed. She intends this claim in a good way, as a way we can identify truly scientific activity (given that she thinks there is no such thing as a scientific method). But if you go this route, you have placed science on equal footing with religion and other approaches. A social construct identifiable only by experts who get expertise by training from other experts who all exist within the same tradition? Sounds the same for a shaman or a scientist.
Is there a specific, detailed, step-by-step “scientific method” that we all follow in every scientific endeavor? No. But is there broadly a scientific method? Certainly, and we know this because many activities clearly do not qualify as science, even as judged by non-experts.
Science is defined by logical, rational theory informing and informed by careful observation and controlled experimentation. There is more, for example consilience between alternative approaches (including from different disciplines), but that’s the core.
What I liked:
Perspectives on Kuhn:
Oreskes adds nuance to the picture that scientists have about Kuhn. I thought he was a crank, but also that his ideas had been gobbled up as gospel by many social scientists. Oreskes points out that Kuhn had some good points regarding the social nature of science, but she also notes that historians “tended to find the incommensurability claim to be overblown” (p. 41).
Perspectives on the sociology of science:
Oreskes stresses that some key figures like Sandra Harding and Helen Longino were in support of science and were trying to bolster its standing by grounding it in social activity rather than method (since the method approach is one that they—and Oreskes—think was not fruitful). Social construction was not implying lack of objectivity, in their conception. Longino says “socializing cognition is not a corruption or displacement of the rational but a vehicle of its performance” (p. 57). (Unfortunately, if rationality is defined only by social consensus, this leaves us entirely vulnerable to claims like Alioto declaring that the identification of gods as explanations for physical phenomena is “good science” A History of Western Science.)
Something similar is true for some of the Edinburgh school of social scientists, particularly David Bloor and Steven Shapin. Scientists often think the Strong Programme in the sociology of science was radically relativist and abandoned all notions of truth, but Oreskes argues that these scholars actually supported science. Do note that this is not a view shared by all historians of science (e.g., Wootton’s The Invention of Science: A New History of the Scientific Revolution).
Emphasis on consensus:
As Oreskes notes, “scientific consensus is hard to come by. This is an underappreciated fact” (p. 128). She discusses several prominent examples of science “gone wrong” and points out that in none of these cases was there a scientific consensus for the wrong idea. When people dismiss science because “it’s been wrong before”, that’s almost always a flawed argument because it generally hasn’t been.
What I found frustrating:
Lots!
Lack of any understanding of probability:
One of the most frustrating things was complete omission of Bayes’ theorem or indeed any discussion of probability. Oreskes discusses the logical positivists and the eventual rejection of the idea that scientific claims could be definitively proved. “The dream of positive knowledge has truly ended” (p. 49) and “we can never be entirely positive” (p. 249). She then discussion Popper and the eventual rejection of the idea that scientific claims could be definitively disproved. This is the perfect opening to discuss Bayesianism, where additional evidence can raise or lower credences in ideas, but never reach p=0 or p=1.
At times Oreskes wants to include a Bayesian approach, but she appears completely ignorant of its existence. When discussing the effect of birth control on mood, she wants to include evidence from patient reports and physically plausible mechanisms in a way that would lower the statistical evidence needed to believe a claim (p. 115). She claims that “under currently prevailing norms” such things can’t be included, but that’s simply wrong.
It’s not like this is an obscure topic. It’s taught in introductory classes, and discussed in popular books like Steven Pinker’s Rationality. But maybe Oreskes doesn’t actually want to consider physical plausibility, because if she did she’d need to discard her beliefs in “alternative” medicine.
This book doesn’t know what it is:
Is it an argument for everyday people to trust science? No. It delves far too much into abstract philosophy for that, and Oreskes rejects Susan Lindee’s serious attempt to move in this direction in her commentary. Oreskes asserts that Lindee is making a logical fallacy by arguing that the success of technology is support for science being correct (p. 219), even though this is actually the best argument for most people.
Is it pure philosophy? No, as she has little engagement with any philosophy of science in the past 50 years, and only sketchy engagement with its philosophy before then.
Is it about the sociology of science? No. Oreskes has no training in that field, and feels content citing fewer than a half dozen scholars coming from just two particular camps.
So what is this book? I’m not sure, and neither is Oreskes.
Oreskes doesn’t understand science:
Or, to be more generous, she’s insisting on combining together everything we call “science” (physical, biological, and even social), and she’s trying to describe all of it in ways that only apply to some of it.
To give a concrete example, Oreskes describes “classical mechanics” as “rejected as wrong” and “on the scrap heap of history” (p. 19). She has superficial knowledge that this isn’t true—she later says “Newtonian mechanics still works when the objects under consideration are not moving very quickly” (p. 73). But she clearly doesn’t really understand what this means. We still teach classical mechanics to engineers and physicists, and moreover we still use it professionally. Indeed for many applications it’s all we need.
This is a consequential mistake for Oreskes. It’s very easy to fall into the mistake of Kuhnian paradigm shifts and subjective truth if you believe that well-established scientific theories have indeed been entirely discarded, but it’s simply not true. To her credit Oreskes avoids these extreme positions, but it’s frankly not entirely clear to me why.
It’s thus infuriating how she dismisses Steven Weinberg as someone going wrong when stepping outside his area of expertise (pp. 263, 269). He made crucial points about stability and advancement in physics—his area of expertise—that Oreskes just dismisses without any understanding of the point. A key point is that Oreskes believes “the contributions of science cannot be viewed as permanent” (p. 49), which she claims in specific opposition to Weinberg’s view, but she says this with no understanding of physics. From the continued utility of Newtonian mechanics to the relatively recent result that quantum field theory is the effective field theory for any high-energy theory, there are things in physics that are really, truly, firmly established for all time. They’re not the final answers, but they are correct approximations in useful domains, and thus will continue to be used.
It’s also strange that she’s so harsh in her criticism that “we should trust Weinberg about physics, but not about its history” (p. 263), when Weinberg wrote a fairly comprehensive book on the history, with substantial engagement with both primary sources and analysis To Explain the World: The Discovery of Modern Science. It would be one thing if Weinberg were demonstrably wrong when stepping outside his original discipline, but the only places Oreskes claims he went wrong are in fact places she has gone wrong. Given that, she comes across as merely engaging in a turf war.
Given her intense insistence that we not trust experts outside their areas of expertise, and her strong implication that you can’t acquire expertise outside formal training, it’s odd that Oreskes feels it’s appropriate for her to write and talk extensively about philosophy, given that her only formal training is in geology and history. By her own standards, she’s entirely unqualified to discuss philosophy.
Worse, Oreskes is inconsistent on this point. When convenient for her, she says “developing expertise outside conventional avenues of credentialism is certainly possible” (p. 131), certainly a contrast with her insistence that people shouldn’t be trusted outside their areas of expertise (expertise that she claims can only be determined by social consensus, that is, “conventional avenues of credentialism”). It’s absurd that when she says “the track record of scientists outside their specialties is not particularly impressive” (p. 60), she supports this only with three brief anecdotes with no context. She cites no statistical evidence or indeed any other evidence at all, citing only a single paper that she herself notes does not make the claim she thinks it should have.
Oreskes may not even understand what science is:
At times her description of science sounds quite like mine, and it seems like she would agree with the famous dictum that we can’t derive “ought” from “is”. That is, science describes how the world is and models how it will be, but asking questions like what should be done is not the domain of science at all. She explicitly acknowledges this in the context of climate change. However, her discussion of eugenics completely goes against this. The primary question in eugenics is not whether or not humans could be selectively bred for traits some consider desirable—the answer is obviously yes, since humans are animals just like dogs and sheep, which can be bred for physical traits but also intelligence and broad personality. The primary issue of eugenics is asking if humans should be selectively bred in this way, to which modern people give a resounding “no” because of moral opinions on human rights and self determination.
When Oreskes asks “was there a scientific consensus on eugenics?” (p. 95), this is a category error, not a sensible question. Eugenics, as it was practiced, was a moral issue, not a scientific one. It’s analogous to atomic weapons. They were based on scientific theory, but the decision to build (and use!) them was not scientific.
Flawed compression of all science into one thing:
Oreskes argues that diversity in participants is necessary for all science, because, for example, “when scientists were almost exclusively white men, they developed theories about women and African Americans that were at best incomplete and at times pernicious—theories that have now been rejected” (p. 53). While this was true for social sciences like anthropology and psychology (although it’s arguable whether these fields should have counted as science at the time), she offers no evidence that this observation applies elsewhere. It is notable that in physics, as participation from women and from non-white and non-European people massively expanded, the theories… didn’t change at all. Turns out those white European men had figured out some good approximations of objective truth.
Fracturing truth:
Oreskes refers to “what we conventionally call ‘Western science’” (p. 62). There is no such thing as “Western science”. There is just science, the roots of which one might trace to Greek settlements to modern-day Turkey, but whose origins range from modern day Britain (e.g., Newton) to north Africa (e.g., Archimedes) to Uzbekistan (Ulugh Beg Observatory). It’s a historical accident that when science finally took real form in the 1600s that happened in Europe.
Today everyone in the world participates in the same scientific approach. The “civilizational knowledge” from other parts of the world fares no better than traditional “civilizational knowledge” from Europe (which would be everything from ancient Greek and Norse religions to Santa Claus and homeopathy). Fun stories, but not accurate ways of determining knowledge.
Inappropriately supporting non-science:
Oreskes falls prey to the trap of treating other cultures with more respect than her own. In the past few decades this has been a common problem for academics who aren’t scientists, presumably an overcorrection to the earlier tendency of Western writers to treat other cultures with less respect than their own. But neither is a good approach.
To give an example, she claims acupuncture, “Traditional Chinese Medicine”, and Ayurvedic medicine “can be efficacious in treating certain diseases and conditions for which Western medicine has little to offer” (p. 62). This is false. The unified idea of so-called “traditional” Chinese medicine (TCM) is largely a modern construct under Mao Zedong, because it was cheap (although Mao himself didn’t believe it worked). Neither TCM, acupuncture, nor Ayurveda have efficacy for diseases, let alone diseases modern medicine can’t treat. Amazingly Oreskes cites an early piece by Edzard Ernst in support, apparently in complete ignorance that Ernst himself started subjecting alternative medicine to real scientific scrutiny and has since published works like SCAM: So-Called Alternative Medicine. Should I bring up once again Oreskes’s dictum to not trust experts outside their domain of expertise, and note that we shouldn’t take medical advice from a historian?
But Oreskes graces such nonsense with the title of “civilization knowledge traditions”, although somehow she fails to mention that the four humors theory, leeches and bloodletting, and sympathetic unguents (putting salve on the weapon to cure a wound) would also be civilization knowledge traditions and “traditional European medicine”. She contrasts her precious “indigenous” medical views with “popular claims that are ignorant, erroneous” (p. 62), but here she can only bring herself to criticize the idea that vaccines cause autism, a claim most prominently supported by white people, and therefore one where criticism is allowable.
She talks a good game, including saying that “respecting alternative knowledge traditions does not mean that we suspend judgement, either about those traditions or our own” (p. 63), but she provides no examples where she’s willing to put this into practice when considering non-European traditions. In fact, as detailed above, she provides ample evidence that she does indeed suspend judgement when it comes to such traditions.
This failure echoes loudly when Oreskes says “when we know something about relevant mechanisms, there is no reason to play dumb” (p. 135). Indeed there is not, and this is why much of “alternative” medicine can be rejected without even performing RCTs. If qi and meridians do not exist, and there is no known mechanism whereby a needle in one’s arm can affect allergies or menstrual cramps, maybe we should trust evidence from underpowered studies in trash Chinese journals run by true believers. “It seems obvious to say, but scientific theories should be based on evidence” (p. 135). No shit, Oreskes. Try applying this uniformly.
Motivated reasoning:
Let’s contrast how she treats the link between birth control and depression and how she treats the link between vaccination and autism.
Oreskes experienced depression when taking hormonal birth control. She says “my experience can be dismissed as ‘just anecdote,’ but I prefer to view it as a clinical study in which n=1” (p. 107). She thinks that doctors shouldn’t have dismissed “iffy” case reports about this issue (p. 117) and “there is a mechanism that explains why hormonal contraceptives have this effect” (p. 113). In Bayesian terms, we should modify our priors based on bench science, before even interpreting the human trial data.
Contrast this with how she treats other claims.
Should we treat a personal anecdote as a “clinical study”? Not when it comes to vaccination and autism! She claims parents of autistic children can’t judge what caused it (p. 132) even though they’re very close to the issue. How is this different from women observing depression when starting birth control? Many women start birth control in late adolescence, which is also a common time to be diagnosed with depression even if not on birth control (Fruzzetti & Fidecicchi 2020, Clinical Drug Investigation, 40, 12, 1097). Is this not similar to the fact that autism is often diagnosed around the same age that childhood vaccinations are done?
Is key difference plausible mechanism? Anti-vax advocates claim plausible mechanisms too. Also, the claim of plausible mechanism for birth control was raised and assessed but didn’t have obvious validity (e.g., Glick & Bennet 1981, Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 1, 6, 350). And if we’re taking plausible physical mechanism into account, Oreskes couldn’t maintain her belief in “Traditional” Chinese Medicine.
There are differences between the vaccination case and the birth control case. An absolutely crucial one is the fact that birth control can be started and stopped multiple times, thus allowing the effect to be be observed repeatedly in one person. But does Oreskes mention this at all? Nope!
She doesn’t even seem competent in her supposed area of expertise:
Oreskes is, above all else, a historian of science. Maybe it’s too much to expect her to be solid on philosophy or indeed science itself, but surely she’s solid on the history? Nope! She approvingly quotes Longino claiming that Einstein “could provide an alternative explanation of the Michelson-Morely interferometer experiment” (p. 53), although Einstein in fact came up with his special theory of relativity while entirely unaware of Michelson–Morely.
September 28, 2021
“All scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental. All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time.” (Sir Austin Bradford Hill)
This is an astoundingly effective synthesis of thought about scientific epistemology, the public role of science, and the implications of scientific insights in human progress. I begin this review with a quote she refers to, in part because part of the power of this lecture is the way it synthesizes 100 years of discussion about what makes something science and how that is used. I know this field pretty well -- I even teach some of it -- and I am really impressed at how Oreskes covers the history of thought in this area and shows how it can provide a strong basis for considering scientific knowledge, tied to its interactions with empirical reality, as trustworthy for guiding actions and policy. Her argument, in the end, is that science has always been a social activity, and knowledge really is socially constructed, but that the priority of data over other arguments and the interaction of scientists to argue about reality provides the best basis we have for interpreting the physical world and what that means for our decisions. It may lean a bit to the philosophical, but it is relevant to our challenges in the world of science for policy.
The lecture begins with the discussion of the history/philosophy of science debates. Then she deals with 5 cases where 'science got it wrong' to draw lessons of when science might be questionable. Finally she integrates the material into a strong defense of the role of scientific expertise in society.
The book version then continues with 3 other views that in some ways challenge Oreskes perspective although still being very much concerned with how society could come to trust science as a basis for decision making where it is relevant. The challenges are both about some arguments she doesn't prioritize, the challenges of convincing non-scientists, and whether the points she raises are the most important ones. Oreskes then responds, politely but strongly, to these critiques. And the book ends with some updated 2018 thoughts about the crisis of trust during the Trump administration.
It is an impressive work. I will likely assign it to students, it is so good. I don't completely agree with her synthesis -- for example, I think she gives too little credence to the "it produces useful results" argument that, while philosophically limited, is, I think, at the core of many practitioners' commitment to science -- but I think she comes closer than anyone to giving us a well-justified positive synthesis supporting the critical role of science in human endeavors.
This is an astoundingly effective synthesis of thought about scientific epistemology, the public role of science, and the implications of scientific insights in human progress. I begin this review with a quote she refers to, in part because part of the power of this lecture is the way it synthesizes 100 years of discussion about what makes something science and how that is used. I know this field pretty well -- I even teach some of it -- and I am really impressed at how Oreskes covers the history of thought in this area and shows how it can provide a strong basis for considering scientific knowledge, tied to its interactions with empirical reality, as trustworthy for guiding actions and policy. Her argument, in the end, is that science has always been a social activity, and knowledge really is socially constructed, but that the priority of data over other arguments and the interaction of scientists to argue about reality provides the best basis we have for interpreting the physical world and what that means for our decisions. It may lean a bit to the philosophical, but it is relevant to our challenges in the world of science for policy.
The lecture begins with the discussion of the history/philosophy of science debates. Then she deals with 5 cases where 'science got it wrong' to draw lessons of when science might be questionable. Finally she integrates the material into a strong defense of the role of scientific expertise in society.
The book version then continues with 3 other views that in some ways challenge Oreskes perspective although still being very much concerned with how society could come to trust science as a basis for decision making where it is relevant. The challenges are both about some arguments she doesn't prioritize, the challenges of convincing non-scientists, and whether the points she raises are the most important ones. Oreskes then responds, politely but strongly, to these critiques. And the book ends with some updated 2018 thoughts about the crisis of trust during the Trump administration.
It is an impressive work. I will likely assign it to students, it is so good. I don't completely agree with her synthesis -- for example, I think she gives too little credence to the "it produces useful results" argument that, while philosophically limited, is, I think, at the core of many practitioners' commitment to science -- but I think she comes closer than anyone to giving us a well-justified positive synthesis supporting the critical role of science in human endeavors.
December 9, 2019
I am in two minds about this book. I am giving it a four because Oreskes makes strong arguments and brings logic to the subject, but I am clearly not the audience for this book. I think this book is for working scientists only, which is sad because Merchants Of Doubt was really a good read for everyone.
What I found refreshing about the book is its excellent argumentation for diversity in science, both in terms of being socially inclusive and in terms of methodology.
What I found refreshing about the book is its excellent argumentation for diversity in science, both in terms of being socially inclusive and in terms of methodology.
March 3, 2021
If the purpose of Oreskes’ book was to convince scientists who share the same viewpoints why they should trust science, I think she could be largely successful in this goal. However, if the purpose of the book was to convince people outside of the scientific community why they should trust science (e.g., lay people, Republicans, religious, Creationists, etc.), I believe Oreskes epically failed at this goal.
July 31, 2020
This was even better than I had expected. Oreskes is exceptionally insightful throughout and the engagement with other scholars in the second half provides an especially rewarding experience. Timely in the age not only of climate change but now COVID-19.
January 12, 2022
The book surprised me, I thought the whole narrative on why to trust science was something along the lines "trust us because scientists are superior minds". Instead it's a fair and humble account of the scientific method and history of science. I also appreciate how it pointed out that science can be wrong and how in the past 2 centuries, science was manipulated by economists, religion, the media and politics to fit their agenda.
Despite the title, The audience is an educated one, mainly higher educated people, not a lay person as the title might suggest. Honestly, some of the things needed to be said! 80% of the academic I know think they are better than others. How much they discard the peer reviewing system for example? We should all be reminded to stay humble and having an academic degree doesn't make you any better than those who don't.
Chapter 9 on the audiobook is shocking. I knew about the cheating, but people doing it on purpose like in some fields of engineering is gross. No wonder why the general public has lost trust in science. I think the author touched important points on how science should collectively do better by starting amending it's own fault so that those who distrust science might change their opinions.
Despite the title, The audience is an educated one, mainly higher educated people, not a lay person as the title might suggest. Honestly, some of the things needed to be said! 80% of the academic I know think they are better than others. How much they discard the peer reviewing system for example? We should all be reminded to stay humble and having an academic degree doesn't make you any better than those who don't.
Chapter 9 on the audiobook is shocking. I knew about the cheating, but people doing it on purpose like in some fields of engineering is gross. No wonder why the general public has lost trust in science. I think the author touched important points on how science should collectively do better by starting amending it's own fault so that those who distrust science might change their opinions.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 5, 2025
5 yıldızı hak eden bir kitap. Post modern dönemde bilime yapılan sürekli, maksatlı ve çoğunlukla politik saldırılar göz önüne alındığında bilime bir kurum olarak neden güvenmemiz gerektiğini anlamak gerekiyor. Bunun için çok iyi bir girişim. Kitabın başında bilim felsefesinin gelişimi ve ekoller çok kısa ama etkili şekilde özetleniyor. Ardından önemli vakalar üzerinden bilimsel bilginin niteliği ve güvenirliliği tartışılıyor. Başka bilim insanı ve felsefecilerin yazılarının eklendiği sıradaki bölümde yazarın ilk bölümdeki örnekleri üzerinden kişisel görüşler veriliyor. Son bölümde ise yazar her bir yazıya tek tek cevap veriyor. Hem yapısı bakımından çok iyi, hem de tartışma ve fikir kazandırma açısından da doyurucu. Bilimle ilgilenen herkese önerebilirim.
January 2, 2022
Speaking as someone in academic science, this book was preaching to the choir, but I'm not quite sure it would have its intended effect on a non-scientific audience. In addition, I certainly agree with the book's core premise, that the collaborative and community-based structure of scientific endeavor is its biggest strength. However, I think the book falls short of acknowledging that one of the weaknesses of academia science is how inaccessible and exclusive the community is. Sometimes it felt like the book framed scenarios of scientific failure which involve this systemic exclusion as unfortunate accidents or the result of a few misguided people, rather than actively part of the design of the community at the time.
September 10, 2022
کتاب برای عام مناسب نیست. بنظر مخاطبش قشر تحصیلکرده و دانشگاهیه که در دنیای علم فعال باشه یا حداقل نزدیک به این حوزه باشه.
September 1, 2021
Takeaway:
A great book on a deceptively simple question. I’m sure it’s not too controversial to claim that most people believe that science is in some degree of trouble with regard with its public image and trustworthiness. Think post-truth, scepticism (of climate change or vaccines for example), mistrust of experts, and so forth. To understand what we actually mean when we say science as a public image problem, a book like this one is essential for framing the issue and defining the terms we use in discussing it. What it does particularly well, in my opinion, is boil down decades of research into the history, sociology, and philosophy of science into a core argument: that science is a human endeavour, and truly understanding how scientific knowledge is created involves understanding the human dimension of it. This has important implications for the trustworthiness of science: social consensus and personal values are just as important in defending scientific knowledge as empirical facts and reliable methods.
Apart from the occasional bit of jargon and abstract philosophical concept this book reads surprisingly easily without patronising the reader. Certain sections are weaker than others, particularly some of the comments by other scholars, but overall I can recommend this book to anyone who has a stake in science being trustworthy and reliable (which should be most people, really).
Chunkier synopsis:
The book is somewhat unusually split into four broad sections. In the first (Chapter 1), Naomi Oreskes gives us a crash course on the philosophy of science since the late 19th Century, specifically on the major developments in the way we understand the truthfulness of science and its “Method”. The reader is taken on an intellectual whistle-stop tour of the main ways we have understood science to be done. It starts at the scientific empiricists who claimed that science was true when it could be verified by observation, and makes stops at those who contended that science was concerned with proving things wrong rather than right, those who argued that scientific facts were arrived at through communal ways of thinking, and eventually to those who believed that science progressed in leaps (read: revolutions) which irreversibly change the ways science is done. After a brief stopover this narrative train then leaves behind debates about what the “method” of science is and enters the territory of science studies (or, studying how science in its social, history, and philosophical contexts), treating the reader to vistas of social constructivism, anthropologies of science, and feminist critiques of science. This whole chapter is a fantastic introduction to the biggest developments in Western philosophy of science over the past century-and-a-half. It is particularly useful in providing the reader with the intellectual toolset to start thinking about the points raised in Chapter 2.
The second section (Chapter 2) is itself split into two bits. In the first Oreskes gives the reader five examples of misguided science, including the initial rejection of the now widely accepted continental drift theory, dubious interpretations of eugenics in the first half of the 20th Century, and misunderstandings about the use of dental floss. These examples are relatively brief and generally interesting, but they primarily serve the purpose of setting up the second part of the chapter, wherein Oreskes outlines the five things she believes are necessary for producing reliable scientific knowledge: consensus, method, evidence, values, and humility. What Oreskes says about scientific consensus is excellent, particularly her point that we should learn and remember to distinguish between scientific debate (which takes place in journals, labs, etc.) and all other kinds of debate (political, economic, even the airing of grievances on Twitter). As long as we conflate these two, for example by mischaracterising industry lobbying as part of scientific debate, we’ll never solve the issue of trust in science (133). On method, Oreskes makes the excellent point that a disproportionate focus on methodology can amount to a (biased) fetishization of methodology. Privileging a certain Method A (by, for example, discounting data gleaned from Method B) has led to the kinds of misguided science noted previously in the chapter, which should remind us to not necessarily discount messy evidence just because it is messy.
On values Oreskes as quite a lot to say, most notably arguing against the idea that science is somehow value-free. Scientists are people, and different people carry different perspectives, beliefs, and morals. This is ultimately the most important argument for diversity in science – a more diverse scientific community reduces the bias of a more homogenous one. Besides, Oreskes highlights the central contradiction in the valuelessness of science by asking how scientists can claim to be honest while also claiming to be value-free? If they say they don't let values influence their work, how could you ever prove this? Would you even want to trust a person who proclaims to have no values (152)? Of course not. One of the book’s main pieces of advice given to scientists is that they should not be afraid to share some of their personal values – it might help them come across as more trustworthy to those who share even some of them.
The third section of the book (Chapters 3-6) includes four short comments on Oreskes’ thesis about trust in science from a number of scholars. These responses vary considerably in focus (and quality, in my opinion). The one that appealed to me the most is given by Prof. Susan Lindee, who suggests that we need to re-introduce intellectualism in everyday objects. She calls this the “epistemology of frozen peas”: “Frozen peas are saturated with reliable truth", including i.e. geological sciences in oil/gas industry, plastics science, chemical freezing processes, social science of marketization, etc. (165). According to Lindee, becoming more aware of the ways science is materialised in such mundane objects might help foster trust in it. To me it sounds like a variation on “new materialism” scholarship, which I am generally in favour of, hence why this response in particular may have resonated with me. But Lindee also talks about the line between science and technology in the 20th Century. She notes how in the 1950s scientists were quick to separate science (as the pursuit of knowledge) from technology (as merely the application of knowledge). She notes how one scientist even excluded vaccines and chemotherapy from the list of what he considered ‘scientific things’. Although such a sharp distinction is not exactly helpful, I would tend to agree with the caution in attributing many different things to science. I think it relates to what Oreskes was arguing earlier about conflating scientific debates with other kinds of debates. Especially now, in 2021, I feel there is often a tendency to equate Covid vaccines (often referred to simply by the company that makes them: Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, etc.) with "science", encouraging a “look at what science has given us”-attitude. In the spirit of Lindee’s frozen peas, this obscures the fact that these vaccines also embody the knowledge of manufacturing, logistics, marketing, financial systems, social relations, etc. But perhaps more consequential is the fact that you would be connecting, for better or for worse, the public image of these commercial products with science writ large. In fact, near the end of the book Oreskes explicitly names AstraZeneca amongst the companies who have been caught funding sham science to promote and defend their products (241) – a spicy detail for anyone reading this in 2020 or later. To what extent does a PR disaster for one company affect the PR of the wider scientific community?
The other comments, though overall not wrong, I found to be weaker. Lange's comment is barely a comment (until the final paragraph), and although interesting in its discussion about “dimensional homogeneity”, doesn't strike me as particularly useful in the context of this book. Again, whilst valid, the Edenhofer and Kowarsch comment really concerns more policy-making (and science-backed policy) than it does scientific knowledge per se. They do make a very similar argument to Oreskes though, encouraging diversity amongst policy-makers. Krosnick's comment felt particularly bland and repetitive, and unhelpful in the sense that he doesn't seem to be contributing anything new to the discussion. He also concludes with an unhelpful statement along the lines of ‘we need to recognise the problem, come up with solutions, and implement them’ (Oreskes – surprisingly savagely – tears this response apart in her reply).
The fourth section of the book covers Oreskes’ insightful replies to these comments, and offers a concluding Afterword. In the Afterword she stresses the core argument of her book, namely that you can’t fight fire (read: doubt mongering and fraudulent science) with fire (read: more empirical facts). More attention should instead be paid to her five fundamentals of scientific trustworthiness. This is ultimately the main takeaway for practicing scientists, but foor non-scientists, this conclusion invites us to think more closely about why we believe the science we do, and to reflect on the standards we hold science to.
A great book on a deceptively simple question. I’m sure it’s not too controversial to claim that most people believe that science is in some degree of trouble with regard with its public image and trustworthiness. Think post-truth, scepticism (of climate change or vaccines for example), mistrust of experts, and so forth. To understand what we actually mean when we say science as a public image problem, a book like this one is essential for framing the issue and defining the terms we use in discussing it. What it does particularly well, in my opinion, is boil down decades of research into the history, sociology, and philosophy of science into a core argument: that science is a human endeavour, and truly understanding how scientific knowledge is created involves understanding the human dimension of it. This has important implications for the trustworthiness of science: social consensus and personal values are just as important in defending scientific knowledge as empirical facts and reliable methods.
Apart from the occasional bit of jargon and abstract philosophical concept this book reads surprisingly easily without patronising the reader. Certain sections are weaker than others, particularly some of the comments by other scholars, but overall I can recommend this book to anyone who has a stake in science being trustworthy and reliable (which should be most people, really).
Chunkier synopsis:
The book is somewhat unusually split into four broad sections. In the first (Chapter 1), Naomi Oreskes gives us a crash course on the philosophy of science since the late 19th Century, specifically on the major developments in the way we understand the truthfulness of science and its “Method”. The reader is taken on an intellectual whistle-stop tour of the main ways we have understood science to be done. It starts at the scientific empiricists who claimed that science was true when it could be verified by observation, and makes stops at those who contended that science was concerned with proving things wrong rather than right, those who argued that scientific facts were arrived at through communal ways of thinking, and eventually to those who believed that science progressed in leaps (read: revolutions) which irreversibly change the ways science is done. After a brief stopover this narrative train then leaves behind debates about what the “method” of science is and enters the territory of science studies (or, studying how science in its social, history, and philosophical contexts), treating the reader to vistas of social constructivism, anthropologies of science, and feminist critiques of science. This whole chapter is a fantastic introduction to the biggest developments in Western philosophy of science over the past century-and-a-half. It is particularly useful in providing the reader with the intellectual toolset to start thinking about the points raised in Chapter 2.
The second section (Chapter 2) is itself split into two bits. In the first Oreskes gives the reader five examples of misguided science, including the initial rejection of the now widely accepted continental drift theory, dubious interpretations of eugenics in the first half of the 20th Century, and misunderstandings about the use of dental floss. These examples are relatively brief and generally interesting, but they primarily serve the purpose of setting up the second part of the chapter, wherein Oreskes outlines the five things she believes are necessary for producing reliable scientific knowledge: consensus, method, evidence, values, and humility. What Oreskes says about scientific consensus is excellent, particularly her point that we should learn and remember to distinguish between scientific debate (which takes place in journals, labs, etc.) and all other kinds of debate (political, economic, even the airing of grievances on Twitter). As long as we conflate these two, for example by mischaracterising industry lobbying as part of scientific debate, we’ll never solve the issue of trust in science (133). On method, Oreskes makes the excellent point that a disproportionate focus on methodology can amount to a (biased) fetishization of methodology. Privileging a certain Method A (by, for example, discounting data gleaned from Method B) has led to the kinds of misguided science noted previously in the chapter, which should remind us to not necessarily discount messy evidence just because it is messy.
On values Oreskes as quite a lot to say, most notably arguing against the idea that science is somehow value-free. Scientists are people, and different people carry different perspectives, beliefs, and morals. This is ultimately the most important argument for diversity in science – a more diverse scientific community reduces the bias of a more homogenous one. Besides, Oreskes highlights the central contradiction in the valuelessness of science by asking how scientists can claim to be honest while also claiming to be value-free? If they say they don't let values influence their work, how could you ever prove this? Would you even want to trust a person who proclaims to have no values (152)? Of course not. One of the book’s main pieces of advice given to scientists is that they should not be afraid to share some of their personal values – it might help them come across as more trustworthy to those who share even some of them.
The third section of the book (Chapters 3-6) includes four short comments on Oreskes’ thesis about trust in science from a number of scholars. These responses vary considerably in focus (and quality, in my opinion). The one that appealed to me the most is given by Prof. Susan Lindee, who suggests that we need to re-introduce intellectualism in everyday objects. She calls this the “epistemology of frozen peas”: “Frozen peas are saturated with reliable truth", including i.e. geological sciences in oil/gas industry, plastics science, chemical freezing processes, social science of marketization, etc. (165). According to Lindee, becoming more aware of the ways science is materialised in such mundane objects might help foster trust in it. To me it sounds like a variation on “new materialism” scholarship, which I am generally in favour of, hence why this response in particular may have resonated with me. But Lindee also talks about the line between science and technology in the 20th Century. She notes how in the 1950s scientists were quick to separate science (as the pursuit of knowledge) from technology (as merely the application of knowledge). She notes how one scientist even excluded vaccines and chemotherapy from the list of what he considered ‘scientific things’. Although such a sharp distinction is not exactly helpful, I would tend to agree with the caution in attributing many different things to science. I think it relates to what Oreskes was arguing earlier about conflating scientific debates with other kinds of debates. Especially now, in 2021, I feel there is often a tendency to equate Covid vaccines (often referred to simply by the company that makes them: Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, etc.) with "science", encouraging a “look at what science has given us”-attitude. In the spirit of Lindee’s frozen peas, this obscures the fact that these vaccines also embody the knowledge of manufacturing, logistics, marketing, financial systems, social relations, etc. But perhaps more consequential is the fact that you would be connecting, for better or for worse, the public image of these commercial products with science writ large. In fact, near the end of the book Oreskes explicitly names AstraZeneca amongst the companies who have been caught funding sham science to promote and defend their products (241) – a spicy detail for anyone reading this in 2020 or later. To what extent does a PR disaster for one company affect the PR of the wider scientific community?
The other comments, though overall not wrong, I found to be weaker. Lange's comment is barely a comment (until the final paragraph), and although interesting in its discussion about “dimensional homogeneity”, doesn't strike me as particularly useful in the context of this book. Again, whilst valid, the Edenhofer and Kowarsch comment really concerns more policy-making (and science-backed policy) than it does scientific knowledge per se. They do make a very similar argument to Oreskes though, encouraging diversity amongst policy-makers. Krosnick's comment felt particularly bland and repetitive, and unhelpful in the sense that he doesn't seem to be contributing anything new to the discussion. He also concludes with an unhelpful statement along the lines of ‘we need to recognise the problem, come up with solutions, and implement them’ (Oreskes – surprisingly savagely – tears this response apart in her reply).
The fourth section of the book covers Oreskes’ insightful replies to these comments, and offers a concluding Afterword. In the Afterword she stresses the core argument of her book, namely that you can’t fight fire (read: doubt mongering and fraudulent science) with fire (read: more empirical facts). More attention should instead be paid to her five fundamentals of scientific trustworthiness. This is ultimately the main takeaway for practicing scientists, but foor non-scientists, this conclusion invites us to think more closely about why we believe the science we do, and to reflect on the standards we hold science to.
November 16, 2022
Oreskes (geologist-turned-history-of-science-professor at Harvard U.) presents arguments in favor of science. These arguments are timely, as the world, the US in particular, is deluged with anti-science sentiments and policy proposals. After centuries of success as the ultimate in fairness and truthfulness, science faces a crisis. Today, people with certain political leanings do not hesitate to doubt science if its findings clash with their cherished beliefs or economic interests.
Oreskes is careful not to imply that science is always right. On the contrary, she stresses the fact that sometimes even Nobel Laureates have changed their minds. Science is trustworthy because it has mechanisms for error detection and correction built in. Use of control groups, peer review, requirement for reproducibility, follow-up studies, and, in the extreme, retraction of published results provides a level of trust and transparency that is lacking in almost all other human endeavors.
Oreskes offers her arguments in the form of rebuttals to four commentaries from colleagues (Chapter 3, science historian Susan Lindee; Chapter 4, science philosopher Marc Lange; Chapter 5, economist Ottomar Edenhofer & philosopher Martin Kowarsch; Chapter 6, social psychologist Jon A. Krosnick). The commentaries/rebuttals, which form the bulk of the book, are sandwiched between background material in an introduction, Chapter 1, & Chapter 2, and concluding thoughts in Chapter 7 & an afterword.
About hostile questions at her talks, Oreskes has opined in an interview that she can tell when one is coming. Empirically speaking, "They're always men, almost always over 50-ish, and they stand up using belligerent body language." Oreskes was motivated to put her pro-science arguments on paper when an audience member at one of her talks asked what she considered to be a fair question: "Well, that's all well and good, but why should we believe you or trust the science anyway?"
Oreskes is careful not to imply that science is always right. On the contrary, she stresses the fact that sometimes even Nobel Laureates have changed their minds. Science is trustworthy because it has mechanisms for error detection and correction built in. Use of control groups, peer review, requirement for reproducibility, follow-up studies, and, in the extreme, retraction of published results provides a level of trust and transparency that is lacking in almost all other human endeavors.
Oreskes offers her arguments in the form of rebuttals to four commentaries from colleagues (Chapter 3, science historian Susan Lindee; Chapter 4, science philosopher Marc Lange; Chapter 5, economist Ottomar Edenhofer & philosopher Martin Kowarsch; Chapter 6, social psychologist Jon A. Krosnick). The commentaries/rebuttals, which form the bulk of the book, are sandwiched between background material in an introduction, Chapter 1, & Chapter 2, and concluding thoughts in Chapter 7 & an afterword.
About hostile questions at her talks, Oreskes has opined in an interview that she can tell when one is coming. Empirically speaking, "They're always men, almost always over 50-ish, and they stand up using belligerent body language." Oreskes was motivated to put her pro-science arguments on paper when an audience member at one of her talks asked what she considered to be a fair question: "Well, that's all well and good, but why should we believe you or trust the science anyway?"
April 1, 2022
برای من کتاب متوسط تر از چیزی بود که تعریف ها و ستایش ها از کتاب وعده میدادند.
اورسکیز نگاهی به چالش های یافتن روش در علم می اندازد و بعد به سراغ نقدهای اجتماعی میرود. و نهایتا راه حلی را برای موجه دانستن باور به علم پیشنهاد میدهد: علم قابل اعتماد است از آنجا که و تا آنجا که محصول اجماع یک جماعت علمی از متخصصان نقاد، گشوده و متنوع است.
مهمترین نقد به این طرح را مارک لنگ به عالی ترین شکل در نقد دوم به سخنرانی های اورسکیز طرح میکند: این ویژگی علم نمیتواند برای کل علم توجیهی دست و پا کند و دچار دور است؛ اول اینکه چه کسی متخصص بودن را مشخص میکند؟ دوم اینکه اصلا چرا این ملاک میتواند توجیه ساز باشد؟
فرض کنیم که این ملاک بدون تقلیل به چیزی دیگر موجه ساز است؛ خب این را هم اورسکیز به خوبی توضیح نمیدهد.
به نظر من بخش جالب تر کتاب بررسی های موردی است و مقادیری نصیحت حاصل از تاریخ برای دانشمندان:
مثل نداشتن فتیش روشی، یا گشودن جامعه علمی برای تنوع بیشتر.
اما یک سوال دیگر: واقعا اجماعی که اورسکیز مدنظر دارد چه مقدار حاصل میشود؟
اورسکیز نگاهی به چالش های یافتن روش در علم می اندازد و بعد به سراغ نقدهای اجتماعی میرود. و نهایتا راه حلی را برای موجه دانستن باور به علم پیشنهاد میدهد: علم قابل اعتماد است از آنجا که و تا آنجا که محصول اجماع یک جماعت علمی از متخصصان نقاد، گشوده و متنوع است.
مهمترین نقد به این طرح را مارک لنگ به عالی ترین شکل در نقد دوم به سخنرانی های اورسکیز طرح میکند: این ویژگی علم نمیتواند برای کل علم توجیهی دست و پا کند و دچار دور است؛ اول اینکه چه کسی متخصص بودن را مشخص میکند؟ دوم اینکه اصلا چرا این ملاک میتواند توجیه ساز باشد؟
فرض کنیم که این ملاک بدون تقلیل به چیزی دیگر موجه ساز است؛ خب این را هم اورسکیز به خوبی توضیح نمیدهد.
به نظر من بخش جالب تر کتاب بررسی های موردی است و مقادیری نصیحت حاصل از تاریخ برای دانشمندان:
مثل نداشتن فتیش روشی، یا گشودن جامعه علمی برای تنوع بیشتر.
اما یک سوال دیگر: واقعا اجماعی که اورسکیز مدنظر دارد چه مقدار حاصل میشود؟
April 28, 2022
بنظرم ایراد بزرگ این کتاب توی عنوانش هست
"چون محتوا دنبال این نیست که "چرا باید به علم اعتماد کنیم" بلکه دنبال اینه که ما "باید به چگونه علمی اعتماد کنیم
در واقع مخاطب کتاب افراد بی اعتماد به علم نیستن بلکه کسایی هستن که نمیدونن به کدوم نظریه اعتماد کنن
منظور من در واقع اینه که اگه شما به هر دلیلی یک فرد بی اعتماد به علم باشید این کتاب تقریبا هیچ کمکی نمیکنه که اعتمادی پیدا کنید
از طرف دیگه خانم نویسنده ی ما یک فمینیست تمام عیار هستن و نصف بیشتر مثال هایی که میزنه از همین ویژگی برخاسته و از یه جایی به بعد تکرار این مثال ها میره رو مخ خواننده
سه ستاره زیادش بود ولی خب اونقدی هم بد نبود که دو ستاره بدم
"چون محتوا دنبال این نیست که "چرا باید به علم اعتماد کنیم" بلکه دنبال اینه که ما "باید به چگونه علمی اعتماد کنیم
در واقع مخاطب کتاب افراد بی اعتماد به علم نیستن بلکه کسایی هستن که نمیدونن به کدوم نظریه اعتماد کنن
منظور من در واقع اینه که اگه شما به هر دلیلی یک فرد بی اعتماد به علم باشید این کتاب تقریبا هیچ کمکی نمیکنه که اعتمادی پیدا کنید
از طرف دیگه خانم نویسنده ی ما یک فمینیست تمام عیار هستن و نصف بیشتر مثال هایی که میزنه از همین ویژگی برخاسته و از یه جایی به بعد تکرار این مثال ها میره رو مخ خواننده
سه ستاره زیادش بود ولی خب اونقدی هم بد نبود که دو ستاره بدم
March 3, 2023
Hard to keep reading this one… for a book filled with super interesting research/information, this was incredibly dull to read. Also I wouldn’t recommend for someone who wouldn’t already know much scientific or research jargon which is kind of disappointing. But maybe I should’ve expected that
January 28, 2021
کی گوش میده به صدای عقل؟ رسانه؟ دولت؟ نهاد علم؟ تودهی مردم؟
ما در مقام یک گونهی حیات موجودات عقلگرایی هستیم؟
ما در مقام یک گونهی حیات موجودات عقلگرایی هستیم؟
December 3, 2022
simply amazing!
October 31, 2021
This is an important book that I would advise anyone who has concerns about the current state of science (i.e., almost everyone, but scientists especially) to read.
I think this book will also become a milestone in the literature on the history and philosophy of science for scholars and interested non-specialists.
For general readers, it provides the philosophical groundwork and useful framework for why we should trust science in general based on: 1. consensus, 2. diversity, 3. method, 4. evidence, and 5. values. My only concern here is that some of the introductory material on the history and philosophy of science is a bit academic at times, but I have mixed feelings about this. On the one hand, the background on history/philosophy of science feels too detailed, and I worry that some this may go over the heads of general readers. Having done some reading on history/philosophy of science in the past myself, I also think that it might benefit from being MORE detailed to provide better perspective on just how hotly debated many of the issues mentioned in the intro have been historically (for example, only a few pages are dedicated to falsificationism and verificationism, glossing over half a century of debate within the scholarly community). But overall, I don't think the average reader is especially interested in these historical debates, so I think it's fine as is - my complaint is that I, personally, would want to see more of this.
For specialists and non-specialists interested in the history and philosophy of science, this book will likely become a touchstone because, although not all the ideas presented are entirely novel, this is the first time I've seen them consolidated in one place. Personally, I have been waiting for a book like this to be published for some time. I had previously read on these issues and the field had seemingly reached a dead of sorts in the 1970s and subsequently (e.g. Feyerabend and "Against Method", Chalmers with "What is This Thing Called Science?"). I perceived that the field was at an impasse in terms of how to deal with the problems presented in the introduction to this book - I had asked multiple people in the field of history/philosophy of science where I should turn next for my reading on this topic, but few were able to provide a satisfying answer.
I was incorrect. This book is the answer to the question of where history and philosophy of science has been since that era and where it goes next. It also provides references to important interconnecting material that I had not been previously aware of, such as the contributions of of Helen Longino and other feminist philosophers of science in developing many of the ideas in this book related to consensus and the importance of diversity within scientific communities. The field was not at a dead end, as I previously thought.
Therefore, this book may now serve as touchstone for future work on the history/philosophy of science, as well as consolidating and providing the "connective tissue" between older literature on this topic and the cutting edge for non-specialists.
I think this book will also become a milestone in the literature on the history and philosophy of science for scholars and interested non-specialists.
For general readers, it provides the philosophical groundwork and useful framework for why we should trust science in general based on: 1. consensus, 2. diversity, 3. method, 4. evidence, and 5. values. My only concern here is that some of the introductory material on the history and philosophy of science is a bit academic at times, but I have mixed feelings about this. On the one hand, the background on history/philosophy of science feels too detailed, and I worry that some this may go over the heads of general readers. Having done some reading on history/philosophy of science in the past myself, I also think that it might benefit from being MORE detailed to provide better perspective on just how hotly debated many of the issues mentioned in the intro have been historically (for example, only a few pages are dedicated to falsificationism and verificationism, glossing over half a century of debate within the scholarly community). But overall, I don't think the average reader is especially interested in these historical debates, so I think it's fine as is - my complaint is that I, personally, would want to see more of this.
For specialists and non-specialists interested in the history and philosophy of science, this book will likely become a touchstone because, although not all the ideas presented are entirely novel, this is the first time I've seen them consolidated in one place. Personally, I have been waiting for a book like this to be published for some time. I had previously read on these issues and the field had seemingly reached a dead of sorts in the 1970s and subsequently (e.g. Feyerabend and "Against Method", Chalmers with "What is This Thing Called Science?"). I perceived that the field was at an impasse in terms of how to deal with the problems presented in the introduction to this book - I had asked multiple people in the field of history/philosophy of science where I should turn next for my reading on this topic, but few were able to provide a satisfying answer.
I was incorrect. This book is the answer to the question of where history and philosophy of science has been since that era and where it goes next. It also provides references to important interconnecting material that I had not been previously aware of, such as the contributions of of Helen Longino and other feminist philosophers of science in developing many of the ideas in this book related to consensus and the importance of diversity within scientific communities. The field was not at a dead end, as I previously thought.
Therefore, this book may now serve as touchstone for future work on the history/philosophy of science, as well as consolidating and providing the "connective tissue" between older literature on this topic and the cutting edge for non-specialists.
April 28, 2021
"لماذا الثقة في العلم؟"
في شهر اكتوبر2019، أي قبل أربعة أشهر من انتشار جائحة كوفيد 19، صدر هذا الكتاب بقلم متخصصة في تاريخ وفلسفة الدراسات العلمية، وهي البروفيسورة الأمريكية/ ناومي أوراسكيس.
رسالة الكتاب هي التوضيح كيف ولماذا يمكن أن يثق الناس في العلم ولماذا يتم أحيانا رفضه، وتوصلت المؤلفة لمادة كتابها من خلال تقصيها لتاريخ وفلسفة العلوم منذ أواخر القرن التاسع عشر إلى أيامنا هذه من القرن الحادي والعشرين.
ارتأت المؤلفة إصدار الكتاب بسبب شيوع رفض بعض الآراء العلمية وقت زعامة الرئيس الأمريكي السابق/ دونالد ترامب، وكذلك لما تنامى إلى مسامعها مرارا وتكرارا، صراحة أو تلميحا، من التشكيك في أهم آرائها العلمية التي تبنتها ودافعت عنها بقوة: صحة نظرية التغير المناخي وظاهرة "الاحترار" العالمي.
وفي أيامنا هذه، أي بعد حوالي عام ونصف من صدور هذا الكتاب، لاحظ المختصون ازدياد الطلب على استعارته من المكتبات العامة، وارتفاع نسبة مبيعاته، مع الاستشهاد ببعض ما ورد فيه أثناء النقاش الشائع حول أنواع التطعيم المخصص للوقاية من فيروس كوفيد 19، أو مع الجدل للتشكيك في مصداقية بعضها أو سلامة أسلوب إنتاجه، ولهذا استحسنت نشر مراجعتي لمادة الكتاب.
يوضح الكتاب الأسباب التى تراها المؤلفة مؤدية لرفض الجمهور لبعض الأقوال العلمية، وأهمها تعدد الطرق التي يستخدمها العلماء للوصول إلى استنتاجاتهم موضحة بأنه لا يمكن أن تكون طريقة واحدة فقط، أو قد يكون الرفض لعدم رغبة البعض في تصديق تلك الاستنتاجات العلمية لأنها ترعبهم أو تؤدي لخسارتهم لبعض مصالحهم سواء كانت اقتصادية أو اجتماعية أو سياسية.
هذا وينتقد الكتاب أسلوب التعليم العلمي حيث أنه يؤهل خريجي العلوم بمختلف تخصصاتهم لسرد الحقائق العلمية، ولكن مع عدم إجادتهم لتوضيح كيفية استنتاج ما توصلوا إليه بالمقارنة مع الطرق الأخرى، هذا مع عدم إجادة "سرد الحكاية"، مع أن ذلك مما يرسخ المعلومة ويساعد الجمهور على تمحيص ما يصل إليه.
يتبنى الكتاب أهمية تعليم كيفية عمل العلوم وفلسفتها وتاريخها مؤكدا أن ذلك أفضل أثرا وأعمق من مجرد حشو رؤوس المتعلمين بالمزيد من العلوم.
وقد أشار الكتاب إلى وجود حالات تم فيها قبول النظريات العلمية، ولكن متأخرا بعد ثبات صحتها كما هو حال مشكلة تغير المناخ والاحترار العالمي التي بدأ التحذير من حصولها في الخمسينات من القرن الفائت، لتظهر واضحة للجميع بعد العقد الأول من القرن العشرين، كما أشار الكتاب إلى إمكانية نجاح تعاون العلم والسياسة قبل حصول الكارثة، كما حصل في مشكلة ثقب الأوزون.
الكتاب بحث علمي رصين موجه للعقلية التعليمية التي تستند إلى إمكانية التشكيك في أي معلومة تتلقاها، بحيث يكون الاقتناع بها بعد تقصي ما يثبتها، وتمحيص ما يناقضها، وأجمل مافيه فصليه الأول والثاني، ففي الأول توضيح لماذا تتباين طرق الوصول للاستنتاجات العلمية، وفي الثاني أيراد حالات أخفقت فيها الاستنتاجات العلمية مع توضيح أسباب ذلك.
مع أن جوهر الكتاب يركز على قضية تغير المناخ والاحترار العالمي، إلا أنه يصلح مدخلا عميقا لتقييم الاختلافات الجوهرية حول جدوى التطعيم ضد فيروس كوفيد 19، ولتقييم الاختلافات حول نظرية النشوء والارتقاء "التطور البيولوجي"، وكذلك أي استنتاجات علمية يحصل جدل حول مصداقيتها، خاصة وأن مؤلفته تتبنى بقوة أهمية تعدد الآراء الرصينة مهما كان الاختلاف بين الآراء، حيث أن ذلك يؤدي للنظر من عدة زوايا قبل الوصول لأي استنتاج علمي.
Happy Reading especially of the first two chapters.
في شهر اكتوبر2019، أي قبل أربعة أشهر من انتشار جائحة كوفيد 19، صدر هذا الكتاب بقلم متخصصة في تاريخ وفلسفة الدراسات العلمية، وهي البروفيسورة الأمريكية/ ناومي أوراسكيس.
رسالة الكتاب هي التوضيح كيف ولماذا يمكن أن يثق الناس في العلم ولماذا يتم أحيانا رفضه، وتوصلت المؤلفة لمادة كتابها من خلال تقصيها لتاريخ وفلسفة العلوم منذ أواخر القرن التاسع عشر إلى أيامنا هذه من القرن الحادي والعشرين.
ارتأت المؤلفة إصدار الكتاب بسبب شيوع رفض بعض الآراء العلمية وقت زعامة الرئيس الأمريكي السابق/ دونالد ترامب، وكذلك لما تنامى إلى مسامعها مرارا وتكرارا، صراحة أو تلميحا، من التشكيك في أهم آرائها العلمية التي تبنتها ودافعت عنها بقوة: صحة نظرية التغير المناخي وظاهرة "الاحترار" العالمي.
وفي أيامنا هذه، أي بعد حوالي عام ونصف من صدور هذا الكتاب، لاحظ المختصون ازدياد الطلب على استعارته من المكتبات العامة، وارتفاع نسبة مبيعاته، مع الاستشهاد ببعض ما ورد فيه أثناء النقاش الشائع حول أنواع التطعيم المخصص للوقاية من فيروس كوفيد 19، أو مع الجدل للتشكيك في مصداقية بعضها أو سلامة أسلوب إنتاجه، ولهذا استحسنت نشر مراجعتي لمادة الكتاب.
يوضح الكتاب الأسباب التى تراها المؤلفة مؤدية لرفض الجمهور لبعض الأقوال العلمية، وأهمها تعدد الطرق التي يستخدمها العلماء للوصول إلى استنتاجاتهم موضحة بأنه لا يمكن أن تكون طريقة واحدة فقط، أو قد يكون الرفض لعدم رغبة البعض في تصديق تلك الاستنتاجات العلمية لأنها ترعبهم أو تؤدي لخسارتهم لبعض مصالحهم سواء كانت اقتصادية أو اجتماعية أو سياسية.
هذا وينتقد الكتاب أسلوب التعليم العلمي حيث أنه يؤهل خريجي العلوم بمختلف تخصصاتهم لسرد الحقائق العلمية، ولكن مع عدم إجادتهم لتوضيح كيفية استنتاج ما توصلوا إليه بالمقارنة مع الطرق الأخرى، هذا مع عدم إجادة "سرد الحكاية"، مع أن ذلك مما يرسخ المعلومة ويساعد الجمهور على تمحيص ما يصل إليه.
يتبنى الكتاب أهمية تعليم كيفية عمل العلوم وفلسفتها وتاريخها مؤكدا أن ذلك أفضل أثرا وأعمق من مجرد حشو رؤوس المتعلمين بالمزيد من العلوم.
وقد أشار الكتاب إلى وجود حالات تم فيها قبول النظريات العلمية، ولكن متأخرا بعد ثبات صحتها كما هو حال مشكلة تغير المناخ والاحترار العالمي التي بدأ التحذير من حصولها في الخمسينات من القرن الفائت، لتظهر واضحة للجميع بعد العقد الأول من القرن العشرين، كما أشار الكتاب إلى إمكانية نجاح تعاون العلم والسياسة قبل حصول الكارثة، كما حصل في مشكلة ثقب الأوزون.
الكتاب بحث علمي رصين موجه للعقلية التعليمية التي تستند إلى إمكانية التشكيك في أي معلومة تتلقاها، بحيث يكون الاقتناع بها بعد تقصي ما يثبتها، وتمحيص ما يناقضها، وأجمل مافيه فصليه الأول والثاني، ففي الأول توضيح لماذا تتباين طرق الوصول للاستنتاجات العلمية، وفي الثاني أيراد حالات أخفقت فيها الاستنتاجات العلمية مع توضيح أسباب ذلك.
مع أن جوهر الكتاب يركز على قضية تغير المناخ والاحترار العالمي، إلا أنه يصلح مدخلا عميقا لتقييم الاختلافات الجوهرية حول جدوى التطعيم ضد فيروس كوفيد 19، ولتقييم الاختلافات حول نظرية النشوء والارتقاء "التطور البيولوجي"، وكذلك أي استنتاجات علمية يحصل جدل حول مصداقيتها، خاصة وأن مؤلفته تتبنى بقوة أهمية تعدد الآراء الرصينة مهما كان الاختلاف بين الآراء، حيث أن ذلك يؤدي للنظر من عدة زوايا قبل الوصول لأي استنتاج علمي.
Happy Reading especially of the first two chapters.
May 22, 2020
This book is a challenge, but one that is well worth it.
I came to Ms Oreskes via her previous work "Merchants of Doubt" which chronicles the efforts of a loose group of free market ideologues to undermine science on a number of issues in order to head off governmental regulation. That book neatly exposes the history and tactics of professional science denier whose efforts were felt in the fight over tobacco and second hand smoke, acid rain, CFCs and ozone depletion, and, of course, climate change.
Merchant of Doubt deals with the growing threat of science denial for ideological and/or economic purposes. Why Trust Science is nominally an accompanying book which considers the title question. Anyone who has encountered individuals who try to refute climate science by claiming "they were wrong about global cooling in the 80s" understands why such a book may be necessary.
The book itself is laid out in an interesting manner. In the first 2 chapters Ms Oreskes deals with fundamental topics of knowledge and scientific advancement and discusses instances when science has actually gone off the rails. This section, in itself was interesting as Ms Oreskes makes the argument that "the scientific method" as we understand it is NOT the true strength behind science. Instead, that strength is the scientific community. Ms Oreskes makes the argument that your world is a set of social trust relationships: you implicitly trust your dentist, your plumber, your barber. What makes science different is that there is a central "community" that bestows expert status, reviews ideas and new information, and rejects those that fail to convince or contain error. Is it perfect? It's a community of humans so the answer must be no. But it works a lot (a real lot) more often than it doesn't.
Ms Oreskes then turns the middle chapters of the book over to other writers who contribute critiques of her initial thoughts. The book ends with Ms Oreskes response to these critiques. The technique is obviously intended to remind the reader of the tradition of peer review in scientific papers, but it also provides an interesting and thought provoking experience.
The book is a challenge to read. It presents more as a scientific paper than as a book for general consumption. Certainly, it is much more formal in presentation than the approachable Merchants of Doubt. Given that Ms Oreskes stated purpose is to try to inoculate the public against the growing tide of science denial, one does wonder if a less academic approach might be more successful.
I did go into the book expecting a less difficult read but I'm glad I stuck with it. I walked away with some new ideas on epistemology, science, and most importantly, how to deal with both as a layman.
September 24, 2020
This book makes many excellent points about trusting science in the face of growing dismissive beliefs; the core issue sparking the defense is climate change, but Oreskes explores everything from the origins of science to times scientists did get it wrong to WHY they got it wrong, and how good science is conducted. It also includes four engaging responses, and the author's own responses to those, creating a great back and forth dialogue.
Oreskes begins her book with the history of philosophers of science throughout history - admittedly, my least favorite part, which was quite a dry sequence of topics and lenses to look through. However, the pacing picked up with five examples of how scientists were wrong in the past, and more importantly, exploring WHY they got it wrong. These topics include the ugly topic of eugenics, to the sexist Limited Energy Theory (used to exclude women from academia) and delay of science to recognize birth control pills caused depression, to topics as inoffensive as continental drift and dental floss.
The arguments espoused and consistently well-explained by the author is that in errors of science, the causes for bad science typically boil down to the values of the scientists. However, the rebuttal - and core arguments for the title - is that overall, science is trustworthy because good science entails a) a general consensus of the experts in the field, b) diversities of opinions to ensure problems are looked at from multiple angles, and c) methodological flexibility ensures many ways of proving something is possible.
Furthermore, being a sideways defense of climate change science, Oreskes explores how arguments against the field are not based in science, but in the social, political, or economic values of the attackers; in this, a) science is not actually faulty and b) we cannot attempt to reason with detractors via the evidence of scientific knowledge, even as they happily utilize the products of science all around them (iPhones, frozen peas, toasters, etc. - admittedly one of my favorite points, from one of the reply essays by Susan Lindee).
All in all, a cohesive, persuasive book, if sometimes overly wordy/philosophical for me.
Oreskes begins her book with the history of philosophers of science throughout history - admittedly, my least favorite part, which was quite a dry sequence of topics and lenses to look through. However, the pacing picked up with five examples of how scientists were wrong in the past, and more importantly, exploring WHY they got it wrong. These topics include the ugly topic of eugenics, to the sexist Limited Energy Theory (used to exclude women from academia) and delay of science to recognize birth control pills caused depression, to topics as inoffensive as continental drift and dental floss.
The arguments espoused and consistently well-explained by the author is that in errors of science, the causes for bad science typically boil down to the values of the scientists. However, the rebuttal - and core arguments for the title - is that overall, science is trustworthy because good science entails a) a general consensus of the experts in the field, b) diversities of opinions to ensure problems are looked at from multiple angles, and c) methodological flexibility ensures many ways of proving something is possible.
Furthermore, being a sideways defense of climate change science, Oreskes explores how arguments against the field are not based in science, but in the social, political, or economic values of the attackers; in this, a) science is not actually faulty and b) we cannot attempt to reason with detractors via the evidence of scientific knowledge, even as they happily utilize the products of science all around them (iPhones, frozen peas, toasters, etc. - admittedly one of my favorite points, from one of the reply essays by Susan Lindee).
All in all, a cohesive, persuasive book, if sometimes overly wordy/philosophical for me.
September 17, 2021
I came to Why Trust Science (2019, paperback edition 2021) after reading The Merchants of Doubt (2010). The later book, which focused on the ways that science is cast in doubt by those who find that it conflicts with their interests, ended with a brief discussion about why we should want to trust science. I was hoping for more than was offered and fortunately, one of the coauthors of Merchants of Doubt, Naomi Oreskes, provides a more in-depth answer to the question.
The book is based on lectures that Oreskes gave at Princeton in 2016. It includes and introduction by Stephen Macedo that provides an excellent overview of the book (life hack: use the “Look Inside” feature of Amazon to read the entire introduction or if you read ebooks, download the “Sample” from the Apple store), commentary from four scholars and expanded material to the original lectures as well as replies to her critics.
I highly recommend reading first The Merchants of Doubt followed by Why Trust Science in order, back-to-back. I have reviewed The Merchants of Doubt on that books Goodreads page, so I won’t repeat that here only to comment that it is a deeply researched and compellingly argued case for how we have gotten to a place where there is so much distrust of science today.
In Why Trust Science, we get an equally well-argued answer to the question, with some supporting evidence from surprising quarters.
Chapter 1 begins with a concise history of the philosophy of science beginning with Comte (positivism) and working through the Vienna Circle (verification), Popper (falsifiability), Fleck (thought collectives), Kuhn (paradigms), the Edinburgh School (social construction of knowledge), Feyerabend (against method) and others. (I greatly enjoyed this refresher, as this has been an area of interest for me for years. Popper, for instance, is one of my heroes).
She finishes her survey with what she calls “Social Epistemology”, which she attributes to the contributions made by feminist philosophers, especially Sandra Harding and Helen Longino (both new to me). These writers demonstrate how science can be more objective if it is more diverse. Social epistemology observes that one of the central features of science is that it is self-correcting, or more properly “it is not so much that science corrects itself, but that scientists correct each other through the social processes that constitute ‘transformative interrogation’. It is through the give and take of ideas – the challenging, the questioning, the adjusting and the amending – that scientists integrate their colleagues’ work, offer up criticisms, and contribute to the growth of knowledge”. Assuming this is true, then the process of transformative interrogation is enriched by a diversity of points of view. Accepting that scientists are not value free and don’t come to table with a blank slate relative to their backgrounds, communities, and assumptions, then broadening the range of participants will bring to bear more perspectives on an issue than a less divers one. While scientist, being human, have subjective biases, science, being a social phenomenon, gets closer to objectivity though a broadening of competing perspectives. To quote Longino: “Values are not incompatible with objectivity, but objectivity emerges as a function of community practices rather than as an attitude of individual researchers”.
With the conclusion of this survey, Orestes’ key conclusion is that science is fundamentally consensual. To quote Longino again: “To say that a theory or hypothesis was accepted on the basis of objective methods does not entitle us to say it is true but rather that it reflects the critically achieved consensus of the scientific community. And it is not clear we should hope for anything better”.
Oreskes adds: “There is no (singular) scientific method…scientific practice consists of communities of people, making decisions for reasons that are both empirical and social, using diverse methods.” Given this, then why trust science? Oreskes reply is two fold:
• We trust science because of its sustained engagement with the world
• We trust science because of its social character
On the first point, Oreskes surfaces the issue of expertise. She points out that we rely on experts to navigate all areas of life: plumbers, electricians, physicians, etc. And we trust these people. Maybe not individual practitioners, but their professions. Without experts, society would come to a standstill. By analogy she argues that scientists are our “designated experts for studying the world. Therefore, to the degree that we would trust anyone to tell us about the world, we should trust scientists”.
One the second point, she argues that being an expert at telling us about the world in not sufficient for establishing trust in science, but we must also weigh “the social character of science and the role it plays in vetting claims”. This includes peer review, conferences, institutions, the process of tenure, and even informal conversations – the mechanisms that vet claims. She concludes: “The social character of science forms the basis of its approach to objectivity and there the grounds on which we may trust it”.
Before closing the first chapter, Oreskes as two caveats to her position. First, there is no guarantee that scientists are correct in any given case. However, science provides the mechanism by which errors can be identified and corrected. Second, we should not put our trust in individual scientists, especially is they stray outside their domains. We are rather to put our trust in the consensual conclusions of scientific communities.
Oreskes adds a coda to all of this by asking why we might not trust the research and findings of a sector like the petroleum industry. Certainly, they have scientists who are actively engaged in the world with the goal of growing knowledge about the oil production. To this has a three-word answer: Conflict of Interest. I return you to the Merchants of Doubt to watch Oreskes and her co-author, meticulously demonstrate the truth of this proposition.
The remainder of the book is essentially exercises and examples that help the reader better understand her argument, in a way; to teach us how to practice what she is preaching.
The second chapter provides examples of science that has gone awry and what can be done to avoid it. In the course of the analysis, she offers additional advice on how to produce Reliable Knowledge. The keys are consensus, method, evidence, values and humility. This chapter also has a coda about the importance of values in science (answer, values are very important).
Chapters 3-6 are comments from other scholars about Orestes’ theses with chapter 7 offering her robust replies.
In the Afterword, she summarizes her efforts and concludes: “There is much we do not know, but that is no reason not to trust science on the things we do know. The argument for trust in science is not an argument for blind or blanket trust. It is an argument for warranted confidence against unwarranted skepticism in scientist’s findings in their domains of expertise”.
As she notes in the epigraph of the book:
Trust but Verify – Ronald Reagan
The book is based on lectures that Oreskes gave at Princeton in 2016. It includes and introduction by Stephen Macedo that provides an excellent overview of the book (life hack: use the “Look Inside” feature of Amazon to read the entire introduction or if you read ebooks, download the “Sample” from the Apple store), commentary from four scholars and expanded material to the original lectures as well as replies to her critics.
I highly recommend reading first The Merchants of Doubt followed by Why Trust Science in order, back-to-back. I have reviewed The Merchants of Doubt on that books Goodreads page, so I won’t repeat that here only to comment that it is a deeply researched and compellingly argued case for how we have gotten to a place where there is so much distrust of science today.
In Why Trust Science, we get an equally well-argued answer to the question, with some supporting evidence from surprising quarters.
Chapter 1 begins with a concise history of the philosophy of science beginning with Comte (positivism) and working through the Vienna Circle (verification), Popper (falsifiability), Fleck (thought collectives), Kuhn (paradigms), the Edinburgh School (social construction of knowledge), Feyerabend (against method) and others. (I greatly enjoyed this refresher, as this has been an area of interest for me for years. Popper, for instance, is one of my heroes).
She finishes her survey with what she calls “Social Epistemology”, which she attributes to the contributions made by feminist philosophers, especially Sandra Harding and Helen Longino (both new to me). These writers demonstrate how science can be more objective if it is more diverse. Social epistemology observes that one of the central features of science is that it is self-correcting, or more properly “it is not so much that science corrects itself, but that scientists correct each other through the social processes that constitute ‘transformative interrogation’. It is through the give and take of ideas – the challenging, the questioning, the adjusting and the amending – that scientists integrate their colleagues’ work, offer up criticisms, and contribute to the growth of knowledge”. Assuming this is true, then the process of transformative interrogation is enriched by a diversity of points of view. Accepting that scientists are not value free and don’t come to table with a blank slate relative to their backgrounds, communities, and assumptions, then broadening the range of participants will bring to bear more perspectives on an issue than a less divers one. While scientist, being human, have subjective biases, science, being a social phenomenon, gets closer to objectivity though a broadening of competing perspectives. To quote Longino: “Values are not incompatible with objectivity, but objectivity emerges as a function of community practices rather than as an attitude of individual researchers”.
With the conclusion of this survey, Orestes’ key conclusion is that science is fundamentally consensual. To quote Longino again: “To say that a theory or hypothesis was accepted on the basis of objective methods does not entitle us to say it is true but rather that it reflects the critically achieved consensus of the scientific community. And it is not clear we should hope for anything better”.
Oreskes adds: “There is no (singular) scientific method…scientific practice consists of communities of people, making decisions for reasons that are both empirical and social, using diverse methods.” Given this, then why trust science? Oreskes reply is two fold:
• We trust science because of its sustained engagement with the world
• We trust science because of its social character
On the first point, Oreskes surfaces the issue of expertise. She points out that we rely on experts to navigate all areas of life: plumbers, electricians, physicians, etc. And we trust these people. Maybe not individual practitioners, but their professions. Without experts, society would come to a standstill. By analogy she argues that scientists are our “designated experts for studying the world. Therefore, to the degree that we would trust anyone to tell us about the world, we should trust scientists”.
One the second point, she argues that being an expert at telling us about the world in not sufficient for establishing trust in science, but we must also weigh “the social character of science and the role it plays in vetting claims”. This includes peer review, conferences, institutions, the process of tenure, and even informal conversations – the mechanisms that vet claims. She concludes: “The social character of science forms the basis of its approach to objectivity and there the grounds on which we may trust it”.
Before closing the first chapter, Oreskes as two caveats to her position. First, there is no guarantee that scientists are correct in any given case. However, science provides the mechanism by which errors can be identified and corrected. Second, we should not put our trust in individual scientists, especially is they stray outside their domains. We are rather to put our trust in the consensual conclusions of scientific communities.
Oreskes adds a coda to all of this by asking why we might not trust the research and findings of a sector like the petroleum industry. Certainly, they have scientists who are actively engaged in the world with the goal of growing knowledge about the oil production. To this has a three-word answer: Conflict of Interest. I return you to the Merchants of Doubt to watch Oreskes and her co-author, meticulously demonstrate the truth of this proposition.
The remainder of the book is essentially exercises and examples that help the reader better understand her argument, in a way; to teach us how to practice what she is preaching.
The second chapter provides examples of science that has gone awry and what can be done to avoid it. In the course of the analysis, she offers additional advice on how to produce Reliable Knowledge. The keys are consensus, method, evidence, values and humility. This chapter also has a coda about the importance of values in science (answer, values are very important).
Chapters 3-6 are comments from other scholars about Orestes’ theses with chapter 7 offering her robust replies.
In the Afterword, she summarizes her efforts and concludes: “There is much we do not know, but that is no reason not to trust science on the things we do know. The argument for trust in science is not an argument for blind or blanket trust. It is an argument for warranted confidence against unwarranted skepticism in scientist’s findings in their domains of expertise”.
As she notes in the epigraph of the book:
Trust but Verify – Ronald Reagan
February 23, 2020
Naomi Oreskes book, "Why Trust Science?", was a little dry for my taste, but the author tries to make the point that science done right, works. The process follows the scientific method of testing, proving and re-proving, and responds to evidence, observations, and experience. A scientific belief may be held until it can be proven to be untrue, and when it can't be shown to be untrue, given enough tries and enough time, we then begin to have confidence.
But even then, some people may have trouble accepting what's presented as scientific facts. That may be due to a conflict with religious beliefs (such as the age of the earth), or conflicts with political beliefs (such as the belief that markets, not regulations, are the way to solve problems). If accepting a science report conflicts with a previously held religious belief, or conflicts with a previously held political belief, one may disregard the science over their value system. But if one can examine their own values, their prejudices, and examine how the analysis was performed, it might help.
Before theories are taken seriously, further studies need to be made, and confirmation testing must be completed. Science tends to be self-correcting, and when enough studies and tests are completed, confidence increases. Oreskes makes the point that consensus is a crucial indicator of when a scientific matter has been settled, and in those cases, the knowledge produced is likely to be trustworthy.
Still, Oreskis notes that the process may not be perfect. Nothing ever is when humans are involved. She gives a number of examples where commonly held "scientific" beliefs in the past have been proven wrong. For a time, people thought that the human race could be improved through controlled population breeding (eugenics). Also, when the idea of plate tectonics and continental drift was first introduced, it was ridiculed, until further analysis and examination found that the facts fit the theory. Also, there was a time when men felt women shouldn't be educated because the strength and energy required would be harmful. Certainly, given the chance, women around the world have proven that belief to be wrong.
But despite several examples widely held beliefs that have proven to be wrong, it doesn't mean that we should be skeptical of all science. Ideas presented as scientific, but which really aren't, do need to be challenged. Science, properly vetted, does work. We've got satellites, cell phones, x-ray technology, computers, weather radar and 7-day forecasts, rockets, weapons, planes, submarines, oil exploration, fracking, all things produced by good science. We believe in these things, because we see them, use them. When scientists tell us things, in their field of expertise, and in overwhelming numbers, it's worth paying attention. Science is trustworthy. On the other hand, the voice of a singular person, or even a scientist discussing items NOT in his or her field of expertise, is not reassuring.
But even then, some people may have trouble accepting what's presented as scientific facts. That may be due to a conflict with religious beliefs (such as the age of the earth), or conflicts with political beliefs (such as the belief that markets, not regulations, are the way to solve problems). If accepting a science report conflicts with a previously held religious belief, or conflicts with a previously held political belief, one may disregard the science over their value system. But if one can examine their own values, their prejudices, and examine how the analysis was performed, it might help.
Before theories are taken seriously, further studies need to be made, and confirmation testing must be completed. Science tends to be self-correcting, and when enough studies and tests are completed, confidence increases. Oreskes makes the point that consensus is a crucial indicator of when a scientific matter has been settled, and in those cases, the knowledge produced is likely to be trustworthy.
Still, Oreskis notes that the process may not be perfect. Nothing ever is when humans are involved. She gives a number of examples where commonly held "scientific" beliefs in the past have been proven wrong. For a time, people thought that the human race could be improved through controlled population breeding (eugenics). Also, when the idea of plate tectonics and continental drift was first introduced, it was ridiculed, until further analysis and examination found that the facts fit the theory. Also, there was a time when men felt women shouldn't be educated because the strength and energy required would be harmful. Certainly, given the chance, women around the world have proven that belief to be wrong.
But despite several examples widely held beliefs that have proven to be wrong, it doesn't mean that we should be skeptical of all science. Ideas presented as scientific, but which really aren't, do need to be challenged. Science, properly vetted, does work. We've got satellites, cell phones, x-ray technology, computers, weather radar and 7-day forecasts, rockets, weapons, planes, submarines, oil exploration, fracking, all things produced by good science. We believe in these things, because we see them, use them. When scientists tell us things, in their field of expertise, and in overwhelming numbers, it's worth paying attention. Science is trustworthy. On the other hand, the voice of a singular person, or even a scientist discussing items NOT in his or her field of expertise, is not reassuring.
January 27, 2021
On the one hand, it's so refreshing to read a well researched and thought out argument on a topic. On the other, it's a shame that the very academic approach to the writing makes it almost inevitable that the vast majority of people who are able to appreciate it are the one's who already agree with the author.
The amount of academic jargon used almost necessitated a fair amount of prior knowledge of science and philosophy. I enjoyed the brief history lesson on how the philosophy of science came about and the obstacles it had to overcome. However, some of Oreskes arguments were surprisingly weak, such as trying to judge the costs of not trusting science on the basis of Pascal's wager logic. One of the commentary essays even brought up the issue, but I also found the essays to be lacking in terms of both writing and argument quality, especially the last one.
I definitely learned a few things and, for the most part, agreed with the author on the changes she'd like to see in the scientific community such as embracing the fact that people can never be truly objective and should make explicit their personal values and interests. There were a number of problematic topics that didn't really get as much attention as I expected, such as the inaccessibility of scientific journals, p-hacking, and, ironically, the communication gap between academia and the general population.
This is one of those books that I enjoyed reading, but which is hard to recommend. Did the author make a compelling argument on why you should trust science? I guess. Personally, it mostly reaffirmed the reasons I have to trust scientific consensus with the caveat that new information could come along at any time and change what the consensus is, especially in some of the newer scientific fields such as psychology and nutrition. Unfortunately, there's no way you could recommend this to your conspiracy-loving uncle and expect them to grasp the types of arguments discussed here. And while that's a shame, I'm pretty sure logic and reason aren't the methods they use to vet their sources of information anyway.
The amount of academic jargon used almost necessitated a fair amount of prior knowledge of science and philosophy. I enjoyed the brief history lesson on how the philosophy of science came about and the obstacles it had to overcome. However, some of Oreskes arguments were surprisingly weak, such as trying to judge the costs of not trusting science on the basis of Pascal's wager logic. One of the commentary essays even brought up the issue, but I also found the essays to be lacking in terms of both writing and argument quality, especially the last one.
I definitely learned a few things and, for the most part, agreed with the author on the changes she'd like to see in the scientific community such as embracing the fact that people can never be truly objective and should make explicit their personal values and interests. There were a number of problematic topics that didn't really get as much attention as I expected, such as the inaccessibility of scientific journals, p-hacking, and, ironically, the communication gap between academia and the general population.
This is one of those books that I enjoyed reading, but which is hard to recommend. Did the author make a compelling argument on why you should trust science? I guess. Personally, it mostly reaffirmed the reasons I have to trust scientific consensus with the caveat that new information could come along at any time and change what the consensus is, especially in some of the newer scientific fields such as psychology and nutrition. Unfortunately, there's no way you could recommend this to your conspiracy-loving uncle and expect them to grasp the types of arguments discussed here. And while that's a shame, I'm pretty sure logic and reason aren't the methods they use to vet their sources of information anyway.
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