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How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities Hardcover – November 10, 2009
Behind the alarming headlines about job losses, bank bailouts, and corporate greed is a little-known story of bad ideas. For fifty years or more, economists have been busy developing elegant theories of how markets work—how they facilitate innovation, wealth creation, and an efficient allocation of society’s resources. But what about when markets don’t work? What about when they lead to stock market bubbles, glaring inequality, polluted rivers, real estate crashes, and credit crunches?
In How Markets Fail, John Cassidy describes the rising influence of what he calls utopian economics—thinking that is blind to how real people act and that denies the many ways an unregulated free market can produce disastrous unintended consequences. He then looks to the leading edge of economic theory, including behavioral economics, to offer a new understanding of the economy—one that casts aside the old assumption that people and firms make decisions purely on the basis of rational self-interest. Taking the global financial crisis and current recession as his starting point, Cassidy explores a world in which everybody is connected and social contagion is the norm. In such an environment, he shows, individual behavioral biases and kinks—overconfidence, envy, copycat behavior, and myopia—often give rise to troubling macroeconomic phenomena, such as oil price spikes, CEO greed cycles, and boom-and-bust waves in the housing market. These are the inevitable outcomes of what Cassidy refers to as “rational irrationality”—self-serving behavior in a modern market setting.
Combining on-the-ground reporting, clear explanations of esoteric economic theories, and even a little crystal-ball gazing, Cassidy warns that in today’s economic crisis, conforming to antiquated orthodoxies isn’t just misguided—it’s downright dangerous. How Markets Fail offers a new, enlightening way to understand the force of the irrational in our volatile global economy.
- Print length400 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherFarrar, Straus and Giroux
- Publication dateNovember 10, 2009
- Dimensions6.48 x 1.34 x 9.22 inches
- ISBN-100374173206
- ISBN-13978-0374173203
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Praise for How Markets Fail
“Cassidy clearly knows a great deal of economics, and he tells his story extremely well . . . Many of his chapters—on the development of general equilibrium theory (how everything in the economy systematically depends on everything else), for example, or marginalism (why prices are determined by what we’re prepared to pay for the very last item of something we buy, rather than what the whole amount is worth to us)—would make useful supplementary reading in an undergraduate economics course.” —Benjamin M. Friedman, The New York Review of Books
“[A] wonderful book . . . The most concise and elegantly written account, among the many that have come out, of how we got into this mess.” —Liaquat Ahamed, The National Interest
“[How Markets Fail] brilliantly dissects much of what has passed for economic wisdom, and decries the lack of humility from those whose theories helped cause the disaster.” —Floyd Norris, The New York Times
“Highly readable . . . Cassidy offers a clear and occasionally colorful exposition of the evolution of relevant economic thought in a way that is accessible to non-economists.” —Richard N. Cooper, Foreign Affairs
“Fascinating and important.” —Eliot Spitzer, Slate
“An admirably lucid account of how ‘utopian economics’ drove us to disaster . . . This is a compelling synthesis that derives most of its narrative energy from the author’s clarity of thought and exposition.” —James Pressley, Bloomberg.com
“An essential, grittily intellectual, yet compelling guide to the financial debacle of 2009.” —Geordie Greig, London Evening Standard
“The last major attempt of 2009 to make sense of what has become of the discipline of economics.” —Stefan Stern, Financial Times (Best Books of the Year)
“A well constructed, thoughtful and cogent account of how capitalism evolved to its current form.” —Edmund Conway, The Daily Telegraph
“[How Markets Fail] is more than just an account of the failures of regulators and the self-deception of bankers and homebuyers, although these are well covered. For Mr. Cassidy, the deeper roots of the crisis lie in the enduring appeal of an idea: that society is always best served when individuals are left to pursue their self-interest in free markets . . . An ambitious book, and one that mostly succeeds.” —The Economist
“An ambitious, nuanced work that brings ideas alive . . . Cassidy makes a compelling case that a return to hands-off economics would be a disaster.”—Chris Farrell, BusinessWeek
“Brilliant.” —Paul M. Barrett, New York Times Book Review
“Both a narrative and a call to arms, [How Markets Fail] provides an intellectual and historical context for the string of denial and bad decisions that led to the disastrous ‘illusion of harmony,’ the lure of real estate and the Great Crunch of 2008. Using psychology and behavioral economics, Cassidy presents an excellent argument that the market is not in fact self-correcting, and that only a return to reality-based economics—and a reform-minded move to shove Wall Street in that direction—can pull us out of the mess in which we’ve found ourselves.” —Publishers Weekly
“An elegant, readable treatise on economics, swathed in current headlines . . . Cassidy delivers on the promise of his title, but he also offers a clear-eyed look at economic thinking over the last three centuries, from Adam Smith to Ben Bernanke, and shows how the major theories have played out in practice, often not well . . . Cassidy writes with terrific clarity and a finely tuned sense of moral outrage, yielding a superb book.” —Kirkus Reviews (starred review)
About the Author
John Cassidy is a journalist at The New Yorker and a frequent contributor to The New York Review of Books. He is the author of Dot.con: How America Lost Its Mind and
Money in the Internet Era and lives in New York City.
Product details
- Publisher : Farrar, Straus and Giroux
- Publication date : November 10, 2009
- Edition : 1st
- Language : English
- Print length : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0374173206
- ISBN-13 : 978-0374173203
- Item Weight : 1.36 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.48 x 1.34 x 9.22 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #275,365 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #45 in Money & Monetary Policy (Books)
- #154 in Systems & Planning
- #377 in Economic Conditions (Books)
- Customer Reviews:
About the author

John Cassidy is a journalist at The New Yorker and a frequent contributor to The New York Review of Books. He is the author of Dot.con: How America Lost Its Mind andMoney in the Internet Era and lives in New York City.
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Customers appreciate the book's deep understanding of economic intellectual history and find it an excellent summation of economic theory and practice. Moreover, they praise its readability and clarity, describing it as an easy read for heavy topics. However, the book receives mixed reactions regarding market failure, with some customers expressing concerns about how markets work.
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Customers find the book highly informative, providing an excellent summation of economic theory and practice while offering a deep understanding of economic intellectual history.
"...It starts with description of externalities, the concept of the losses or damage associated with some action being socialized with the gains being..." Read more
"...The writing is exceptionally good, smooth, and explanatory, but the twist in his presentation is an obvious and transparent attempt to justify his..." Read more
"...It gives a good introduction to the limitations of otherwise impressively mathematical results of utopian General Equilibrium Theory, so likely to..." Read more
"...He's got some good points, if - and this is not an insignificant "if"-- if you work in the particular area of finance that knows this..." Read more
Customers find the book readable and worth the effort to read.
"...But all in all, truly a good work that ought to be read to gain great insight into what happened, why, who believed what and why they believed it." Read more
"...This book seems to ignore that goal. Yet it is worth reading to gain insight, and the book is one of the best out there...." Read more
"...On the one hand, I think he does do some wonderful things in the way of reviewing history and certain distortions that have lead to crisis...." Read more
"I just finished the first part of this book. I have very much enjoyed reading this book so far because it starts explaining the financial crisis by..." Read more
Customers praise the book's clarity, finding it easy to read and understand, with one customer noting it presents ideas without being boring or confusing.
"...The writing is exceptionally good, smooth, and explanatory, but the twist in his presentation is an obvious and transparent attempt to justify his..." Read more
"...It was well written, accurate and fair...." Read more
"...His analysis of this complex flow of debt and capital is really well done...." Read more
"...He presents a very clear picture of what went wrong and why...." Read more
Customers have mixed opinions about the book's coverage of market failure, with some appreciating its comprehensive analysis while others disagree.
"...Free markets do work, entrepreneurial behavior is the key element to our success, and the goal of the Government should be to take all actions as is..." Read more
"Cassidy has written this book in a way that anyone can understand the dynamics of an economic system...." Read more
"...of why this is, because it is not market generated forces, they are policies..." Read more
"This book is a very complete review of how markets work and what their inherent problems actually are...." Read more
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- Reviewed in the United States on February 7, 2010Format: HardcoverVerified PurchaseHow Markets Fail is an excellent overview of the field of modern day economics and its intellectual history. The purpose of the book is make the reader embrace the reality that market failures are abundant and not solvable by free market capitalism. The book approaches the subject matter in a very foundational way and starts with no assumed knowledge, leading the reader through the history of economic thought from Smith to Walrus through Keynes up to modern day Lucas and Minsky. It is an excellent overview, the best I think I have read so far. The contents are both quite digestible to the reader and illuminating.
The book is split into three parts. The first part describes the intellectual history that drove the belief in laissez-faire economics. Starting with Smith, it gives a solid overview of the original pin factory example of personal interest driving efficiency and thus societal benefit. He then describes Hayek and the insight of prices being the signalling force that drives efficient allocation of resources in the marketplace. Walrus is then described and the economy as a systems of simultaneous equations that needed to be solved. The concept of relative marginal utility is illustrated and the condition of Pareto efficiency of resource allocation was then described. We then get into more modern day economics with the work of Arrow and the Arrow Debreu market place and the existence of equilibrium under strict conditions. This is followed by the doctrine of Friedman and a quick description of the revisionist explanation of the depression as that of money supply. The modern day efficient market ideas are then discussed discussing some of the dissent of Mandelbrot. The first part is concluded by the supposed triumph of utopian economists (ones who believe the invisible hand is both efficient at allocation and adaptive to change which forces incremental benefit through competition) with the discussion of Lucas and the mathematics of society functioning under the rational discounting person with perfect information.
The second part of the book is a great overview of all of the problems with utopian economics. It starts with description of externalities, the concept of the losses or damage associated with some action being socialized with the gains being privatized. The example used is pollution and things like global warming, the intellectual orgins of this being attributed to Pigou, a contemporary of Keynes. The book then goes into Bator's examination of the assumptions of the Arrow Debreu model and their implausiblity, the consequences are then explored. Game theory is then described and in particular the situations of the tragedy of the commons and the prisoner's dilemna in which lack of coordination causes poor outcomes when acting in ones self interest. Informational assymetries and the consequences of them are explored, from used cars to health care, the repurcussions of the market for lemons is deep and well described. The book then describes Keynes and the observation that investment is an exercise in greater fool theory rather than pure bottom up analysis and that decisions under knightian uncertainty are very different from under probabilistic uncertainty. Then the phenomenon of herding is desribed and the examples in the mutual fund industry in which it is rational to follow the herd instead of exercising independence (for fear of being in the spotlight if one is wrong). The beginning of Behavioural economics is then described and examples of irrationality are given in detail. The chapter is ended with Minsky and his observations on the endogenous nature of instability that exists with money and the market for it.
After going through the intellectual history of free market capitalism and its skeptics we go back to the real world. The history of our financial institutions and asset markets is gone through, the fed's perspective and beliefs are discussed. The real estate market is described, the craziness of the mortgage terms and the incentive problems that drove the mortgage origination and financial repackaging. The feedback effects of asset markets were described and the banks need to keep playing the game while others were. The phenomenon of racing to the bottom is repeatedly shown to be the driving factor in a lot of what took place. Finally the inevitablity of bailouts and the description of the crisis was discussed clearly. In aggregate this book is a fantastic overview of modern day economics, it is done with great intuition and no math. It brings people up to speed on a lot of very important ideas in a fairly short amount of space with key and illustrative examples. Rarely is a book able to accomplish so much and convincingly argues the need to address the market failures that took us here and the need to remove them through regulation. I have no real criticisms, i guess the only thing I wish the author articulated better was that price mechanisms are much important for goods and services (barring externality costs) than they are for asset markets. But all in all, truly a good work that ought to be read to gain great insight into what happened, why, who believed what and why they believed it.
- Reviewed in the United States on November 17, 2009Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase"How Markets Fail" by John Cassidy is but one of a growing number of books attempting to explain both the world of finance and its underpinnings and the resulting collapse of the financial markets. The book is exceptionally well written and deals with all of the critical elements of what got us where we are today. Yet it is worth considering the many issues he discusses in light of other factors.
The book is divided into three parts as presented by the author in the first Chapter. Part I is a review of the classic economists and up to the present. Part II is the behavioral economists and their influence in understanding herd dynamics and stickiness in the market. Part II focuses on the current crisis.
Much of what is written is written well albeit with a strong political bent. For example just out of the box the author states on p. 9 in his introduction of Part I that "Markets encourage power companies to despoil the environment and cause global warming; health insurers to exclude sick people from coverage; computer makers to force customers to buy software programs they don't need; and CEOs to stuff their own pockets at the expense of their stockholders." Now if that quote does not set the stage for all to come nothing else will. It is clear that the author has a strong bias against the free market and denies any personal responsibilities on the part of the individuals. It is a restatement of the victimization approach to economics. He believes that the market, whatever that may be, makes the decision to dump polyphenols from a GE plant into the Hudson. In reality it was the management, the people in GE who did that, not the market. Yet, this theme that capitalism is the forcing function or deus ex machine for all the evils of mankind seems to continue throughout the book.
On p.11 he states that "The subprime boom represented a failure of capitalism in the presence of bounded cognition, uncertainty, hidden information, trend following and plentiful credit." That is in part true but it was the legislation and the regulatory environment that stimulated this process and yes the greed and outright dishonesty of many who participated. Greed and capitalism are not a one to one mapping. Greed has existed in every environment, suffice it to say that it is one of the seven deadly sins.
On p. 12 he calls the problem that Prince had at Citi as an example of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Frankly it was not even close in a game theoretic sense. It was Rubin along with Prince working with the residual of the Sandy Weill collection of companies in a highly leverage state in a financial downturn that most likely led to their downfall.
On pp 17-18 the author speaks towards the issue of having knowledge but not having the ability to conceive of the consequences. He uses Pearl Harbor as an example. Frankly there were many such examples of how this was anticipated ranging from the Navy's War Plan Orange to the well read book by Hector Bywater, The Great Pacific War, detailed in the 1920s the actual plan of the Japanese. In fact the Japanese planning organization actually use the Bywater plan in its own effort. The same types of issues could be said about the attack on 9/11, data was there but "management" was clueless. In fact the collapse of 2008-2009 was presaged by the same market and housing and banking collapse of 1987. Then we had a 25% one day drop in the DOW, a 20-25% drop in housing, and the S&L collapse. The difference was that then people held a reasonable amount of equity in their homes and 401Ks were not as prevalent. The Government took the actions to move from a risky position to a riskier one. Thus it was not the Market but the Government whose hands are dirty. Cassidy seems not to consider that.
On p 23 the author starts his use of Galbraithian dicta. This in and of itself sets the tone. Galbraith in his three books for public consumption on his view of economics, American Capitalism, The Affluent Society, and The New Industrial State, makes the assumption that the battle is between the poor defenseless consumer and the massive impenetrable corporations. It requires the use of "countervailing power" to balance the interests and that is where the need is for all benevolent and all knowing Government is seen as the arbiter of fairness and justice in such transactions. Per Galbraith and the author, the Market is both inefficient and lacks a Rawlsian justice in its allocation of what is produced.
On p. 38 the author details how Hayek was considered a "right wing nut" when he was a student at Oxford in the early 1980s. Well it was Oxford, what more need be said. Hayek's proposition that markets are aggregators of information was an essential and critical observation as was his understanding that centralized organizations had problems dealing with the division of knowledge (p. 41). In fact one need look no further than to an entrepreneurial company versus a large corporation to see the effect of this gross inefficiency of central planning, and the best example is the old Soviet economy, centrally planned, yet incapable of functioning.
On pp 63-68 the author has an interesting and lucid discussion of Arrow's welfare economics. One should remember that Arrow is the uncle of Larry Summers, now in the White House, and once the Treasury Secretary. This discussion is used as a justification of redistribution economics. Namely the basis of the distribution of wealth generated by some is definable by some hypothetical utility function which in turn holds across all people. This utility function has certain mathematical characteristics that are assumed to reflect reality. The net result is that markets, namely free markets, can generate what are termed efficient outcomes, and that efficiency and equity, again a Rawlsian justice schema, can be achieved. Arrow's analysis is just that, and analytical schema. The results are just as good as the assumptions, thus one should beware that the assumptions are just that, assumptions.
On p 65 the author gives a somewhat backhanded compliment to Johnnie von Neumann, a man who amongst those who know and understand his magnificent contributions consider him one with few if any equals. The author calls him "some sort of genius". He was a genius, not "some sort of". He was brilliant and a true polymath with seminal contributions across the spectra of human knowledge. The author then goes on to characterize von Neumann's life as "loquacious and virulently anti-communist, he drank heavily, told off color jokes, was married twice, and died of cancer..." One is amazed as to the cavalier and heavy handed characterization of the life of a person who has so great respect and has made so great a number of contributions. This one statement is a classic example in my opinion of the less than fair, equitable and knowledgeable writing on the part of the author.
On p 78 the author begins to take focus at Friedman and his monetary theory analysis. He states "Friedman liked to invoke the ancient "quantity theory of money" which many of his critics considered hopeless out of date" Frankly the Friedman theory of money was not ancient, it was an new innovation. In fact the theory of money in and of itself was less than ancient, for economists as such had been around at best in some form since the 1650s.
On p 81 the author begins his critique of Friedman and uses the example of the elimination of Federal regulators. That was actually the work of Alfred Kahn and was documented in his classic work, The Economics of Regulation. It was in the Carter Administration that the antitrust suits against AT&T and IBM were started and it was Asst Atty General Baxter under Reagan who dismissed one and settled the other. AT&T was a monopoly and it had a strangle hold on the US telecommunications business. The explosion of entrepreneurial spirit and innovation in telecommunications and the information age was the direct and immediate result of its splitting.
On p 91 the author speaks of the Black Scholes model. He states: "Some of the mathematics used in these theories is pretty befuddling which explains why there are so many physicists and mathematicians working on Wall Street..." Well let me set the author straight, these equations arose from engineers, from the likes of Norbert Wiener and Rudy Kalman, from Stratonovich in Russia and Ito in Japan, and from my book written in the late 1960s, Stochastic Systems and State Estimation. They were used to model and design estimation and control systems. As engineers, we frequently warned people about the limits of models and the concerns of instabilities. Black and Scholes appear to have taken little heed of those issues resulting most likely in the collapse of Long Term Capital Management. One should note that the "equations" which were the underpinnings of the Black Scholes model were also used by the engineers who designed the navigation and guidance systems for the Apollo space missions. But as ones used by engineers they had engineered into them safety margins to assure against the instabilities of real life. Unlike the engineered solutions of Apollo, the Black Scholes approach were used by bankers who ran them to the edge, to the edge of the envelope if you will, and thus these models when applied suffered from the smallest of perturbations and instabilities and thus collapsed.
On p 193 he infers that Volker was the architect of the 19% interest rates. Actually they were the legacy of Nixon and the collapse of gold, Ford and the total lack of confidence, and finally Carter and his gross mishandling of the economy and the final oil crisis. Volker inherited these and then righted them, albeit with high unemployment.
On p 115 the author introduces the Pigou Club of Mankiw at Harvard. Simply this is the group which says that you tax the thing you do not want to happen. This is the way the economist thinks. Rather than solving the problem, you tax it. An engineer would try to find a way to remedy it. The result is the engineer's approach is lower cost, social and otherwise. One should wonder why China's senior officials are mostly engineers whereas we in the US have mostly lawyers with economists in the shadows.
On pp 118-124 the author tackles the Coase approach to life. Coase looked simply at the problem of unintended consequences, their costs, and the remedies thereto. For example a railroad company has tracks and the grass adjacent to the tracks catches fire and burns the wheat of a farmer. The courts may allow a law suit to be filed and the jury may rule in favor of the farmer who gets paid for the damage. If however the farmer loses the suit he may get together with other farmers and then they may pay the railroad to fix the problem. Either way there is a "free market" solution to the problem, yet the costs may flow one way or the other. The author clearly dislikes Coase and his free market approach. He uses the aforementioned GE and Hudson River example. He then follows Coase with the obligatory Global Warming issue on pp 123-124.
On p 128-133 the author starts looking at antitrust issues. Antitrust laws were there to protect competition and not competitors. They were designed to protect the system not the incumbents. The author speaks of Baumol and his view that monopolies did not need to be exposed to competition but the threat of competition. It was Baumol along with Willig who developed the theorem of interconnection pricing, the Baumol-Willing Theorem, which was an ad hoc propiter hoc argument to sustain the AT&T monopoly by allowing the incumbent to collect a "tax" from the competition based upon the premise that AT&T had more customers and that in and of itself had value as some externality. This was in many ways at the heart of the failure of the 1996 Telecom Act whose goal was to allow competition to exist. The author again returns to Galbraith and his book, The New Industrial State, which claims that corporations are dominant controllers of the economy run by technocrats. It is ironic that at most half of the companies Galbraith cites are even in existence today. Their "power" did not keep them from going out of existence. The entrepreneurs, the true engines of growth in the economy, came along and redefined the business under their feet. Consider the telecommunications equipment manufacturers, there is now not a single one in the US, they are just gone. He states Galbraith's claim, "the initiative in deciding what is produced comes not from the sovereign producer, through the market, ... rather, it comes from the great producing organization which reaches forward to control the markets that it is presumed to serve and, beyond, to bend the consumer to its needs..." This was Galbraith's view, and it reflects a 1960's mentality. It however has clearly been shown to have been broken by the mass development of new entrepreneurial businesses, from Microsoft, Apple, and Google.
On p 130 he states, "Then there is high technology sector, where monopoly is endemic." That is clearly false by example. The high tech market is very fluid with new entrants changing the landscape day by day. Yet Intel has a hold, but there is Qualcomm and many others who have disintermediated the broad base of semiconductors for uses well beyond just computation. He continues speaking about the concept of "network externalities" which means that having more users one gets to retain position. That is at best questionable. Just look at wireless versus wireline. The wireline side dominated the business until 2004 when wireless took over. This violates the Baumol-Willig Theorem and lets one see that externalities can be shifted again and again. They are not sustainable barriers to entry.
On p 137 he speaks of the Internet and uses the term "package switching (sic)" It is "packet switching". This was a seminal disintermediation introduced into the telecommunications world view. The story told by one of the Internet founders is that they tried to get AT&T to work with them but AT&T through its arrogance as a monopoly player wanted to control it all. AT&T did not understand that ARPA could reinvent communications, which it did, and this resulted in the never ending decline of the old AT&T.
On pp 158-159 he speaks of insurance and speaks of Arrow stating that the Government should run insurance. That is questionable. Well one should examine the Arrow paper more carefully. He states that health care is a service and as such is different. Ken Arrow, in his well read paper entitled Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Health Care, states the following special characteristics of health care in his view:
"A. The Nature of Demand The most obvious distinguishing characteristics of an individual's demand for medical services is that it is not steady in origin as, for example, for food or clothing, but irregular and unpredictable..."
My simple answer is that there are many people in such a service business, just look at the plumber. Look at the lawyer. Look at the electrician. There are lots of businesses out there that are the same in their demand characteristic as health care. Arrow continues:
"B. Expected Behavior of the Physician: It is clear from everyday observation that the behavior expected of sellers of medical care is different from that of business men in general. These expectations are relevant because medical care belongs to the category of commodities for which the product and the activity of production are identical."
Consider lawyers, they are service providers. There are hundreds of professions, accountants to name another, where the product and the activity are the same. The definition is the personal services industry, it even has an SIC code! But this was an 1963 article, in the days of Galbraith, where economists viewed the world as large corporations against the common man! Prof Arrow, in my opinion, is in error with this attempt at both generalizing and specializing. Arrow continues in his paper:
"C. Product Uncertainty: Uncertainty as to the quality of the product is perhaps more intense here than in any other important commodity. Recovery from disease is as unpredictable as is its incidence. In most commodities, the possibility of learning from one's own experience or that of others is strong because there is an adequate number of trials."
One need just go to a civil or criminal trial, especially with a jury, because the practice of law is similar, the outcome is always unpredictable.
The author makes many other statements and I chose just a few to counter. The writing is exceptionally good, smooth, and explanatory, but the twist in his presentation is an obvious and transparent attempt to justify his political position. Free markets do work, entrepreneurial behavior is the key element to our success, and the goal of the Government should be to take all actions as is necessary to defend and support that effort. This book seems to ignore that goal. Yet it is worth reading to gain insight, and the book is one of the best out there. My favorite book in this area is the recent one by Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera (MIT Press, 2008) which is a superb tale by a highly respected expert in the field. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Inside Technology) The two should be read side by side.
- Reviewed in the United States on December 7, 2024Format: PaperbackVerified PurchaseIt's quickly becoming one of my favorite financial books.
Top reviews from other countries
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Vincenzo MeliReviewed in Italy on January 11, 2022
5.0 out of 5 stars Ottimo
Format: PaperbackVerified PurchaseUn libro molto ben scritto, utilissimo a chi sia interessato ad un excursus dell'evoluzione del pensiero economico da Adam Smith ad oggi e comprendere, senza ideologismi, pregi e limiti delle dottrine sul libero mercato.
- Jean MichelReviewed in the United Kingdom on April 27, 2012
5.0 out of 5 stars Not only How but Why Markets Fail
How Markets Fail by John Cassidy provides a detailed review of economic theories relating to the operations of markets and illustrates the power of ideas; sometimes - bad ideas.
Cassidy provides the reader with a highly relevant historical journey that weaves the development of economic theories (particularly in finance and macroeconomics) with their practice in the real world leading up to the breaking of the financial crash of 2008-2009 centred on the US housing bubble. Key characters include economists from both sides of the spectrum together with pivotal policy makers.
This is definitely one of the better books I have read on the financial crisis since Cassidy illustrates how we came to be in this dreadful place through a combination of factors. Grounded in a fair representation of the conflicting theories of finance and macroeconomic policy this books avoids the kind of ranting witnessed in certain other publications on the subject.
Perhaps most valuable in this book is the way in which Cassidy traces the thinking of theoreticians about how markets operate from the classical to the contemporary period and illustrates how these various theories were adopted by politicans and financiers in the real world. Sometimes with disastrous results.
Hence whilst the book goes to some lenghts to explain the relevant theoretical constructs of the economics community, it is complemented by an equal consideration of the psychology and political economics at play amongst some of the key players.
As recorded in other publications on the financial crisis the book reinforces the sense that the demise of millions of people results from the games played by a relatively small number of players at the top of the power pyramid.
Sadly, although the conclusion of the book offers up some suggestions on how the crisis might be turned into an opportunity for significant reform in banking (particularly investment banking), the intervening three years since the book was published witness very little has been changed. A seriously missed opportunity.
At its heart this is a book that revisits the intellectual struggle by top economists from Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, from the ideas of Karl Marx to the insights of John Maynard Keynes. But it also includes some less well known figures whose contributions have greatly enriched our understanding of how people behave in market situations, in particular Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their contributions from psychology and Hyman Minsky's grasp of reality of how markets really work.
It reminds us that as students of political economics, there are two sides to consider; namely, the political (in particular the use of power) and the economic. The same can be said of financial economics, where there are the increasingly mathematically based models to consider, but there are also the psychological and political elements of the players. At its heart, this book reads as a review of the ideological battle between those (both theorists and practitioners) who believe in the efficiencies of the market and the need to minimise government intervention, versus those who take a more pragmatic approach that acknowledges the realities of market failure and the need to insulate society from its excesses. It is of course a conflict that continues to this day.
- Uttam DinodiaReviewed in India on January 20, 2021
5.0 out of 5 stars Great read...
It covers really basis foundation parts of market collapse in very simple and understandable factors. Book has been written in three parts for better and deep understanding. I loved the insight.
- Cliente AmazonReviewed in Spain on February 14, 2016
5.0 out of 5 stars Magnificent book
Magnificent book. Covers many areas in the economic field: economic history, economic theory, political economics,.. Very well written. Good edition.
- philgrondinReviewed in Canada on October 15, 2014
5.0 out of 5 stars Very intelligent writer. I loved Dot
Very intelligent writer. I loved Dot. con too. Probably the best book I've read recently. I wish he wrote more books. Gives great insight into mass psychology and economics theory and why theory and practice doesn't always coincide. Any one who has money in the market should read this. Other good books: Guns Germs and Steel, the Emperor of all maladies, ghost map.