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The Theory of Money and Credit
The Theory of Money and Credit integrated monetary theory into the main body of economic analysis for the first time, providing fresh, new insights into the nature of money and its role in the economy and bringing Mises into the front rank of European economists. The Theory of Money and Credit also presented a new monetary theory of the trade cycle, which, under further development by Mises’s student Nobel Laureate F. A. Hayek, came to challenge all previous trade-cycle theories. Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) was the leading spokesman of the Austrian School of economics throughout most of the twentieth century.
544 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1912
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About the author
Ludwig von Mises
230 books1,199 followersLudwig Heinrich Edler von Mises (German pronunciation: [ˈluːtvɪç fɔn ˈmiːzəs]; September 29, 1881 – October 10, 1973) was an Austrian economist, historian, philosopher, author, and classical liberal who had a significant influence on the Austrian government's economic policies in the first third of the 20th century, the Austrian School of Economics, and the modern free-market libertarian movement.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 54 reviews
January 12, 2011
If you want to become like Jim Rogers, Marc Faber, Peter Schiff, you need to read and understand this book, otherwise you will be only an amateur on financial markets, this book alone with Mises 1928 monograph are the best books on money ever, becareful you need to have some background on Menger,Bohm-Bawerk and Banking theories, Take a breath and open your mind into the best book on money ever !
March 30, 2023
Fourth re-read, this time with gpt4 helping me, still goat. DM for summary.
January 7, 2013
As most of the Western world continues to believe that monetization of debt has no real consequences, it is important to point out that not everyone shares this view.
Ludwig von Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit takes the opposite view. This book belongs to what is called "The Austrian School" - the concept that the expansion of the money supply and/or credit will have real - although not always apparent - consequences.
The heart of much contention is a debate over the nature of economic activity. Is the economy largely organic or is the economy basically created and guided by the state?
Von Mises, of course, believes that the economy functions best without government intervention in the money supply (which can take many forms).
This is a debate that many people are having, and it behooves you to read up on more specific points like the business cycle, potential price distortions in the market, demand, and international trade.
My favorite point: creating money does not always produce obvious inflation if it prices goods out of the reach of ordinary people. Hmmm.....
Ludwig von Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit takes the opposite view. This book belongs to what is called "The Austrian School" - the concept that the expansion of the money supply and/or credit will have real - although not always apparent - consequences.
The heart of much contention is a debate over the nature of economic activity. Is the economy largely organic or is the economy basically created and guided by the state?
Von Mises, of course, believes that the economy functions best without government intervention in the money supply (which can take many forms).
This is a debate that many people are having, and it behooves you to read up on more specific points like the business cycle, potential price distortions in the market, demand, and international trade.
My favorite point: creating money does not always produce obvious inflation if it prices goods out of the reach of ordinary people. Hmmm.....
January 15, 2013
As most of the Western world continues to believe that monetization of debt has no real consequences, it is important to point out that not everyone shares this view.
Ludwig von Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit takes the opposite view. This book belongs to what is called "The Austrian School" - the concept that the expansion of the money supply and/or credit will have real - although not always apparent - consequences.
The heart of much contention is a debate over the nature of economic activity. Is the economy largely organic or is the economy basically created and guided by the state?
Von Mises, of course, believes that the economy functions best without government intervention in the money supply (which can take many forms).
This is a debate that many people are having, and it behooves you to read up on more specific points like the business cycle, potential price distortions in the market, demand, and international trade.
My favorite point: creating money does not always produce obvious inflation if it prices goods out of the reach of ordinary people. Hmmm.....
Ludwig von Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit takes the opposite view. This book belongs to what is called "The Austrian School" - the concept that the expansion of the money supply and/or credit will have real - although not always apparent - consequences.
The heart of much contention is a debate over the nature of economic activity. Is the economy largely organic or is the economy basically created and guided by the state?
Von Mises, of course, believes that the economy functions best without government intervention in the money supply (which can take many forms).
This is a debate that many people are having, and it behooves you to read up on more specific points like the business cycle, potential price distortions in the market, demand, and international trade.
My favorite point: creating money does not always produce obvious inflation if it prices goods out of the reach of ordinary people. Hmmm.....
April 18, 2010
This was surprisingly readable once I got into it (I expected von Mises to be impenetrable). Critics will say it has not aged well since some things von Mises posits as impossible have come to pass. I'm actually not sure our current, completely-untethered-to-gold money system will remain indefinitely intact, but I doubt von Mises would have believed it would endure 35+ years, which it has. Still, I found myself agreeing with the basic thesis that money is too important to entrust to government, even a theoretically apolitical part of it like a central bank. The temptation to expand monetary issue, stealing little by little from the holders of money until a crisis occurs, is a problem I cannot see any way to avoid but removing the power over money from government altogether.
October 4, 2013
a dense and somewhat difficult book on the nature of money, the reasons for interest, the effects of inflation, and the justifications for metal currency. The arguments that it refutes soundly I still hear today, but they are no more correct now than then, and I think this holds up quite well with the passing of time, and is a good point of reference for arguments against deficit spending and inflationary policies. Far more self consistent than the competition.
June 23, 2024
(1912)
Part III Money and Banking
Chapter 19. Money, Credit, and Interest
1. On the Nature of the Problem
...But beyond this the paths of the two schools diverged. Tooke, Fullarton, and their disciples flatly denied that the banks had any power to increase the amount of their note issue beyond the requirements of business. In their view, the media of payment issued by the banks at any particular time adjust themselves to the requirements of business in such a way that with their assistance the payments that have to be made at that time at a given level of prices can all be settled by the use of the existing quantity of money. As soon as the circulation is saturated, no bank, whether it has the right to issue notes or not, can continue to grant credit except from its own capital or from that of its depositors.8 These views were directly opposed to those of Lord Overstone, Torrens, and others, who started by assuming the possibility of the banks having the power of arbitrarily extending their note issue, and who attempted to determine the way in which the disturbed equilibrium of the market would reestablish itself after such a proceeding. 9 The Currency School propounded a theory, complete in itself, of the value of money and the influence of the granting of credit on the prices of commodities and on the rate of interest. Its doctrines were based upon an untenable fundamental view of the nature of economic value; its version of the quantity theory was a purely mechanical one. But the school should certainly not be blamed for this: its members had neither the desire nor the power to rise above the economic doctrine of their time. Within the Currency School’s own sphere of investigation, it was extremely successful. This fact deserves grateful recognition from those who, coming after it, build upon the foundations it laid. This needs particular emphasis in the face of the belittlements of its influence which now appear to be part of the stock contents of all writings on banking theory. The shortcomings exhibited by the system of the Currency School have offered an easy target to the critical shafts of their opponents, and doubtless the adherents of the banking principle deserve much credit for making use of this opportunity. If this had been all that they did, if they had merely announced themselves as critics of the currency principle, no objection could be raised against them on that account. The disastrous thing about their influence lay in their claiming to have created a comprehensive theory of the monetary and banking systems and in their imagining that their obiter dicta on the subject constituted such a theory. For the classical theory whose shortcomings should not be extenuated but whose logical acuteness and deep insight into the complications of the problem are undeniable, they substituted a series of assertions that were not always formulated with precision and often contradicted one another. In so doing they paved the way for that method of dealing with monetary problems that was customary in our science before the labors of Menger began to bear their fruit.10
The fatal error of Fullarton and his disciples was to have overlooked the fact that even convertible banknotes remain permanently in circulation and can then bring about a glut of fiduciary media the consequences of which resemble those of an increase in the quantity of money in circulation. Even if it is true, as Fullarton insists, that banknotes issued as loans automatically flow back to the bank after the term of the loan has passed, still this does not tell us anything about the question whether the bank is able to maintain them in circulation by repeated prolongation of the loan. The assertion that lies at the heart of the position taken up by the Banking School, namely that it is impossible to set and permanently maintain in circulation more notes than will meet the public demand, is untenable; for the demand for credit is not a fixed quantity; it expands as the rate of interest falls, and contracts as the rate of interest rises. But since the rate of interest that is charged for loans made in fiduciary media created expressly for that purpose can be reduced by the banks in the first instance down to the limit set by the marginal utility of the capital used in the banking business, that is, practically to zero, the whole edifice built up by Tooke’s school collapses.
It is not our task to give a historical exposition of the controversy between the two famous English schools, however tempting an enterprise that may be. We must content ourselves with reiterating that the works of the much abused Currency School contain far more in the way of useful ideas and fruitful thoughts than is usually assumed, especially in Germany, where as a rule the school is known merely through the writings of its opponents, such as Tooke and Newmarch’s History of Prices, J. S. Mill’s Principles, and German versions of the banking principle which are deficient in comprehension of the nature of the problems they deal with.
,,,
3. Equilibrium Rate and Money Rate of Interest:
We have already had an opportunity of finding out where the error in this argument lies. The quantity of fiduciary media flowing from the banks into circulation is admittedly limited by the number and extent of the requests for discounting that the banks receive. But the number and extent of these requests are not independent of the credit policy of the banks; by reducing the rate of interest charged on loans, it is possible for the banks indefinitely to increase the public demand for credit. And since the banks—as even the most orthodox disciples of Tooke and Fullarton cannot deny—can meet all these demands for credit, they can extend their issue of fiduciary media arbitrarily. For obvious reasons an individual bank is not in a position to do this so long as its competitors act otherwise; but there seems to be no reason why all the credit-issuing banks in an isolated community, or in the whole world, taken together could not do this by uniform procedure. If we imagine an isolated community in which there is only a single credit-issuing bank in business, and if we further assume (what indeed is obvious) that the fiduciary media issued by it enjoy general confidence and are freely employed in business as money substitutes, then the weakness of the assertions of the orthodox theory of banking is most clear In such a situation there are no other limits to the bank’s issue of fiduciary media than those which it sets itself.
But even the Currency School has not treated the problem in a satisfactory manner It would appear—exhaustive historical investigation might perhaps lead to another conclusion—that the Currency School was merely concerned to examine the consequences of an inflation of fiduciary media in the case of the coexistence of several independent groups of banks in the world, starting from the assumption that these groups of banks did not all follow a uniform and parallel credit policy. The case of a general increase of fiduciary media, which for the first half of the nineteenth century had scarcely any immediate practical importance, was not included within the scope of its investigations. Thus it did not even have occasion to consider the most important aspect of the problem. What is necessary for clearing up this important problem still remains to be done; for even Wicksell’s most noteworthy attempt cannot be said to have achieved its object. But at least it has the merit of having stated the problem clearly.
Wicksell distinguishes between the natural rate of interest (natürliche Kapitalzins), or the rate of interest that would be determined by supply and demand if actual capital goods were lent without the mediation of money, and the money rate of interest (Geldzins), or the rate of interest that is demanded and paid for loans in money or money substitutes. The money rate of interest and the natural rate of interest need not necessarily coincide, since it is possible for the banks to extend the amount of their issues of fiduciary media as they wish and thus to exert a pressure on the money rate of interest that might bring it down to the minimum set by their costs. Nevertheless, it is certain that the money rate of interest must sooner or later come to the level of the natural rate of interest, and the problem is to say in what way this ultimate coincidence is brought about.15 Up to this point Wicksell commands assent; but his further argument provokes contradiction.
...
Wicksell incidentally makes cursory mention of a second limit to the circulation of fiduciary media. He thinks that the banks that charge a lower rate of interest than that which corresponds to the average level of the natural rate of interest encounter a limit which is set by the employment of the precious metals for industrial purposes. If the purchasing power of money is too low it discourages the production of gold but increases, ceteris paribus, the industrial consumption of gold, and the deficiency which would arise as soon as consumption began to exceed production has to be made up from the bank reserves.18 This is perfectly true when metallic money is employed; an increase of fiduciary media must be stopped before the reduction of the objective exchange value of money that it brings about absorbs the value arising from the monetary employment of the metal. As soon as the objective exchange value of money had sunk below the value of the metal in industrial uses, every further loss in value (which, of course, would also affect the purchasing power of the money substitutes in the same degree), would send all those who needed the metal for industrial purposes to the counters of the banks as their cheapest source of supply. The banks would not be able to extend their issue any further since it would be possible for their customers to make a profit simply by the exchange of fiduciary media for money; all fiduciary media issued beyond the given limit would return immediately to the banks.19
But demonstrating this does not bring us a step nearer to the solution of our problem. The mechanism, by which a further issue of fiduciary media is restricted as soon as the falling objective exchange value of the material from which the money is made has reached the level set by its industrial employment, is, of course, effective only in the case of commodity money; in the case of credit money, it is effective only when the embodied claim refers to commodity money. And it is never effective in the case of fiat money. Of greater importance is a second factor: this limit is a distant one, so that even when it is eventually effective it still leaves considerable scope for an increase in the issue of fiduciary media. But it by no means follows from this that it remains possible for the banks to reduce the rate of interest on loans as much as they like within these wide limits; as the following argument will attempt to prove.
4. Interest Policy and Production:
Assuming uniformity of procedure, the credit-issuing banks are able to extend their issues indefinitely. It is within their power to stimulate the demand for capital by reducing the rate of interest on loans, and, except for the limits mentioned above, to go so far in this as the cost of granting the loans permits. In doing this they force their competitors in the loan market, that is all those who do not lend fiduciary media which they have created themselves, to make a corresponding reduction in the rate of interest also. Thus the rate of interest on loans may at first be reduced by the credit-issuing banks almost to zero. This, of course, is true only under the assumption that the fiduciary media enjoy the confidence of the public so that if any requests are made to the banks for liquidation of the promise of prompt cash redemption which constitutes the nature of fiduciary media, it is not because the holders have any doubts as to their soundness. Assuming this, the only possible reason for the withdrawal of deposits or the presentation of notes for redemption is the existence of a demand for money for making payments to persons who do not belong to the circle of customers of the individual banks. The banks need not necessarily meet such demands by paying out money; the fiduciary media of those banks among whose customers are those persons to whom the banks’ own customers wish to make payments are equally serviceable in this case. Thus there ceases to be any necessity for the banks to hold a redemption fund consisting of money; its place may be taken by a reserve fund consisting of the fiduciary media of other banks. If we imagine the whole credit system of the world concentrated in a single bank, it will follow that there is no longer any presentation of notes or withdrawal of deposits; in fact, the whole demand for money in the narrower sense may disappear. These suppositions are not at all arbitrary. It has already been shown that the circulation of fiduciary media is possible only on the assumption that the issuing bodies enjoy the full confidence of the public, since even the dawning of mistrust would immediately lead to a collapse of the house of cards that comprises the credit circulation. We know, furthermore, that all credit-issuing banks endeavor to extend their circulation of fiduciary media as much as possible, and that the only obstacles in their way nowadays are legal prescriptions and business customs concerning the covering of notes and deposits, not any resistance on the part of the public. If there were no artificial restriction of the credit system at all, and if the individual credit-issuing banks could agree to parallel procedure, then the complete cessation of the use of money would only be a question of time. It is, therefore, entirely justifiable to base our discussion on the above assumption.
Now, if this assumption holds good, and if we disregard the limit that has already been mentioned as applying to the case of metallic money, then there is no longer any limit, practically speaking, to the issue of fiduciary media; the rate of interest on loans and the level of the objective exchange value of money is then limited only by the banks’ running costs—a minimum, incidentally which is extraordinarily low. By making easier the conditions on which they will grant credit, the banks can extend their issue of fiduciary media almost indefinitely. Their doing so must be accompanied by a fall in the objective exchange value of money. The course taken by the depreciation that is a consequence of the issue of fiduciary media by the banks may diverge in some degree from that which it takes in the case of an increase of the stock of money in the narrower sense, or from that which it takes when the fiduciary media are issued otherwise than by banks; but the essence of the process remains the same. For it is a matter of indifference whether the diminution in the objective exchange value of money begins with the mine owners, with the government which issues fiat money credit money, or token coins, or with the undertakings that have the newly issued fiduciary media placed at their disposal by way of loans.
5. Credit and Economic Crises
Our theory of banking, like that of the currency principle, leads ultimately to a theory of business cycles. It is true that the Currency School did not inquire thoroughly into even this problem. It did not ask what consequences follow from the unrestricted extension of credit on the part of the credit-issuing banks; it did not even inquire whether it was possible for them permanently to depress the natural rate of interest. It set itself more modest aims and was content to ask what would happen if the banks in one country extended the issue of fiduciary media more than those of other countries. Thus it arrived at its doctrine of the “external drain” and at its explanation of the English crises that had occurred up to the middle of the nineteenth century.
If our doctrine of crises is to be applied to more recent history, then it must be observed that the banks have never gone as far as they might in extending credit and expanding the issue of fiduciary media. They have always left off long before reaching this limit, whether because of growing uneasiness on their own part and on the part of all those who had not forgotten the earlier crises, or whether because they had to defer to legislative regulations concerning the maximum circulation of fiduciary media. And so the crises broke out before they need have broken out. It is only in this sense that we can interpret the statement that it is apparently true after all to say that restriction of loans is the cause of economic crises, or at least their immediate impulse; that if the banks would only go on reducing the rate of interest on loans they could continue to postpone the collapse of the market. If the stress is laid upon the word postpone, then this line of argument can be assented to without more ado. Certainly, the banks would be able to postpone the collapse; but nevertheless, as has been shown, the moment must eventually come when no further extension of the circulation of fiduciary media is possible. Then the catastrophe occurs, and its consequences are the worse and the reaction against the bull tendency of the market the stronger, the longer the period during which the rate of interest on loans has been below the natural rate of interest and the greater the extent to which roundabout processes of production that are not justified by the state of the capital market have been adopted.
https://web.mit.edu/merolish/Public/b...
Part III Money and Banking
Chapter 19. Money, Credit, and Interest
1. On the Nature of the Problem
...But beyond this the paths of the two schools diverged. Tooke, Fullarton, and their disciples flatly denied that the banks had any power to increase the amount of their note issue beyond the requirements of business. In their view, the media of payment issued by the banks at any particular time adjust themselves to the requirements of business in such a way that with their assistance the payments that have to be made at that time at a given level of prices can all be settled by the use of the existing quantity of money. As soon as the circulation is saturated, no bank, whether it has the right to issue notes or not, can continue to grant credit except from its own capital or from that of its depositors.8 These views were directly opposed to those of Lord Overstone, Torrens, and others, who started by assuming the possibility of the banks having the power of arbitrarily extending their note issue, and who attempted to determine the way in which the disturbed equilibrium of the market would reestablish itself after such a proceeding. 9 The Currency School propounded a theory, complete in itself, of the value of money and the influence of the granting of credit on the prices of commodities and on the rate of interest. Its doctrines were based upon an untenable fundamental view of the nature of economic value; its version of the quantity theory was a purely mechanical one. But the school should certainly not be blamed for this: its members had neither the desire nor the power to rise above the economic doctrine of their time. Within the Currency School’s own sphere of investigation, it was extremely successful. This fact deserves grateful recognition from those who, coming after it, build upon the foundations it laid. This needs particular emphasis in the face of the belittlements of its influence which now appear to be part of the stock contents of all writings on banking theory. The shortcomings exhibited by the system of the Currency School have offered an easy target to the critical shafts of their opponents, and doubtless the adherents of the banking principle deserve much credit for making use of this opportunity. If this had been all that they did, if they had merely announced themselves as critics of the currency principle, no objection could be raised against them on that account. The disastrous thing about their influence lay in their claiming to have created a comprehensive theory of the monetary and banking systems and in their imagining that their obiter dicta on the subject constituted such a theory. For the classical theory whose shortcomings should not be extenuated but whose logical acuteness and deep insight into the complications of the problem are undeniable, they substituted a series of assertions that were not always formulated with precision and often contradicted one another. In so doing they paved the way for that method of dealing with monetary problems that was customary in our science before the labors of Menger began to bear their fruit.10
The fatal error of Fullarton and his disciples was to have overlooked the fact that even convertible banknotes remain permanently in circulation and can then bring about a glut of fiduciary media the consequences of which resemble those of an increase in the quantity of money in circulation. Even if it is true, as Fullarton insists, that banknotes issued as loans automatically flow back to the bank after the term of the loan has passed, still this does not tell us anything about the question whether the bank is able to maintain them in circulation by repeated prolongation of the loan. The assertion that lies at the heart of the position taken up by the Banking School, namely that it is impossible to set and permanently maintain in circulation more notes than will meet the public demand, is untenable; for the demand for credit is not a fixed quantity; it expands as the rate of interest falls, and contracts as the rate of interest rises. But since the rate of interest that is charged for loans made in fiduciary media created expressly for that purpose can be reduced by the banks in the first instance down to the limit set by the marginal utility of the capital used in the banking business, that is, practically to zero, the whole edifice built up by Tooke’s school collapses.
It is not our task to give a historical exposition of the controversy between the two famous English schools, however tempting an enterprise that may be. We must content ourselves with reiterating that the works of the much abused Currency School contain far more in the way of useful ideas and fruitful thoughts than is usually assumed, especially in Germany, where as a rule the school is known merely through the writings of its opponents, such as Tooke and Newmarch’s History of Prices, J. S. Mill’s Principles, and German versions of the banking principle which are deficient in comprehension of the nature of the problems they deal with.
,,,
3. Equilibrium Rate and Money Rate of Interest:
We have already had an opportunity of finding out where the error in this argument lies. The quantity of fiduciary media flowing from the banks into circulation is admittedly limited by the number and extent of the requests for discounting that the banks receive. But the number and extent of these requests are not independent of the credit policy of the banks; by reducing the rate of interest charged on loans, it is possible for the banks indefinitely to increase the public demand for credit. And since the banks—as even the most orthodox disciples of Tooke and Fullarton cannot deny—can meet all these demands for credit, they can extend their issue of fiduciary media arbitrarily. For obvious reasons an individual bank is not in a position to do this so long as its competitors act otherwise; but there seems to be no reason why all the credit-issuing banks in an isolated community, or in the whole world, taken together could not do this by uniform procedure. If we imagine an isolated community in which there is only a single credit-issuing bank in business, and if we further assume (what indeed is obvious) that the fiduciary media issued by it enjoy general confidence and are freely employed in business as money substitutes, then the weakness of the assertions of the orthodox theory of banking is most clear In such a situation there are no other limits to the bank’s issue of fiduciary media than those which it sets itself.
But even the Currency School has not treated the problem in a satisfactory manner It would appear—exhaustive historical investigation might perhaps lead to another conclusion—that the Currency School was merely concerned to examine the consequences of an inflation of fiduciary media in the case of the coexistence of several independent groups of banks in the world, starting from the assumption that these groups of banks did not all follow a uniform and parallel credit policy. The case of a general increase of fiduciary media, which for the first half of the nineteenth century had scarcely any immediate practical importance, was not included within the scope of its investigations. Thus it did not even have occasion to consider the most important aspect of the problem. What is necessary for clearing up this important problem still remains to be done; for even Wicksell’s most noteworthy attempt cannot be said to have achieved its object. But at least it has the merit of having stated the problem clearly.
Wicksell distinguishes between the natural rate of interest (natürliche Kapitalzins), or the rate of interest that would be determined by supply and demand if actual capital goods were lent without the mediation of money, and the money rate of interest (Geldzins), or the rate of interest that is demanded and paid for loans in money or money substitutes. The money rate of interest and the natural rate of interest need not necessarily coincide, since it is possible for the banks to extend the amount of their issues of fiduciary media as they wish and thus to exert a pressure on the money rate of interest that might bring it down to the minimum set by their costs. Nevertheless, it is certain that the money rate of interest must sooner or later come to the level of the natural rate of interest, and the problem is to say in what way this ultimate coincidence is brought about.15 Up to this point Wicksell commands assent; but his further argument provokes contradiction.
...
Wicksell incidentally makes cursory mention of a second limit to the circulation of fiduciary media. He thinks that the banks that charge a lower rate of interest than that which corresponds to the average level of the natural rate of interest encounter a limit which is set by the employment of the precious metals for industrial purposes. If the purchasing power of money is too low it discourages the production of gold but increases, ceteris paribus, the industrial consumption of gold, and the deficiency which would arise as soon as consumption began to exceed production has to be made up from the bank reserves.18 This is perfectly true when metallic money is employed; an increase of fiduciary media must be stopped before the reduction of the objective exchange value of money that it brings about absorbs the value arising from the monetary employment of the metal. As soon as the objective exchange value of money had sunk below the value of the metal in industrial uses, every further loss in value (which, of course, would also affect the purchasing power of the money substitutes in the same degree), would send all those who needed the metal for industrial purposes to the counters of the banks as their cheapest source of supply. The banks would not be able to extend their issue any further since it would be possible for their customers to make a profit simply by the exchange of fiduciary media for money; all fiduciary media issued beyond the given limit would return immediately to the banks.19
But demonstrating this does not bring us a step nearer to the solution of our problem. The mechanism, by which a further issue of fiduciary media is restricted as soon as the falling objective exchange value of the material from which the money is made has reached the level set by its industrial employment, is, of course, effective only in the case of commodity money; in the case of credit money, it is effective only when the embodied claim refers to commodity money. And it is never effective in the case of fiat money. Of greater importance is a second factor: this limit is a distant one, so that even when it is eventually effective it still leaves considerable scope for an increase in the issue of fiduciary media. But it by no means follows from this that it remains possible for the banks to reduce the rate of interest on loans as much as they like within these wide limits; as the following argument will attempt to prove.
4. Interest Policy and Production:
Assuming uniformity of procedure, the credit-issuing banks are able to extend their issues indefinitely. It is within their power to stimulate the demand for capital by reducing the rate of interest on loans, and, except for the limits mentioned above, to go so far in this as the cost of granting the loans permits. In doing this they force their competitors in the loan market, that is all those who do not lend fiduciary media which they have created themselves, to make a corresponding reduction in the rate of interest also. Thus the rate of interest on loans may at first be reduced by the credit-issuing banks almost to zero. This, of course, is true only under the assumption that the fiduciary media enjoy the confidence of the public so that if any requests are made to the banks for liquidation of the promise of prompt cash redemption which constitutes the nature of fiduciary media, it is not because the holders have any doubts as to their soundness. Assuming this, the only possible reason for the withdrawal of deposits or the presentation of notes for redemption is the existence of a demand for money for making payments to persons who do not belong to the circle of customers of the individual banks. The banks need not necessarily meet such demands by paying out money; the fiduciary media of those banks among whose customers are those persons to whom the banks’ own customers wish to make payments are equally serviceable in this case. Thus there ceases to be any necessity for the banks to hold a redemption fund consisting of money; its place may be taken by a reserve fund consisting of the fiduciary media of other banks. If we imagine the whole credit system of the world concentrated in a single bank, it will follow that there is no longer any presentation of notes or withdrawal of deposits; in fact, the whole demand for money in the narrower sense may disappear. These suppositions are not at all arbitrary. It has already been shown that the circulation of fiduciary media is possible only on the assumption that the issuing bodies enjoy the full confidence of the public, since even the dawning of mistrust would immediately lead to a collapse of the house of cards that comprises the credit circulation. We know, furthermore, that all credit-issuing banks endeavor to extend their circulation of fiduciary media as much as possible, and that the only obstacles in their way nowadays are legal prescriptions and business customs concerning the covering of notes and deposits, not any resistance on the part of the public. If there were no artificial restriction of the credit system at all, and if the individual credit-issuing banks could agree to parallel procedure, then the complete cessation of the use of money would only be a question of time. It is, therefore, entirely justifiable to base our discussion on the above assumption.
Now, if this assumption holds good, and if we disregard the limit that has already been mentioned as applying to the case of metallic money, then there is no longer any limit, practically speaking, to the issue of fiduciary media; the rate of interest on loans and the level of the objective exchange value of money is then limited only by the banks’ running costs—a minimum, incidentally which is extraordinarily low. By making easier the conditions on which they will grant credit, the banks can extend their issue of fiduciary media almost indefinitely. Their doing so must be accompanied by a fall in the objective exchange value of money. The course taken by the depreciation that is a consequence of the issue of fiduciary media by the banks may diverge in some degree from that which it takes in the case of an increase of the stock of money in the narrower sense, or from that which it takes when the fiduciary media are issued otherwise than by banks; but the essence of the process remains the same. For it is a matter of indifference whether the diminution in the objective exchange value of money begins with the mine owners, with the government which issues fiat money credit money, or token coins, or with the undertakings that have the newly issued fiduciary media placed at their disposal by way of loans.
5. Credit and Economic Crises
Our theory of banking, like that of the currency principle, leads ultimately to a theory of business cycles. It is true that the Currency School did not inquire thoroughly into even this problem. It did not ask what consequences follow from the unrestricted extension of credit on the part of the credit-issuing banks; it did not even inquire whether it was possible for them permanently to depress the natural rate of interest. It set itself more modest aims and was content to ask what would happen if the banks in one country extended the issue of fiduciary media more than those of other countries. Thus it arrived at its doctrine of the “external drain” and at its explanation of the English crises that had occurred up to the middle of the nineteenth century.
If our doctrine of crises is to be applied to more recent history, then it must be observed that the banks have never gone as far as they might in extending credit and expanding the issue of fiduciary media. They have always left off long before reaching this limit, whether because of growing uneasiness on their own part and on the part of all those who had not forgotten the earlier crises, or whether because they had to defer to legislative regulations concerning the maximum circulation of fiduciary media. And so the crises broke out before they need have broken out. It is only in this sense that we can interpret the statement that it is apparently true after all to say that restriction of loans is the cause of economic crises, or at least their immediate impulse; that if the banks would only go on reducing the rate of interest on loans they could continue to postpone the collapse of the market. If the stress is laid upon the word postpone, then this line of argument can be assented to without more ado. Certainly, the banks would be able to postpone the collapse; but nevertheless, as has been shown, the moment must eventually come when no further extension of the circulation of fiduciary media is possible. Then the catastrophe occurs, and its consequences are the worse and the reaction against the bull tendency of the market the stronger, the longer the period during which the rate of interest on loans has been below the natural rate of interest and the greater the extent to which roundabout processes of production that are not justified by the state of the capital market have been adopted.
https://web.mit.edu/merolish/Public/b...
May 20, 2021
The first two-thirds of this book is legitimately interesting with Ludwig Von Mises thoughts on the price of gold’s effect on the creditor-debtor relationship and how the government turning to the printer in order to pay national debts gives banks that offer access to credit a heads up to increase interest on extending credit. This and how the banks work more together cooperatively opposed to be in strict competition with each other as banks rely on other banks not to fail to not lose consumer trust in their monetary deposits. Several goods points in here and I like most of what Mises was saying about inflation and inflationary policies. I don’t agree that going back to the gold standard is a worthy idea but I feel like I left this text with a better understanding of Golds importance as a store of value.
The last third of the book though is just Mises trying to push “individual freedoms” of laisez-faire capitalism and thinks muttering this line is enough to sink the idea of central planning and socialist economics. Saying multiple times how deep critical analysis is required but continues to give a dogmatic defense of the invisible hand of the market and the gold standard as means to stop “totalitarian” government practices.
The last third of the book though is just Mises trying to push “individual freedoms” of laisez-faire capitalism and thinks muttering this line is enough to sink the idea of central planning and socialist economics. Saying multiple times how deep critical analysis is required but continues to give a dogmatic defense of the invisible hand of the market and the gold standard as means to stop “totalitarian” government practices.
November 22, 2019
In the end I couldn't follow this as an audiobook. I didn't abandon it because it wasn't interesting, 'twas very interesting.
Basically monetarism + geography + time + humans. Delivers a constant stream of iinteresting ideas (Keynesiasm as inflationary disaster, inflation as a very uneven redistribution - banks first.)
But this book is from way back, before the current era of a completely false economy
Basically monetarism + geography + time + humans. Delivers a constant stream of iinteresting ideas (Keynesiasm as inflationary disaster, inflation as a very uneven redistribution - banks first.)
But this book is from way back, before the current era of a completely false economy
March 5, 2016
This is a nice booklet, but Human Action is a better book, and it contains a section on monetary policy, and this book doesn't add anything to it
August 11, 2024
Yet another economic treatise by an Austrian. This time Ludwig von Mises. A powerhouse of classical liberalism. In this book, Mises traces the origin of money to its roots in market exchanges, where its value emerges from its usefulness as a commodity in trade. Through this analysis, he builds a compelling case for “sound” money—money that maintains its value and resists inflationary pressures. Mises opposes the use of monetary policy to manipulate economic outcomes (e.g., growth and unemployment), arguing that money should function as a neutral medium of exchange (dictated by market participants), rather than a tool for economic engineering. To support this neutrality, he advocates for the use of the gold standard (whereby currency is defined by a stated quantity of gold), viewing it as essential for preserving the stability and integrity of money within the economy. In contrast, fiat money, which can be created at the discretion of the state, expands government power and undermines economic freedom.
One of the most groundbreaking aspects of this treatise is Mises’ application of marginal utility analysis to money demand. By doing so, Mises offers an explanation of the purchasing power of money and its fluctuations. This approach was revolutionary, as it expanded upon the mainstream Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), which hypothesizes that prices are directly proportional to money supply. Although Mises acknowledges this insight, he critiques QTM for being overly simplistic in the mechanistic way through which changes in money supply affect prices. According to Mises, these changes are deeply influenced by the subjective evaluation of market participants regarding the usefulness or value of money. This value, Mises argues, can be traced back through time, leading to his most intriguing contribution—the “regression theorem.” This theorem posits that the purchasing power of money today is linked to its value yesterday, thereby creating a continuous regression to the initial point when money was first introduced.
Cool stuff all around.
One of the most groundbreaking aspects of this treatise is Mises’ application of marginal utility analysis to money demand. By doing so, Mises offers an explanation of the purchasing power of money and its fluctuations. This approach was revolutionary, as it expanded upon the mainstream Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), which hypothesizes that prices are directly proportional to money supply. Although Mises acknowledges this insight, he critiques QTM for being overly simplistic in the mechanistic way through which changes in money supply affect prices. According to Mises, these changes are deeply influenced by the subjective evaluation of market participants regarding the usefulness or value of money. This value, Mises argues, can be traced back through time, leading to his most intriguing contribution—the “regression theorem.” This theorem posits that the purchasing power of money today is linked to its value yesterday, thereby creating a continuous regression to the initial point when money was first introduced.
Cool stuff all around.
February 5, 2018
Being on a particular topic in economics, The Theory of Money and Credit struck me as a clearer and more focused effort than did Mises's magnus opus, the possibly better-known Human Action. There is no waxing on the virtues of praxeology here; instead, Mises writes exhaustively and with precision solely on the natures of money and credit, and almost always with a dispassionate, analytical, and careful disposition (pace Rothbard, for example). The result is a lengthy tome on money and credit, written by a master, as far as one could understand the subject prior to the Great Depression.
And to be honest, I'm not entirely sure how much knowledge of the subject has really improved since. Surely as far as micro is concerned there is little that Mises has left out (probably the most interesting, developed after Mises published this work, would be game-theoretic explanations for the emergence of monetary standards via coordination games). From a macro standpoint -- I'm afraid I can't really say. I feel as if almost all of 20th century macro can be dispensed outright; I'll have to review what I think I know about the Depression and the monetarists and such and see if, in hindsight & post-Mises, I reckon anyone from Keynes onward actually had anything useful to contribute. There's probably something or other useful that I'm forgetting, but somehow I doubt I'll reckon that Mises missed very much.
And to be honest, I'm not entirely sure how much knowledge of the subject has really improved since. Surely as far as micro is concerned there is little that Mises has left out (probably the most interesting, developed after Mises published this work, would be game-theoretic explanations for the emergence of monetary standards via coordination games). From a macro standpoint -- I'm afraid I can't really say. I feel as if almost all of 20th century macro can be dispensed outright; I'll have to review what I think I know about the Depression and the monetarists and such and see if, in hindsight & post-Mises, I reckon anyone from Keynes onward actually had anything useful to contribute. There's probably something or other useful that I'm forgetting, but somehow I doubt I'll reckon that Mises missed very much.
July 3, 2021
This is a 100 years old book about economics. How the hell could it be relevant now? Well, it contains a lot of economical bombshells and "basic principles" of economics, that i could not believed nobody told me about before (and probably everyone that has to deal with money should be aware).
A lot about basics of "value", functions of money, inflation, gold, commodities and trade.
Having said that, it also contains some very funny parts (or maybe things that should be extremely worrying).
"Concerned about interest rates bellow 5%": Weeeelll, we went a little bit negative with that one :P
"Concerned about money with 'no intrinsic value'': lets compute some hash functions and call it money!
"Concerned about banking notes with nominal values in milions?": Venezuela approves!
Headsup: This is not an easy read. I tried for multiple months and failed horribly. This is even harder to listen as an audiobook. Some of the arguments are pretty long and pretty complicated to keep track of which side is beeing argued for (and i failed at this multiple times). However, it is surprisingly accessible. It is like walking 1000km. It may look a bit intimidating, but you probably have everything you need for it, it will just take a while.
A lot about basics of "value", functions of money, inflation, gold, commodities and trade.
Having said that, it also contains some very funny parts (or maybe things that should be extremely worrying).
"Concerned about interest rates bellow 5%": Weeeelll, we went a little bit negative with that one :P
"Concerned about money with 'no intrinsic value'': lets compute some hash functions and call it money!
"Concerned about banking notes with nominal values in milions?": Venezuela approves!
Headsup: This is not an easy read. I tried for multiple months and failed horribly. This is even harder to listen as an audiobook. Some of the arguments are pretty long and pretty complicated to keep track of which side is beeing argued for (and i failed at this multiple times). However, it is surprisingly accessible. It is like walking 1000km. It may look a bit intimidating, but you probably have everything you need for it, it will just take a while.
August 21, 2024
This book would have been better if the print wasn't so small. The book should really be read as part of a college Economics class. As an reading assignment. I got the book because an MMA fighter was recommending the author. I thought it was interesting an MMA fighter would be into economics. People are not easily stuffed into boxes. So I bought this book and it was difficult to read and understand but I plodded through it. I know I spaced out lots while reading but I didn't go back and re-read anything. Can't recommend it for non-economists.
June 15, 2019
Awesome read. Very comprehensive. I will be reading this one again. It is difficult to review this book. The original content and the addendum that Mises made later are well worth the read. Both the original content and the addendum, Part Four, are within this binding and edition. I recommend that anyone who cares about Economics, whether you are of the Austrian School persuasion or not, read this book.
November 1, 2020
Although a little dated, the majority of Ludwig Von Mises' arguments regarding government intervention being the primary cause of uncontrollable inflation without a gold standard to stabilise currency still hold water even today... and it wouldn't be a book by Von Mises unless he continued in his criticisms towards socialist and Keynesian monetary theory.
Definitely something to read slowly, but still an excellent and insightful read.
Definitely something to read slowly, but still an excellent and insightful read.
June 24, 2022
There's a lot of stuff in this book. That's the problem with this book. There are plenty of theories, facts and differing ideas but their all over the place. Thiz is more of a text book then a book many may want to read. The main idea ends up being stick to gold. That sounds great but keep in mind this book was written in the middle of the last century. The few ideas that connect to current times are spread out so be prepared for lots of information but put in a boring presentation.
December 14, 2022
This really gets good about half way through and it really gets interesting after about chapter 29 when he talks about inflation. But really, this was a longggg book and it was work to get through.
If you want Austrian Economics (economics) then read Thomas Sowell. If nothing else this has just really solidified my admiration and appreciation of Sowell's ability to communicate economic ideas.
If you want Austrian Economics (economics) then read Thomas Sowell. If nothing else this has just really solidified my admiration and appreciation of Sowell's ability to communicate economic ideas.
July 25, 2024
Legitametrly the hardest book I have ever read. I learn some interesting concept about economics and inflation but overall the monetary policy of that time period is just so different that it’s very difficult to comprehend what exactly he’s talking about most of the time. Furthermore, this is a translation from German, so there is tons of vocabulary that doesn’t really fit and mix. It really difficult to understand.
December 28, 2024
At times I found it a little hard to follow and a tad repetitive but it really doesn't take much away from the rich theory of money as a specie of exchange presented here. Anyone worth their salt in economics should read this book it is revolutionary in it's conclusions and day by day becomes increasingly valuable with the utter wreck the federal reserve, bank of England and all other central banks have left our nation's economies in.
9/10
9/10
October 14, 2020
Good read if you want to understand what money was until 1500-1600, useless if you want to actually understand money after that. LvM insists on bringing forward his own personal opinions regardless of 400+ years of historical evidence falsifying them. Much more annoying than this fact, of course, are the ones who, more than a hundred years later, point to this book saying it was right: surreal.
June 7, 2024
This is the worst book I have ever read. Nearly everything in this book has been shown as economic bunk, and the arrogance in which the arguments are made make it legitimately embarrassing at points. The only solace I have after wasting my time on this book is the knowledge that the author will be forgotten by economics.
June 16, 2024
A good book on monetary theory, but some of the episodes of monetary loosening that he refers to were probably more easily understood by his contemporaries than they will be by a modern reader. Moreover, he makes the case for using gold as a store of value, but never really addresses some of the problems associated with using gold (i.e., holding and transport costs etc.).
January 30, 2023
The best book on money ever written in history. Mises saw the future and accurately predicted and warned us of the consequences. I wish the whole world would read this book, but unfortunately it is very dense.
December 22, 2024
The book contains a lot of information and it’s a heavy reading but it’s worth it. For economics fans I imagine this is a must. For those who do not have any background or knowledge in economics, it would be better to start with something less heavy and more introductory.
November 30, 2018
Amazing concepts, more about currency than economy. Very hard to read, doesn't flow well, but the single line quotes are among the best you'll find in any novel.
Read
December 30, 2019Stopped at page 60, not engaging
January 2, 2022
Good book with clear argumentation, but does not seem very relevant for our age of fiat currency.
February 24, 2022
A tough read, but well worth it. Much more accessible than Human Action. A good primer on Austrian economics, and an alternative viewpoint from the conventional Keynesian economic thought.
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