What do you think?
Rate this book
Our Lives in Their Portfolios: Why Asset Managers Own the World
All hail the new masters of How asset managers acquired the world
Banks have taken a backseat since the global financial crisis over a decade ago. Today, our new financial masters are asset managers, like Blackstone and BlackRock. And they don’t just own financial assets.
The roads we drive on; the pipes that supply our drinking water; the farmland that provides our food; energy systems for electricity and heat; hospitals, schools, and even the homes in which many of us live—all now swell asset managers’ bulging investment portfolios.
As the owners of more and more of the basic building blocks of everyday life, asset managers shape the lives of each and every one of us in profound and disturbing ways. In this eye-opening follow-up to Rentier Capitalism, Brett Christophers peels back the veil on “asset manager society.”
Asset managers, he shows, are unlike traditional owners of housing and other essential infrastructure. Buying and selling these life-supporting assets at a dizzying pace, the crux of their business model is not long-term investment and careful custodianship but making quick profits for themselves and the investors that back them.
In asset manager society, the natural and built environments that sustain us become one more vehicle for siphoning money from the many to the few.
Banks have taken a backseat since the global financial crisis over a decade ago. Today, our new financial masters are asset managers, like Blackstone and BlackRock. And they don’t just own financial assets.
The roads we drive on; the pipes that supply our drinking water; the farmland that provides our food; energy systems for electricity and heat; hospitals, schools, and even the homes in which many of us live—all now swell asset managers’ bulging investment portfolios.
As the owners of more and more of the basic building blocks of everyday life, asset managers shape the lives of each and every one of us in profound and disturbing ways. In this eye-opening follow-up to Rentier Capitalism, Brett Christophers peels back the veil on “asset manager society.”
Asset managers, he shows, are unlike traditional owners of housing and other essential infrastructure. Buying and selling these life-supporting assets at a dizzying pace, the crux of their business model is not long-term investment and careful custodianship but making quick profits for themselves and the investors that back them.
In asset manager society, the natural and built environments that sustain us become one more vehicle for siphoning money from the many to the few.
389 pages, Kindle Edition
Published April 25, 2023
86 people are currently reading
1625 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 30 reviews
June 19, 2023
I learned so much reading this book. It really unlocked a lot of the reasoning behind why so many things seem to not work in the US anymore.
January 7, 2024
A critical look at the aspects of asset manager society that we must all suffer under due to the further consolidation of wealth into the hands of a few individuals. Stacked with numbers and a deep understanding of the subject material it provides a clear cartography of how the rich continue to get richer and the massive discrepancy between the few workers who are able to invest and the massive private wealth of a small group of investors. Staggeringly relevant at a time when housing acquisition by Blackstone has become a social media discussion topic. And hey I just like reading about finance.
April 26, 2025
4 in every 10 of the worlds dollars are controlled by and invested through asset managers.
"Ultimately, asset-manager society is merely a reflection of the wider society of which it is a part. Consistently proffering evidence of a short-term, speculative profit calculus riding roughshod over concerns around affordable access to a wide range of socially indispensable physical assets, it is perhaps the purest manifestation we have of a world in which money talks"
Some notes below (too long to paste the whole thing):
"Ultimately, asset-manager society is merely a reflection of the wider society of which it is a part. Consistently proffering evidence of a short-term, speculative profit calculus riding roughshod over concerns around affordable access to a wide range of socially indispensable physical assets, it is perhaps the purest manifestation we have of a world in which money talks"
Some notes below (too long to paste the whole thing):
June 10, 2023
Number-heavy but well done thesis. My assumption was that "asset managers" was going to refer to the Big Three of State Street, BlackRock and Vanguard and the rise of the index fund, but Christophers has something else in mind entirely: a combination of private equity, real estate development, and specialty privatization firms. I don't know that I entirely buy agglomerating them all together as a way to discuss a particular phenomenon. But he gets the particulars of why we should be wary of this purchasing of the commons mostly right.
May 10, 2024
I really enjoyed this balanced look at asset manager society. It explained alot of the basics about asset management and how a profit is made and the way in which asset managers have come to own more and more infrastructure and real estate since the 2000s.
• asset manager capitalism vs asset manager society
• asset managers usually invest 1-5% of total from their own capital, to have skin in game and usually do not make purchase themselves but rather purchase is made by funds they manage or buys the company that manages the asset.
“In asset-manager society, the asset manager controls the physical asset. Indeed, such control is definitive of asset-manager society, being integral to its very constitution. It is the asset manager that decides how the asset is commercially exploited: who electricity is sold to, whether road tolls should be increased, how farmland should be tenanted, and so forth. And this is true even where a wholly owned intermediary portfolio company exists; as Blackstone's Schwarzman said: You have complete control. Under asset-manager capitalism, by contrast, the asset manager does not control the companies in which it holds shares.”
How it came to be:
1) maturity profile of investor liabilities
2) stability and predictability of cash flows generated by infrastructure: people still pay to use roads or rent even in a recession
3) often hold monopoly, because introducing duplicated water pipes or electricity lines would be inefficient
4) protection against inflation risk, as road tolls and rents increase in line with inflation
5)risk diversification: low beta - returns not significantly sensitive to changes in wider market positions
“ core physical frameworks of social life continue to be reconfigured specifically to generate dependable financial returns for investors. Phillip O'Neill, for example, has highlighted the 'key truth' that the private infrastructure investor seeks an urban configuration through which the infrastructure investment can become prof-itable'; hence, local-government policy becomes, in the words of Peter O'Brien and colleagues, a matter of translating urban infrastructure into assets matching the needs of institutional investors globally'."
“In asset-manager society, in short, the perceived 'need' to provide investors with predict-able, regular income is elevated alongside, and sometimes clearly placed above, the actual need of users for ease and affordability of asset access and use.”
“'Financialized landlords', she says, 'extract needlessly high rents, systematically transferring income from working people to wealthy fund managers and
investors.”
“as Daniela Gabor and Sebastian Kohl have recently argued, it is extremely hard to regard the 'mandates and risk/return requirements' of institutional investors and their asset managers as being compatible with 'the delivery of housing as a human right'.”
“There are also often significant harmful effects associated with the implementation of the second golden rule of real-asset asset management. To ready an acquired asset for profitable disposal, it is just as important for an asset manager to minimise the costs of operating that asset as it is to maximise the revenues arising from its operation.”
Who gains?
“But, in the case of both the asset manager and the pension-scheme administrator, the millions of dollars earned are shared between only a small number - perhaps only a handful - of individuals. This applies in particular to the asset manager's carried interest of $78 million.
Usually, only an asset-management firm's most senior executives, together with those investment professionals actively involved in managing a particular fund and its portfolio investments, will share in the carry.”
“The answer to this question is: large US public-pension schemes such as the Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System (with around 500,000 members), or the California Public Employees' Retirement System (with more than 2 million). If, for example, the first of these two schemes provided the full $300 million in our case, then the $200 million in savers' profit generated by the fund would represent, on average, an extra $400 in each member's pension pot - or $40 extra per year. This is arguably nothing to be sniffed at; but, needless to say, it is a long way from Schwarzman-scale earnings.”
“They tell us that, when investments perform well, everyone in the investment chain wins, including those whose retirement savings are increasingly invested in real-asset funds; but, proportionately speaking, the asset manager is comfortably the biggest winner of all. Our scenarios also tell us, however, that when investments perform badly, there is only one loser, and this is not the pension-scheme manager, still less the asset manager.”
“But, compared to the universe of workers more widely, such workers do not have significant retirement savings. As and where asset managers generate capital gains for pension-scheme members, those gains are in reality captured disproportionately not by teachers, nurses and firefighters, but by bankers, lawyers and consultants.”
• asset manager capitalism vs asset manager society
• asset managers usually invest 1-5% of total from their own capital, to have skin in game and usually do not make purchase themselves but rather purchase is made by funds they manage or buys the company that manages the asset.
“In asset-manager society, the asset manager controls the physical asset. Indeed, such control is definitive of asset-manager society, being integral to its very constitution. It is the asset manager that decides how the asset is commercially exploited: who electricity is sold to, whether road tolls should be increased, how farmland should be tenanted, and so forth. And this is true even where a wholly owned intermediary portfolio company exists; as Blackstone's Schwarzman said: You have complete control. Under asset-manager capitalism, by contrast, the asset manager does not control the companies in which it holds shares.”
How it came to be:
1) maturity profile of investor liabilities
2) stability and predictability of cash flows generated by infrastructure: people still pay to use roads or rent even in a recession
3) often hold monopoly, because introducing duplicated water pipes or electricity lines would be inefficient
4) protection against inflation risk, as road tolls and rents increase in line with inflation
5)risk diversification: low beta - returns not significantly sensitive to changes in wider market positions
“ core physical frameworks of social life continue to be reconfigured specifically to generate dependable financial returns for investors. Phillip O'Neill, for example, has highlighted the 'key truth' that the private infrastructure investor seeks an urban configuration through which the infrastructure investment can become prof-itable'; hence, local-government policy becomes, in the words of Peter O'Brien and colleagues, a matter of translating urban infrastructure into assets matching the needs of institutional investors globally'."
“In asset-manager society, in short, the perceived 'need' to provide investors with predict-able, regular income is elevated alongside, and sometimes clearly placed above, the actual need of users for ease and affordability of asset access and use.”
“'Financialized landlords', she says, 'extract needlessly high rents, systematically transferring income from working people to wealthy fund managers and
investors.”
“as Daniela Gabor and Sebastian Kohl have recently argued, it is extremely hard to regard the 'mandates and risk/return requirements' of institutional investors and their asset managers as being compatible with 'the delivery of housing as a human right'.”
“There are also often significant harmful effects associated with the implementation of the second golden rule of real-asset asset management. To ready an acquired asset for profitable disposal, it is just as important for an asset manager to minimise the costs of operating that asset as it is to maximise the revenues arising from its operation.”
Who gains?
“But, in the case of both the asset manager and the pension-scheme administrator, the millions of dollars earned are shared between only a small number - perhaps only a handful - of individuals. This applies in particular to the asset manager's carried interest of $78 million.
Usually, only an asset-management firm's most senior executives, together with those investment professionals actively involved in managing a particular fund and its portfolio investments, will share in the carry.”
“The answer to this question is: large US public-pension schemes such as the Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System (with around 500,000 members), or the California Public Employees' Retirement System (with more than 2 million). If, for example, the first of these two schemes provided the full $300 million in our case, then the $200 million in savers' profit generated by the fund would represent, on average, an extra $400 in each member's pension pot - or $40 extra per year. This is arguably nothing to be sniffed at; but, needless to say, it is a long way from Schwarzman-scale earnings.”
“They tell us that, when investments perform well, everyone in the investment chain wins, including those whose retirement savings are increasingly invested in real-asset funds; but, proportionately speaking, the asset manager is comfortably the biggest winner of all. Our scenarios also tell us, however, that when investments perform badly, there is only one loser, and this is not the pension-scheme manager, still less the asset manager.”
“But, compared to the universe of workers more widely, such workers do not have significant retirement savings. As and where asset managers generate capital gains for pension-scheme members, those gains are in reality captured disproportionately not by teachers, nurses and firefighters, but by bankers, lawyers and consultants.”
November 8, 2023
This is a long and detailed read but an important one that raises the alarm about the increasing asset manager ownership of housing and other public infrastructure in advanced economies.
The so-called Macquarie Infrastructure modelled by the Australian-born investment bank and financial services powerhouse know as the millionaires factory plays a central role in this tome by Brett Christophers, a Swedish-based political economist and human geographer concerned at the growth in rentier capitalism.
Macquarie, along with other large infrastructure investors like Blackstone, have transformed capitalism in recent years, particularly in the decade and a half since the global financial crisis, by seeking and receiving government underwriting guarantees to own and profit from formerly publicly owned infrastructure. In more recent years, the previous focus on toll roads, railways, utilities and ports has extended to residential housing.
The ownership and control of these often highly leveraged assets, which earn the managers inflated fees, is not a more efficient or socially equitable arrangement than public ownership, as their spin doctors proclaim, but a reflection of the growing power of an asset manager-driven economy and society, Christophers writes.
“The growing historic – and, if we have read the runes correctly, likely future – ascendancy of asset managers over society’s vast stock of housing and infrastructure assets has nothing to do with ‘logic’, economic or otherwise. It is, rather, about power,” he says.
“In the final reckoning, in other words, this book has told a remarkably straightforward story. Housing and infrastructure are widely ending up in asset managers’ hands not because the latter are the most ‘appropriate’ or ‘suitable’ or ‘efficient’ owners of such assets, as if in some gigantic drama of perfectly righteous market clearance. Rather, this is increasingly such assets’ default destination simply because asset managers are cash- and power-rich – arguably more so, in fact, than any other category of economic actor at any time in history.”
What’s particularly disturbing about Christopher’s analysis is that supposedly progressive left-leaning governments, wary of the constant attention by the bond market on ‘fiscal responsibility’, are among the first to open the door to private money, while providing all manner of subsidies to guarantee their future profits in areas of the economy that rightly belong in the public domain.
Essential reading for anyone concerned about the erosion of our democracies.
The so-called Macquarie Infrastructure modelled by the Australian-born investment bank and financial services powerhouse know as the millionaires factory plays a central role in this tome by Brett Christophers, a Swedish-based political economist and human geographer concerned at the growth in rentier capitalism.
Macquarie, along with other large infrastructure investors like Blackstone, have transformed capitalism in recent years, particularly in the decade and a half since the global financial crisis, by seeking and receiving government underwriting guarantees to own and profit from formerly publicly owned infrastructure. In more recent years, the previous focus on toll roads, railways, utilities and ports has extended to residential housing.
The ownership and control of these often highly leveraged assets, which earn the managers inflated fees, is not a more efficient or socially equitable arrangement than public ownership, as their spin doctors proclaim, but a reflection of the growing power of an asset manager-driven economy and society, Christophers writes.
“The growing historic – and, if we have read the runes correctly, likely future – ascendancy of asset managers over society’s vast stock of housing and infrastructure assets has nothing to do with ‘logic’, economic or otherwise. It is, rather, about power,” he says.
“In the final reckoning, in other words, this book has told a remarkably straightforward story. Housing and infrastructure are widely ending up in asset managers’ hands not because the latter are the most ‘appropriate’ or ‘suitable’ or ‘efficient’ owners of such assets, as if in some gigantic drama of perfectly righteous market clearance. Rather, this is increasingly such assets’ default destination simply because asset managers are cash- and power-rich – arguably more so, in fact, than any other category of economic actor at any time in history.”
What’s particularly disturbing about Christopher’s analysis is that supposedly progressive left-leaning governments, wary of the constant attention by the bond market on ‘fiscal responsibility’, are among the first to open the door to private money, while providing all manner of subsidies to guarantee their future profits in areas of the economy that rightly belong in the public domain.
Essential reading for anyone concerned about the erosion of our democracies.
November 5, 2023
This is a book that should make readers sit up and take notice.
Excellently argued, clearly written, and deeply engaged with our contemporary world of financial hegemony. Christophers has done an admirable job explaining what asset managers' predominance in our current mode of production *means* for people. Though he maintains his habit of coining neologisms, in the closing pages he admits that this is not some 'new' phenomenon. Rather, it is the consolidation and consequence of finance capital's growing power under existing social relations.
Especially notable is his treatment of housing, including an invaluable intervention into contemporary discussions of what constitutes "financialised housing" (one that I was planning on including in my own work). Brilliant stuff.
Excellently argued, clearly written, and deeply engaged with our contemporary world of financial hegemony. Christophers has done an admirable job explaining what asset managers' predominance in our current mode of production *means* for people. Though he maintains his habit of coining neologisms, in the closing pages he admits that this is not some 'new' phenomenon. Rather, it is the consolidation and consequence of finance capital's growing power under existing social relations.
Especially notable is his treatment of housing, including an invaluable intervention into contemporary discussions of what constitutes "financialised housing" (one that I was planning on including in my own work). Brilliant stuff.
May 8, 2025
A great primer on a topic I knew little about (and fantastic title and cover art!). Clearly, the processes that make up Asset Manager Society are concealed at great effort. Luckily for us, Christophers does a fantastic job of peeling away the facade and laying bare the truth of AM society and its impact.
The book begins with introducing our key players and their main investment vehicles, and all the jargon we’ll need to be familiar with. It moves onto how some of these AM portfolios and companies are structured, the rise of infrastructure investment, the geographical makeup of AM society, the cost to us, who exactly benefits (I thought this was the most interesting chapter), and where AM society stands today, specifically in a post-covid world.
Admittedly, I found the last chapter to be incredibly bleak - the specific details of how the Biden administration threw state support to the wayside following COVID was a rude awakening (and probably particularly so for US centrists/democrats). I was certainly surprised to find our new Prime Minister, Mark Carney, among these pages. I’ve yet to read his book but his words and actions noted in this book don’t paint him in the best picture.
While this book was clear and straightforward, I definitely don’t think it’s an easy read. The author is a university professor and this felt like something I’d read in a first year human geography class in that it’s interesting and a sufficiently challenging read at that level. But I wish it was more accessible - I think it’s the type of valuable information that would have people asking more questions about why AM society continues to persist today, and the role our government plays in maintaining the AM structure, especially after the concessions achieved during COVID.
In an attempt to both promote accessibility to this information and make sure I remember what I read (I was finding that I forgot that I read entire books lol), I’ve added a summary of the book below. However, I wanted to first highlight two key points that stuck with me.
The first - there’s a bizarre myth that Asset Manangers (AMs) need to be incentivized and rewarded for their investment. But really - what risk do they even take, if state bodies are the one shouldering that risk? Chicago parking concessions were used to illustrate the cost to everyday citizens and how exactly AMs exploit the structures of our day-to-day lives.
In short, to attract investors, the city of Chicago absorbed additional risk, “adverse action”. This meant that the city would pay AMs for things such as people not paying meters, temporary meter closures, etc - Chicago absorbed the risk of AMs not getting paid. The AMs were also given monopoly rights - so if a parking garage were to be built nearby, the City would have to pay a fee to the AMs - because it increased competition. If Chicago wanted to make a priority bus lane, they would have to pay a fee to AMs because the bus lane would impact potential income on parking spots. By 2012, Chicago ended up paying the AMs $61 million in fees, which “was nearly three times the annual sum ($22 million) that the city had earned from the meter system just six years earlier”. Jaw DROPPED!
The Second - I did not understand leverage before reading this book but gosh did the explanation of AMs using debt to increase their returns drive me INSANE! Basically, a consortium of AMs (Company A, B, and C) may want to buy infrastructure, but don’t have enough capital to do so - so they take on a loan with Company A at a very high interest rate. The consortium makes money off the investment, but because a large portion of their profits are going to paying off the LOAN, it REDUCES THEIR TAXABLE PROFITS! This is issue #1.
Then, because they’re paying off the loan to Company A at a high interest rate, Company A is making ADDITIONAL PROFIT off this investment. Issue #2!
Finally, taxes are paid in the country of the company owning the loans - so the country where Company A is located, NOT WHERE THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE! So if Company A is located in a tax haven on some island, but the investment is a housing development in europe - the people that are being exploited are not even benefiting from the company paying taxes in that country!!! Issue #3!!! This made me Mad.
Anywho thanks for reading, I have my little notes/ summary below
Ch 1
- Private equity - one of the things that AMs can invest in - "equity (company shares) that is not traded on public exchanges "
- Asset manager capitalism - living in apartment owned by corp publicly listed on stock market. Diff ppl own diff percentage of share
- Asset manager society - you live in an apartment owned by a specific company ; more direct
- Diff types of infrastructures
- Energy, water/wastewater, transportation, telecommunications, social (school/hospital), farmland
Ch 2
- Investors put money into investment funds. These are run by Asset Managers (AMs).
- AMs will invest the funds into infrastructure - this includes hiring subsequent companies to operate said infrastructure - AMs are hands off
- Real Assets acquired are put into three categories: 1. Greenfield - financing construction, 2. Brownfield - existing assets that need upgrading, 3. Secondary - fully operational
- Asset manager capitalism - passive, don't want to run the companies they invest in
- Asset manager Society - control. Ownership of the things they're investing in; “This is the highly active, hands-on business of buying up much smaller numbers of real, physical assets or the companies that hold them - and, in the process, shaping in direct and tangible ways the conditions of everyday life for ordinary people" p.40
- Public private partnership PPP - long term contract where for ex public sector commissions private sector co tractor to build then operate an infrastructure/physical asset for a specified period of time
- Fees include:
- Management fees
- Performance fees - the better a fund does, the more asset manager gets paid
- There's also fees charged to acquired companies - one off legal/transaction fee and quarterly or annual monitoring fee
- "As David Carey and John Morris have wryly observed, the acquired company thereby effectively pays the asset manager 'for the privilege of being [bought and] owned by it" p.58
- "Asset managers predominantly use debt to finance their real-asset acquisitions for a simple reason: to boost returns" p. 60
- Analogy that finally made me understand leverage - Imagine buying a $1 million house, putting $300k down and borrowing $700k and using the house as collateral + using the profit of the asset to pay down the loan so they make more money.
- Dividend recapitalization - Front loading internal rate of return (IRR) so they can borrow more money, then pay shareholders a this as a special dividend - without selling the asset
- Shareholder loans - some of the debt used to finance investment ie provided to the equity investors
- Eg. UK Thames Tidesy Tunnel not complete till 2025 but already paying out investors $51,6 pounds a year - PAID FOR BY PREEMPTIVE INCR IN HOUSEHOLD WATER BILL
Ch 3
- Significant incr in real asset investment via asset managers since 2007/8 financial crisis
- Bc financial crisis meant interest rates were super low, so relatively little reliable income was being made - they had to move their money to something else with returns just as reliable but better returns
- Investors lobbying governments to bring infrastructure projects to market 'in a format appropriate for institutional investment" which means "the projects must deliver competitive returns" p99
- Public or world bank investment as a means to de-risk for private investors , encourage private investment, absorb some of the risk
Ch 4
- Most housing investment is multifamily housing but now single fam housing, senior care homes, mobile homes student housing etc
- TLDR they're investing in predictable and reliable rental income of these assets plus potential for capital gain
- Moving costs are prohibitive so tenants are essentially locked in w/o any choice but to pay rent - they're captives!
- Farmland
- Prev not popular bc too small, not scaleable, lots of restrictions, but interest grew during 07/08 financial crisis
- Bc it was also a food price crisis - ppl were panic buying grain/food and realizing "global pressure on land resources in the context of the climate crisis" which incr value of land
- Energy
- Fossil fuels - Focus on Fuel distribution, storage or coal/gas fired plants, electricity transmission networks, etc rather than extraction
- Renewable energy - renewable based power plants
- 2017 - first year more money committed to renewables than fossil fuel investments
- Income can be paid for electricity produced or volume based payments from companies that need to access infrastructure to deliver their energy/fuel to market
- Social infrastructure - steered clear of this
- Investment $ usually in NA/Europe, AM located in NA/Europe (w Korea following), Investing In NA/Europe w Asia following
- Prev less in America cos infrastructure was public, but incr due to recognition of natl infrastructure gap and interest in embracing investment capital
- Investments in Asia are greenfield - building new stuff instead of maintaining - love to say they're improving economies
Ch 5
- 2 lines sales ppl use to promote ams
1. AMs do good bc they invest the money of every day ppl via pension plans
2. AMs are better custodians of housing/infrastructure than regular ppl or the govt
1. Claim that public tends to underinvest so lower quality
2. Claim that private is more reliable
3. Claim to be cheaper bc greater efficiency
4. Claims to reduce risk to state and subsequently tax payers
- Asset bundling and de risking - setting up PPPs that are amenable to investment
- Need to provide regular income placed above infrastructure accessibility for users
- Alleviates demand risk - risk that there'll be no demand for thing so no money
- Minimum annual revenue or unit priced not tied to demand p 170 171
- Costs of derisking - State absorbs the risk - "risk is socialized"
- Financialisation isn't a good critique bc it suggests that asset managers are worse and private sector real asset owners are better . Both are seeking financial interest, profit maximizing
- Fixed term closed end funds dominate long term infrastructure
- Clear mechanisms on calculating performance fees
- High turnover of AM staff - avoid risk of having ur investment managed by diff ppl
- May be hard to exit open ended real estate /infradtructure
- The quicker the exit, more beneficial impact on fund returns p195
Ch 6 - the most interesting chapter (sorry it was so interesting I forgot to take notes)
- p 242 3 loan from shareholder to reduce taxable profits and interest payments are made to the shareholding company
- Taxes paid in domicile of company owning loans, not where activity takes place
- P246 private debt funds
- P249 carried interest that AMs get paid, at least in America, is taxed as capital gains, which is lower than income tax
- "A tax loophole for the rich that just won't die"
Ch 7 - the future
- “Covid showed us money isn't real”
- Ppl were fooled into thinking “If money was a mere technicality advocated enthused what else could be done?" P 255
- But we were bamboozled, instead of money not being real, it ended up being an opportunity for companies to get in on PPP infrastructure contracts bc govts not willing to fund the whole thing and take loans for it .
- Biden fake confirmed p.258 but we already knew that
- The AM argument during this time - Actually it’s good for us to buy housing and provide rentals bc the financial crisis has shown us that there’s a natural cap to homeownership
- During COVID - AMs saying we are here to help SOLVE the problem, by providing housing
- Inflation made it seem like there were no more good investments for AM but regardless they'll prob keep investing in housing infrastructure bc
1. Most inflation in energy and food so AMs owning this would likely gain than lose money
2. Real assets seen as a better hedge against inflation compared to other assets (housing rents reliable)
3. Rates of construction very behind, so great time for AMs to get in and invest in urban housing markets where there's supply shortage
4. AMs can easily just finance themselves if needed (if interest rates too high)
The book begins with introducing our key players and their main investment vehicles, and all the jargon we’ll need to be familiar with. It moves onto how some of these AM portfolios and companies are structured, the rise of infrastructure investment, the geographical makeup of AM society, the cost to us, who exactly benefits (I thought this was the most interesting chapter), and where AM society stands today, specifically in a post-covid world.
Admittedly, I found the last chapter to be incredibly bleak - the specific details of how the Biden administration threw state support to the wayside following COVID was a rude awakening (and probably particularly so for US centrists/democrats). I was certainly surprised to find our new Prime Minister, Mark Carney, among these pages. I’ve yet to read his book but his words and actions noted in this book don’t paint him in the best picture.
While this book was clear and straightforward, I definitely don’t think it’s an easy read. The author is a university professor and this felt like something I’d read in a first year human geography class in that it’s interesting and a sufficiently challenging read at that level. But I wish it was more accessible - I think it’s the type of valuable information that would have people asking more questions about why AM society continues to persist today, and the role our government plays in maintaining the AM structure, especially after the concessions achieved during COVID.
In an attempt to both promote accessibility to this information and make sure I remember what I read (I was finding that I forgot that I read entire books lol), I’ve added a summary of the book below. However, I wanted to first highlight two key points that stuck with me.
The first - there’s a bizarre myth that Asset Manangers (AMs) need to be incentivized and rewarded for their investment. But really - what risk do they even take, if state bodies are the one shouldering that risk? Chicago parking concessions were used to illustrate the cost to everyday citizens and how exactly AMs exploit the structures of our day-to-day lives.
In short, to attract investors, the city of Chicago absorbed additional risk, “adverse action”. This meant that the city would pay AMs for things such as people not paying meters, temporary meter closures, etc - Chicago absorbed the risk of AMs not getting paid. The AMs were also given monopoly rights - so if a parking garage were to be built nearby, the City would have to pay a fee to the AMs - because it increased competition. If Chicago wanted to make a priority bus lane, they would have to pay a fee to AMs because the bus lane would impact potential income on parking spots. By 2012, Chicago ended up paying the AMs $61 million in fees, which “was nearly three times the annual sum ($22 million) that the city had earned from the meter system just six years earlier”. Jaw DROPPED!
The Second - I did not understand leverage before reading this book but gosh did the explanation of AMs using debt to increase their returns drive me INSANE! Basically, a consortium of AMs (Company A, B, and C) may want to buy infrastructure, but don’t have enough capital to do so - so they take on a loan with Company A at a very high interest rate. The consortium makes money off the investment, but because a large portion of their profits are going to paying off the LOAN, it REDUCES THEIR TAXABLE PROFITS! This is issue #1.
Then, because they’re paying off the loan to Company A at a high interest rate, Company A is making ADDITIONAL PROFIT off this investment. Issue #2!
Finally, taxes are paid in the country of the company owning the loans - so the country where Company A is located, NOT WHERE THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE! So if Company A is located in a tax haven on some island, but the investment is a housing development in europe - the people that are being exploited are not even benefiting from the company paying taxes in that country!!! Issue #3!!! This made me Mad.
Anywho thanks for reading, I have my little notes/ summary below
Ch 1
- Private equity - one of the things that AMs can invest in - "equity (company shares) that is not traded on public exchanges "
- Asset manager capitalism - living in apartment owned by corp publicly listed on stock market. Diff ppl own diff percentage of share
- Asset manager society - you live in an apartment owned by a specific company ; more direct
- Diff types of infrastructures
- Energy, water/wastewater, transportation, telecommunications, social (school/hospital), farmland
Ch 2
- Investors put money into investment funds. These are run by Asset Managers (AMs).
- AMs will invest the funds into infrastructure - this includes hiring subsequent companies to operate said infrastructure - AMs are hands off
- Real Assets acquired are put into three categories: 1. Greenfield - financing construction, 2. Brownfield - existing assets that need upgrading, 3. Secondary - fully operational
- Asset manager capitalism - passive, don't want to run the companies they invest in
- Asset manager Society - control. Ownership of the things they're investing in; “This is the highly active, hands-on business of buying up much smaller numbers of real, physical assets or the companies that hold them - and, in the process, shaping in direct and tangible ways the conditions of everyday life for ordinary people" p.40
- Public private partnership PPP - long term contract where for ex public sector commissions private sector co tractor to build then operate an infrastructure/physical asset for a specified period of time
- Fees include:
- Management fees
- Performance fees - the better a fund does, the more asset manager gets paid
- There's also fees charged to acquired companies - one off legal/transaction fee and quarterly or annual monitoring fee
- "As David Carey and John Morris have wryly observed, the acquired company thereby effectively pays the asset manager 'for the privilege of being [bought and] owned by it" p.58
- "Asset managers predominantly use debt to finance their real-asset acquisitions for a simple reason: to boost returns" p. 60
- Analogy that finally made me understand leverage - Imagine buying a $1 million house, putting $300k down and borrowing $700k and using the house as collateral + using the profit of the asset to pay down the loan so they make more money.
- Dividend recapitalization - Front loading internal rate of return (IRR) so they can borrow more money, then pay shareholders a this as a special dividend - without selling the asset
- Shareholder loans - some of the debt used to finance investment ie provided to the equity investors
- Eg. UK Thames Tidesy Tunnel not complete till 2025 but already paying out investors $51,6 pounds a year - PAID FOR BY PREEMPTIVE INCR IN HOUSEHOLD WATER BILL
Ch 3
- Significant incr in real asset investment via asset managers since 2007/8 financial crisis
- Bc financial crisis meant interest rates were super low, so relatively little reliable income was being made - they had to move their money to something else with returns just as reliable but better returns
- Investors lobbying governments to bring infrastructure projects to market 'in a format appropriate for institutional investment" which means "the projects must deliver competitive returns" p99
- Public or world bank investment as a means to de-risk for private investors , encourage private investment, absorb some of the risk
Ch 4
- Most housing investment is multifamily housing but now single fam housing, senior care homes, mobile homes student housing etc
- TLDR they're investing in predictable and reliable rental income of these assets plus potential for capital gain
- Moving costs are prohibitive so tenants are essentially locked in w/o any choice but to pay rent - they're captives!
- Farmland
- Prev not popular bc too small, not scaleable, lots of restrictions, but interest grew during 07/08 financial crisis
- Bc it was also a food price crisis - ppl were panic buying grain/food and realizing "global pressure on land resources in the context of the climate crisis" which incr value of land
- Energy
- Fossil fuels - Focus on Fuel distribution, storage or coal/gas fired plants, electricity transmission networks, etc rather than extraction
- Renewable energy - renewable based power plants
- 2017 - first year more money committed to renewables than fossil fuel investments
- Income can be paid for electricity produced or volume based payments from companies that need to access infrastructure to deliver their energy/fuel to market
- Social infrastructure - steered clear of this
- Investment $ usually in NA/Europe, AM located in NA/Europe (w Korea following), Investing In NA/Europe w Asia following
- Prev less in America cos infrastructure was public, but incr due to recognition of natl infrastructure gap and interest in embracing investment capital
- Investments in Asia are greenfield - building new stuff instead of maintaining - love to say they're improving economies
Ch 5
- 2 lines sales ppl use to promote ams
1. AMs do good bc they invest the money of every day ppl via pension plans
2. AMs are better custodians of housing/infrastructure than regular ppl or the govt
1. Claim that public tends to underinvest so lower quality
2. Claim that private is more reliable
3. Claim to be cheaper bc greater efficiency
4. Claims to reduce risk to state and subsequently tax payers
- Asset bundling and de risking - setting up PPPs that are amenable to investment
- Need to provide regular income placed above infrastructure accessibility for users
- Alleviates demand risk - risk that there'll be no demand for thing so no money
- Minimum annual revenue or unit priced not tied to demand p 170 171
- Costs of derisking - State absorbs the risk - "risk is socialized"
- Financialisation isn't a good critique bc it suggests that asset managers are worse and private sector real asset owners are better . Both are seeking financial interest, profit maximizing
- Fixed term closed end funds dominate long term infrastructure
- Clear mechanisms on calculating performance fees
- High turnover of AM staff - avoid risk of having ur investment managed by diff ppl
- May be hard to exit open ended real estate /infradtructure
- The quicker the exit, more beneficial impact on fund returns p195
Ch 6 - the most interesting chapter (sorry it was so interesting I forgot to take notes)
- p 242 3 loan from shareholder to reduce taxable profits and interest payments are made to the shareholding company
- Taxes paid in domicile of company owning loans, not where activity takes place
- P246 private debt funds
- P249 carried interest that AMs get paid, at least in America, is taxed as capital gains, which is lower than income tax
- "A tax loophole for the rich that just won't die"
Ch 7 - the future
- “Covid showed us money isn't real”
- Ppl were fooled into thinking “If money was a mere technicality advocated enthused what else could be done?" P 255
- But we were bamboozled, instead of money not being real, it ended up being an opportunity for companies to get in on PPP infrastructure contracts bc govts not willing to fund the whole thing and take loans for it .
- Biden fake confirmed p.258 but we already knew that
- The AM argument during this time - Actually it’s good for us to buy housing and provide rentals bc the financial crisis has shown us that there’s a natural cap to homeownership
- During COVID - AMs saying we are here to help SOLVE the problem, by providing housing
- Inflation made it seem like there were no more good investments for AM but regardless they'll prob keep investing in housing infrastructure bc
1. Most inflation in energy and food so AMs owning this would likely gain than lose money
2. Real assets seen as a better hedge against inflation compared to other assets (housing rents reliable)
3. Rates of construction very behind, so great time for AMs to get in and invest in urban housing markets where there's supply shortage
4. AMs can easily just finance themselves if needed (if interest rates too high)
February 5, 2025
Welcome to the new enclosures. This is a world owned only by a certain few individuals (not you).
February 10, 2024
After reading nine Verso-published books last year, I'm on track with my second of 2024. When I bought this one, I thought it would be a critique of the big three asset managers: Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street. However, it's rather more about the big three direct asset management companies: Blackstone (yes, originally an offshoot of Blackrock), MacQuarrie, and Toronto's own Brookfield.
So, what's the difference here? Where the big three asset managers have influential or controlling stakes in many, many industries, they tend to avoid assets that need to be directly managed, namely housing and infrastructure. That's where a Brookfield would step in, buying assets like wind farms, multi-family dwellings, toll highways, or care homes, and attempting to flip them for a profit in the length of the investment. This means keeping costs low in the form of neglectful maintenance, poor wages, and skirting regulations; while maximizing profits by raising rents and utility costs to the consumer.
In addition, many of the main investors in these schemes are public-sector pension plans and other social services that were once handled at a government level, lending these projects an air of legitimacy, and making any criticism against them a slight again teachers, workers, and the aged. Despite this, of course, the real earners here are the asset managers themselves, and the investors rich and influential enough to dictate their own terms.
Of course, I am being a bit reductive here, but Christophers presents compelling evidence of the danger of an asset manager society using real data and direct quotes. I found the first half of the book lacking in as many case studies as I'm used to, but once the historical picture and the moving parts have been explained, the back half does a great job of explaining why this trend is so insidious. There is an anecdote about the Chicago parking authority in here that will make your hair stand on end.
Overall, this was tough to keep focus on at points as sometimes the data and facts washed over me, as hard as I tried to take it all in, but it all came together to become a unified exposé, and a troubling premonition of how this is likely to continue in the future.
So, what's the difference here? Where the big three asset managers have influential or controlling stakes in many, many industries, they tend to avoid assets that need to be directly managed, namely housing and infrastructure. That's where a Brookfield would step in, buying assets like wind farms, multi-family dwellings, toll highways, or care homes, and attempting to flip them for a profit in the length of the investment. This means keeping costs low in the form of neglectful maintenance, poor wages, and skirting regulations; while maximizing profits by raising rents and utility costs to the consumer.
In addition, many of the main investors in these schemes are public-sector pension plans and other social services that were once handled at a government level, lending these projects an air of legitimacy, and making any criticism against them a slight again teachers, workers, and the aged. Despite this, of course, the real earners here are the asset managers themselves, and the investors rich and influential enough to dictate their own terms.
Of course, I am being a bit reductive here, but Christophers presents compelling evidence of the danger of an asset manager society using real data and direct quotes. I found the first half of the book lacking in as many case studies as I'm used to, but once the historical picture and the moving parts have been explained, the back half does a great job of explaining why this trend is so insidious. There is an anecdote about the Chicago parking authority in here that will make your hair stand on end.
Overall, this was tough to keep focus on at points as sometimes the data and facts washed over me, as hard as I tried to take it all in, but it all came together to become a unified exposé, and a troubling premonition of how this is likely to continue in the future.
July 14, 2023
Crucial reading to understand the growing inequality that exists in the world. This was such a well-researched, well-written book. This book focuses on asset managers, and a particular kind of asset manager (i.e. those that directly own real assets, as opposed to those that holds stocks in companies that hold real assets), but as a former corporate lawyer, the book contextualized the role of law in facilitating infrastructure ownership, how that results in declining public services, and greater social and economic inequality. Everyone, and i mean everyone, should read this.
May 31, 2023
Excellent, daunting. And sad, terribly sad for the likely consequences this entails. Well documented, perfectly explained, the mechanics of asset management society cast little hope on the future of mankind. Personal judgement of course.
February 7, 2025
An exquisite example on how to write a sober reflection on a topic and how to communicate it well. Christophers is very thorough in his presentation, but what is especially noteworthy about it is the way how cogently and pedagogically he builds up his arguments: when terms and concepts are introduced, you can be sure these introductions are indeed used later as proper stepping stones towards understanding the issue from the author's viewpoint. No nonsense, no filler (and, thank the heavenly spheres, no shoddy quips).
What Christophers aims at with this book is an alternative, iconoclastic take on the gospel of private investment in housing and infrastructure. His coinage for the issue is known as "asset manager society", in which asset manager-led investment funds control directly the residential blocks, rolling stock, pipelines, toll roads and/or other essential societal elements. While such an arrangement indubitably directs capital in absolutely necessary areas of life and may help to improve them (at least on paper), the big problem is that, instead of helping everybody, such flows usually rebound back on the asset managers, who are driven by profit. What makes such investments deleterious from the point of view of the citizens is that the former are often closed-ended ventures (i.e. short-term whereas infra and housing are essentially long-term matters) that are highly leveraged, which in turn offers a rabid stimulus for the asset managers to minimise borrowing costs—and in such a scenario it is unlikely that they have scruples about raising rents / fees. And while they are at it, the local authorities, such as municipalities, will have a hard time planning long-term changes in infrastructure as a result from the different concessions that have been granted for the asset managers, as the investment-hungry governments have paved the way for private investment and softened the blow in terms of risk-taking.
This is a simplification of the issue, but Christophers offers a much more varied version of these scenarios. He explains the fee structures of asset managers, the beneficial owners, the different measures asset managers resort to to maximise their profits and the proper distribution of profits. He demonstrates the prerequisites for this relatively new phenomenon, and takes you through a little ride in the recent past to show, how especially the Global North has ended up in a situation where asset managers hold sway. And he also makes more-than-educated guesses on why, in the midst of the on-going battles with climate change, inflation and interest rates, this sway is highly unlikely to be dethroned.
Christophers tackles the topic especially from the point of view of inequality and uneven distribution of wealth. And he does so in a very calculated manner, not resorting to cheap posturing or sensationalism. By way of offering a plethora of insightful examples, he undermines the common narratives about how asset managers end up helping us all, but he also shows how it is not simply asset managers themselves who in their naked goldlust made it all possible.
This, in a word, is a book that not only opens a pair of eyes but also invests them with a keen gaze on our seemingly innocuous surroundings, possibly creaking with precarity.
What Christophers aims at with this book is an alternative, iconoclastic take on the gospel of private investment in housing and infrastructure. His coinage for the issue is known as "asset manager society", in which asset manager-led investment funds control directly the residential blocks, rolling stock, pipelines, toll roads and/or other essential societal elements. While such an arrangement indubitably directs capital in absolutely necessary areas of life and may help to improve them (at least on paper), the big problem is that, instead of helping everybody, such flows usually rebound back on the asset managers, who are driven by profit. What makes such investments deleterious from the point of view of the citizens is that the former are often closed-ended ventures (i.e. short-term whereas infra and housing are essentially long-term matters) that are highly leveraged, which in turn offers a rabid stimulus for the asset managers to minimise borrowing costs—and in such a scenario it is unlikely that they have scruples about raising rents / fees. And while they are at it, the local authorities, such as municipalities, will have a hard time planning long-term changes in infrastructure as a result from the different concessions that have been granted for the asset managers, as the investment-hungry governments have paved the way for private investment and softened the blow in terms of risk-taking.
This is a simplification of the issue, but Christophers offers a much more varied version of these scenarios. He explains the fee structures of asset managers, the beneficial owners, the different measures asset managers resort to to maximise their profits and the proper distribution of profits. He demonstrates the prerequisites for this relatively new phenomenon, and takes you through a little ride in the recent past to show, how especially the Global North has ended up in a situation where asset managers hold sway. And he also makes more-than-educated guesses on why, in the midst of the on-going battles with climate change, inflation and interest rates, this sway is highly unlikely to be dethroned.
Christophers tackles the topic especially from the point of view of inequality and uneven distribution of wealth. And he does so in a very calculated manner, not resorting to cheap posturing or sensationalism. By way of offering a plethora of insightful examples, he undermines the common narratives about how asset managers end up helping us all, but he also shows how it is not simply asset managers themselves who in their naked goldlust made it all possible.
This, in a word, is a book that not only opens a pair of eyes but also invests them with a keen gaze on our seemingly innocuous surroundings, possibly creaking with precarity.
July 21, 2024
The brewing financial troubles at Thames Water, a utility in the UK intrigued me to explore the role and involvement of asset managers/owners in running businesses that are primarily engaged in providing public goods and services. The concentrated ownership of private sector corporates, especially in the Developed economies, in the hands of fund managers through active and passive funds is a well-known fact but their role in managing assets such as public infrastructure, energy, telecommunications and transportation has also increased manifold over the last two decades. Governments had shifted the responsibility of managing public assets to the private sector long ago but the trend of fund managers becoming owners is fairly recent. How that shift has planned out and who has benefited from it? Is the public (users of such assets) better-off due to the involvement of famous asset managers in managing hospitals, toll roads, airports, city parking, multi- family housing and water distribution.
To find answers to these questions, I started reading "Our Lives in Thier Portfolios - Why Asset Managers Own the World" written by Brett Christophers. The author has carried out extensive research and has shared his analysis in an attempt to answer the key question - Who is actually benefiting from the ownership of social and public infrastructure? The answer is pretty clear to the author and he has directed his ire at asset managers (Brookfield, Macquarie, Blackstone, Morgan Stanley IP to name a few) in extracting excess returns from such investments while making the products/services more expensive and operating with a short-term horizon despite a long-term nature of such assets/projects. While the author's criticism is mostly justified, there are several key reasons why fund managers stepped-in to fill the gap left by the governments and public sector in infrastructure and social assets development.
The trend of investment by asset managers in infrastructure assets is not new. It started in in the 1990s and 2000s. Western governments with growing debts began seeking out private investors to acquire ageing infrastructure from airports and railways to water pipes. Over the past decade assets under management in infrastructure funds have increased almost five-fold, to $1.3trn (The Economist). The top three are Australia’s Macquarie, Canada’s Brookfield and Global Infrastructure Partners (acquired by Black Rock in January this year).
The three key trends driving infrastructure demand are 1) Decarbonization – requiring investment in renewables, storage batteries and transmission lines, 2) Digitization – requiring assets such as data centers, fiber optic cables and 5G networks, and 3) Deglobalization – requiring development of local/regional transport infrastructure and factories.
The book is very informative and covers the topic with great details. Definitely a must read for the individuals curious to know more.
To find answers to these questions, I started reading "Our Lives in Thier Portfolios - Why Asset Managers Own the World" written by Brett Christophers. The author has carried out extensive research and has shared his analysis in an attempt to answer the key question - Who is actually benefiting from the ownership of social and public infrastructure? The answer is pretty clear to the author and he has directed his ire at asset managers (Brookfield, Macquarie, Blackstone, Morgan Stanley IP to name a few) in extracting excess returns from such investments while making the products/services more expensive and operating with a short-term horizon despite a long-term nature of such assets/projects. While the author's criticism is mostly justified, there are several key reasons why fund managers stepped-in to fill the gap left by the governments and public sector in infrastructure and social assets development.
The trend of investment by asset managers in infrastructure assets is not new. It started in in the 1990s and 2000s. Western governments with growing debts began seeking out private investors to acquire ageing infrastructure from airports and railways to water pipes. Over the past decade assets under management in infrastructure funds have increased almost five-fold, to $1.3trn (The Economist). The top three are Australia’s Macquarie, Canada’s Brookfield and Global Infrastructure Partners (acquired by Black Rock in January this year).
The three key trends driving infrastructure demand are 1) Decarbonization – requiring investment in renewables, storage batteries and transmission lines, 2) Digitization – requiring assets such as data centers, fiber optic cables and 5G networks, and 3) Deglobalization – requiring development of local/regional transport infrastructure and factories.
The book is very informative and covers the topic with great details. Definitely a must read for the individuals curious to know more.
August 12, 2023
While the general thesis of the book made sense and the breadth of examples provided was excellent, I found the way in which it was presented difficult to read.
Chapters 1-3, while containing a number of interesting examples and accompanying logical explanations (e.g., that farmland, or residential real estate were historically 'bitty'/difficult to invest large amounts in at once and were hence not considered as attractive; or how the 2007-2009 financial crisis affected things) was a bit difficult to follow - without knowledge of the domain that the author likely has but, I, at least, do not, it felt somewhat inconclusive and unstructured. For example, in Chapter 2 discussions on how much value was owned by asset management firms (e.g. $1 trillion of housing, or $22 million in farmland from 2006-2016) were notably not accompanied by data or estimates of the total size of the relevant markets, which made it difficult for me to know if I could or should agree with the author's thesis or not. The later chapters were better, though I wasn't sure if I wanted to continue with the book after Chapter 3.
There's also for me at least some vagueness / what I see as looseness on whether 'asset-manager capitalism' (no control of underlying companies) vs 'asset-manager society' (with control of underlying companies) is referenced when 'asset managers' are referred to in general, in e.g., chapter 6.
The overarching thesis that asset managers having increasing control, especially in the contexts of residential property and infrastructure, is dangerous and costly, was communicated and I (for what little that's worth) agree with it - my main gripes with the book pertained to organisation, and it not being sufficiently rigorous or clear for a non-expert in the field.
Chapters 1-3, while containing a number of interesting examples and accompanying logical explanations (e.g., that farmland, or residential real estate were historically 'bitty'/difficult to invest large amounts in at once and were hence not considered as attractive; or how the 2007-2009 financial crisis affected things) was a bit difficult to follow - without knowledge of the domain that the author likely has but, I, at least, do not, it felt somewhat inconclusive and unstructured. For example, in Chapter 2 discussions on how much value was owned by asset management firms (e.g. $1 trillion of housing, or $22 million in farmland from 2006-2016) were notably not accompanied by data or estimates of the total size of the relevant markets, which made it difficult for me to know if I could or should agree with the author's thesis or not. The later chapters were better, though I wasn't sure if I wanted to continue with the book after Chapter 3.
There's also for me at least some vagueness / what I see as looseness on whether 'asset-manager capitalism' (no control of underlying companies) vs 'asset-manager society' (with control of underlying companies) is referenced when 'asset managers' are referred to in general, in e.g., chapter 6.
The overarching thesis that asset managers having increasing control, especially in the contexts of residential property and infrastructure, is dangerous and costly, was communicated and I (for what little that's worth) agree with it - my main gripes with the book pertained to organisation, and it not being sufficiently rigorous or clear for a non-expert in the field.
September 18, 2024
It's an interesting experience to read a book that is so vehemently oppose to what you thought was unequivocally good and had to some extent been working to achieve. Whilst I did not immediately jump off the ledge and remain to be persuaded both ways, it made me realise how I had not question several things before. How could you, perhaps, when the surrounding narrative is so clear and strong: that we need to transition to net zero (yes), and for that we need money (makes sense), and given the trillion dollar scale those money could only come from private finance and not the limited public finance(yes?)?
While it isn't marketed as such, people working in energy transition or climate finance need to read this book. Not to suddenly pick a side or such, but to challenge our thinking. I do not agree with everything, but it's often well-articulated and persuasive, although if you work in the sector you might find yourself scratching your head a bit and asking, so what's the viable alternatives then? Which unfortunately he didn't go that much in the book.
While it isn't marketed as such, people working in energy transition or climate finance need to read this book. Not to suddenly pick a side or such, but to challenge our thinking. I do not agree with everything, but it's often well-articulated and persuasive, although if you work in the sector you might find yourself scratching your head a bit and asking, so what's the viable alternatives then? Which unfortunately he didn't go that much in the book.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 22, 2024
If you asked most people what the world's biggest problems are today, not many would name ownership of global infrastructure. Roughly 40% of total global financial wealth is now invested in it though, and investors expect to make a return (even if they don't know they are invested in it). This is a relatively recent phenomenon as companies have started to buy up physical assets, as opposed to more traditional shares, bonds and commodities. This book explains how it has happened and what the consequences are. Fundamentally it comes down to the dichotomy between being stewards of homes and vital services - and then needing to make a profit to satisfy shareholders. It feels like everything that can be nailed down today has been flogged off. On the other hand, are governments any good at looking after their own assets? Most books at least end on a positive note, but there seems little hope of arresting this phenomenon (at least in the Global North) and this one doesn't even try to suggest remedies. I guess the best that can be hoped for is at least increased awareness.
December 10, 2024
Was thinking this would be amore advanced but glad it wasn't too advanced. This is a great primer on Asset Management and Asset Managers themselves. Whether it be how they make their money, how they lose (or avoid losing) their money, how they accumulate assets, what assets they prioritize, how do they prioritize assets, lots of great information in this regard.
What I really liked was the part on public infrastructure and PPP's (public-private partnerships) where asset managers will buy portions of government entities that provide public goods and what the in's and out's of that relationship is like.
There were some really great anecdotes and scenarios as well. A good book!
What I really liked was the part on public infrastructure and PPP's (public-private partnerships) where asset managers will buy portions of government entities that provide public goods and what the in's and out's of that relationship is like.
There were some really great anecdotes and scenarios as well. A good book!
August 30, 2023
Lucid and accessible, without ever feeling like the argument has been over-simplified. A tad dry in parts, but that surely comes with writing on a quite technical subject matter.
As Christophers describes it, asset-manager society is the newest evolution of the way that capitalism mediates and withholds from us the essential requirements needed for basic survival and social reproduction (housing, infrastructure, water). This newest manifestation is key to unlocking why everything seems to be getting simultaneously more expensive and more shit.
As Christophers describes it, asset-manager society is the newest evolution of the way that capitalism mediates and withholds from us the essential requirements needed for basic survival and social reproduction (housing, infrastructure, water). This newest manifestation is key to unlocking why everything seems to be getting simultaneously more expensive and more shit.
January 16, 2025
"Four in every ten of the world's equivalent dollars are now controlled by and invested through asset managers". This alone is reason enough to read this book.
A very thorough, detailed review of asset managers, their history, how they function and the impact this is having.
Probably for me, this contained more detail than was necessary - my purpose for reading was a relatively shallow enquiry into the topic. Christophers provides much of what you will need to know on the topic in what is clearly a well-researched book.
A very thorough, detailed review of asset managers, their history, how they function and the impact this is having.
Probably for me, this contained more detail than was necessary - my purpose for reading was a relatively shallow enquiry into the topic. Christophers provides much of what you will need to know on the topic in what is clearly a well-researched book.
May 25, 2023
An excellent and thorough treatment of the subject. The more descriptive parts near the beginning are not necessarily something one can take in with their mind on other things, but that artificial complexity is built into the nature of what's being described. It also has the distinction of being the only book on the subject to come out recently that does not have "Plunder" in the title. 5 stars, I hope it will be read widely.
July 3, 2023
Our lives in their portfolios
I live in country kenya where substantial portion of commercial real estate is owned by pension funds and insurance companies. This book takes itg one step further where rental blocks and other public utilities are now transferred to private entities. These private entities mission may not be aligned with those of general public . At end small guy will suffer
I live in country kenya where substantial portion of commercial real estate is owned by pension funds and insurance companies. This book takes itg one step further where rental blocks and other public utilities are now transferred to private entities. These private entities mission may not be aligned with those of general public . At end small guy will suffer
November 28, 2024
Insightful but way too much complicated language for points that could be made more simply. The author seems to go out of the way to make the language more difficult, realizing at the end of arguments that a quote from somewhere else sums up the point being made easily in less than a sentence.
December 29, 2023
This book should be a must read for anyone in higher education and of course politics.
It is very analytical even at time when it became emotionally charged.
It is very analytical even at time when it became emotionally charged.
January 25, 2024
3.5 stars
Very interesting topic, but dragged significantly in the middle
Very interesting topic, but dragged significantly in the middle
April 14, 2024
Very academic but interesting. Well written and clear
June 23, 2024
timely, interesting--details of an opaque world. Longer than it needed to be, I think
November 17, 2024
Really thought provoking read about the asset management industry. Quite detailed and technical in places but very interesting
March 30, 2025
Another one where I felt I'd mostly got the point before reading it because it was written a few years ago. Another one where the point is very important.
November 4, 2024
Easily one of the best books I’ve ever read. Illuminating, complex, but so incredibly well structured, written and edited. And the research is so thorough. And on top of this all it’s genuinely an entertaining read, at times reads like a detective story, thanks to the way it comes back to aforementioned case studies and points. This is nonfiction done perfectly.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 30 reviews