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Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures
Reference and Existence , Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity . It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersnatches, might have existed). In treating these questions, he makes a number of methodological observations that go beyond the framework of his earlier book -- including the striking claim that fiction cannot provide a test for theories of reference and naming. In addition, these lectures provide a glimpse into the transition to the pragmatics of singular reference that dominated his influential paper, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference" -- a paper that helped reorient linguistic and philosophical semantics. Some of the themes have
been worked out in later writings by other philosophers -- many influenced by typescripts of the lectures in circulation -- but none have approached the careful, systematic treatment provided here. The virtuosity of Naming and Necessity -- the colloquial ease of the tone, the dazzling, on-the-spot formulations, the logical structure of the overall view gradually emerging over the course of the lectures -- is on display here as well.
been worked out in later writings by other philosophers -- many influenced by typescripts of the lectures in circulation -- but none have approached the careful, systematic treatment provided here. The virtuosity of Naming and Necessity -- the colloquial ease of the tone, the dazzling, on-the-spot formulations, the logical structure of the overall view gradually emerging over the course of the lectures -- is on display here as well.
170 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2013
9 people are currently reading
311 people want to read
About the author
Saul A. Kripke
10 books206 followersSaul Aaron Kripke is an American philosopher and logician, now emeritus from Princeton. He teaches as distinguished professor of philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. Since the 1960s Kripke has been a central figure in a number of fields related to logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and set theory. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape-recordings and privately circulated manuscripts.
Kripke was the recipient of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy. He has received honorary degrees from the University of Nebraska, Omaha (1977), Johns Hopkins University (1997), University of Haifa, Israel (1998), and the University of Pennsylvania (2005). He is a member of the American Philosophical Society. Kripke is also an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. In a recent poll conducted by philosophers Kripke was among the top ten most important philosophers of the past 200 years.
Kripke was the recipient of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy. He has received honorary degrees from the University of Nebraska, Omaha (1977), Johns Hopkins University (1997), University of Haifa, Israel (1998), and the University of Pennsylvania (2005). He is a member of the American Philosophical Society. Kripke is also an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. In a recent poll conducted by philosophers Kripke was among the top ten most important philosophers of the past 200 years.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
November 16, 2017
Reference and Existence—transcribed from a series of lectures given in 1973—finds Saul Kripke patching up some of the holes in his theory of direct-reference, as well as edging his theory into some new and exciting territories. Hence, as might be expected, he provides some further arguments against descriptivism, including a rather compelling critique of the Russellian notion of existence as identity. And in the final lecture, he tentatively suggests a solution to the thorny issue of negative existentials—a problem which Quine famously dubbed "Plato's Beard" (i.e., the feeling that non-being must in some sense be, for surely there needs to be something that is not).
But Reference and Existence is most interesting when Kripke shifts his focus to the topic of fiction. What is the ontological status of fictional characters? Of fictional-fictional characters? What are the truth-conditions for propositions like "Sherlock Holmes is the world's greatest detective"? How do identity claims work for fictional and mythical entities? Is trans-work identity possible? And if so, what is the mechanism behind it? Such are the questions that Kripke endeavors to answer.
While I don't wish to get bogged down in argumentative details—just read the book yourself, why don't you!—it is worth noting that Kripke tends to philosophize in broad strokes. Take, for instance, his claim that fictional characters possess certain ontological status, but exist only "in virtue of" the material texts in which they appear. It is not readily apparent how he intends us to cash out this "in virtue of" relation. Is it supervenience? (Not likely.) Dependency? As was the case with the landmark Naming and Necessity, Kripke leaves some of the finer points of his theory for others to work out. (Indeed, Amie Thomasson—in her excellent book Fiction and Metaphysics—has convincingly fleshed out this relation in terms of a particular variety of dependency.)
The upshot of all this is that Reference and Existence in no way constitutes the final word on the issues it raises. But as always, Kripke appears to be concerned first and foremost with providing us with a point of philosophical departure. Over the course of these six lectures, he sketches out the general countours of his view with eloquence and panache, seasoning his discussions with illustrative examples, personal anecdotes and the occasional joke. And philosophical merits aside, this book is an absolute pleasure to read: Kripke is consistently engaging, charismatic and unpretentious, with a knack for lucid explanation (his presentation of the notions of speaker and semantic reference is in itself enough to make reading the book a worthwhile endeavor). Highly recommended.
But Reference and Existence is most interesting when Kripke shifts his focus to the topic of fiction. What is the ontological status of fictional characters? Of fictional-fictional characters? What are the truth-conditions for propositions like "Sherlock Holmes is the world's greatest detective"? How do identity claims work for fictional and mythical entities? Is trans-work identity possible? And if so, what is the mechanism behind it? Such are the questions that Kripke endeavors to answer.
While I don't wish to get bogged down in argumentative details—just read the book yourself, why don't you!—it is worth noting that Kripke tends to philosophize in broad strokes. Take, for instance, his claim that fictional characters possess certain ontological status, but exist only "in virtue of" the material texts in which they appear. It is not readily apparent how he intends us to cash out this "in virtue of" relation. Is it supervenience? (Not likely.) Dependency? As was the case with the landmark Naming and Necessity, Kripke leaves some of the finer points of his theory for others to work out. (Indeed, Amie Thomasson—in her excellent book Fiction and Metaphysics—has convincingly fleshed out this relation in terms of a particular variety of dependency.)
The upshot of all this is that Reference and Existence in no way constitutes the final word on the issues it raises. But as always, Kripke appears to be concerned first and foremost with providing us with a point of philosophical departure. Over the course of these six lectures, he sketches out the general countours of his view with eloquence and panache, seasoning his discussions with illustrative examples, personal anecdotes and the occasional joke. And philosophical merits aside, this book is an absolute pleasure to read: Kripke is consistently engaging, charismatic and unpretentious, with a knack for lucid explanation (his presentation of the notions of speaker and semantic reference is in itself enough to make reading the book a worthwhile endeavor). Highly recommended.
July 10, 2022
Talvez o principal problema deste livro seja o fato de que ele foi publicado muito tardiamente, em 2013, exatamente 40 anos após a realização das conferências que o originaram. Em 1973, o realismo sobre objetos ficcionais de Kripke certamente teria causado um alvoroço na comunidade filosófica, tornando o realismo na ficção uma posição atraente três décadas antes das formulações mais persuasivas dessa posição. Mas, claro, Kripke é uma fonte interminável de insights, de modo que a leitura deste livro continua interessante (e o meu ponto é: um tanto menos interessante do que teria sido na década de 1970) ainda hoje.
May 22, 2019
I find the way his thought develops in this very interesting, but I also feel he meanders at times because he doesn't really have an objective in mind. Fair enough, it is a testament to living thought figuring things out as it goes along, with no pre set conclusion in mind. But it does feel there is lacking the same satisfactory conclusiveness to what he has to say here compared to naming and necessity.
May 2, 2015
If Naming and Necessity was Dirty Dancing, this book was Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights. If Naming and Necessity was the original Star Wars trilogy, this book was the prequel Star Wars trilogy. If Naming and Necessity was Mulan, this book was Mulan 2.
(I'm exaggerating a little. It's not quite that bad.)
(I'm exaggerating a little. It's not quite that bad.)
October 28, 2022
Any work of Kripke should be of 5 star just from the lucid clarity, accessibility, and engaging read of its prose. This book is Kripke's John Locke's lectures in 1973 which were finally published in 2013. It further develops his view of proper names as rigid designators in Naming and Necessity for application to names used in fictional discourse and to referents that don't exist or don't exist in a way initially assumed.
In the first lecture, Kripke spares no time and offers an analysis that shows Russell-Frege theory of proper name (hereafter RFP), which champions proper names as definite descriptions, would come up incorrect if applied to proper names used in fictional discourse. In RFP, a proper name picks out a referent in virtue of some properties or predicate that are instantiated in that referent. For any given narrative, fictional or not, a proper name picks out a referent in virtue of the properties associated with the referent. "Moses" means the person who led the Israelites out of Egypt. This account would be incorrect if applied to fiction. First it wrongly assume uniqueness by suggesting proper name means "the thing satisfying the properties in the story" since many things can satisfy the properties suggested. Second it mistakenly predicts if anything satisfies the properties attributed to the referent, the thing really exists and is no longer a story. Third, RFP wrongly suggests if nothing fits a story about a referent that a name refers, the referent does not exist. If stories about Moses aren't quite right, it does not mean Moses did not exist. Kripke proposed a "Pretense Principle" to characterise proper names in fiction. Proper names in fiction only pretend to be names that pick out the fictional characters. They are "pretended names". The propositions in which they occur are pretended propositions. His account can accommodate a RFP view of proper name or his Millian view.
In the second lecture, Kripke shows RFP analysis is even more problematic in modal context. If "Moses" is just a definite description for the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt, it would erroneously suggest Moses did not exist if he did not lead the Israelites out of Egypt but did live while someone else led the Israelites out of Egypt. Further, RFP offers dubious alternatives of how one should understand the modal proposition that "it is possible that there was not a unique person who led the Israelites out of Egypt". But a better understanding of that proposition is "There is in fact one unique person who led the Israelites out of Egypt but he might not have existed under some circumstances." The latter, if using Kripke's rigid designator view, would accommodate that unique person being Moses but might not have existed, or, Moses existed but was not that unique person. Kripke then examines modal considerations of fictional names such as "Sherlock Holmes", "unicorn", and "dragon". Though someone who did the things of Holmes and might have existed during that period, it is not the same as suggesting the unique fictional character Holmes existed. In the same way, though something that looks like a unicorn might have existed, it is not the case that the fictional creature of unicorn might have existed. It is a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology. Fictional names remain fictional or pretended names. They don't pick out real things that could have existed. Kripke's approach seems to draw a modal distinction between possible worlds and fictional worlds. Fictional worlds are pretended worlds, not possible worlds. Holmes as a fictional character remains a fictional character in other possible worlds that uses the fictional name Holmes. If there is someone in some possible who did what Holmes did, he is not a fictional character in that world. If he is named Holmes too, the fictional character that resembles him is purely coincidental as disclaimer in a movie.
In the third lecture, Kripke develops an ontology of fictional characters that allows us to predicate properties of or to attribute actions to characters. How should one think of the expressions "Hamlet thinks" or "Hamlet soliloquies". One just has to add the implicit qualifier "in the story" to make "Hamlet soliloquies" or "Hamlet is melancholy" to be true according to the story. Again Kripke is using his pretense principle. "Hamlet thinks" is expressing a pretended proposition according to the story. Using a "in the story" qualifier to talk of properties or attribute actions to characters avoid saying contradictory things such as Hamlet soliloquies but he does not exist.
In terms of fictional ontology, Kripke sees fictional characters as abstract entities in virtue of the product of the actual activity of writing plays, novels, and telling stories. He sees it having the same parallel of a nation being an abstract entity in virtue of people's activity. This John Locke lecture series was delivered in 1973 before the notion of institutional facts was developed , especially seen in Searle's work. There are many abstract objects in institutional establishment such as nation, government, contract, ball games, laws, constitutions, chess games etc. Fictional characters and their activities would have a main difference as abstract entities from a nation or a contract in the real world. The latter are institutional "facts" while fictional world entities aren't facts but pretended things in the story as Kripke would say. Bringing Kripke's approach to today's apparatus, one can also use Barwise and Perry's situation semantics or Recanati's domain of discourse to index fiction world as a situation or a domain of its own and assign fictional entities to fictional situation or fictional domain.
In the fourth lecture, Kripke applies his semantics of fictional entities to perceptual verbs discussed by Austin, Ayer, and Moore. In perception, when we talk about perceptual experience and the sense data we perceive, it is a talk about that experience and that data, and not necessarily applying to the referent that that the sense data represents. If Venus is only perceive like a speck in the sky, the talk of the speck about it getting brighter, dimmer, closer, fainter etc, it is a characterisation about the image or data, not Venus. Kripke suggests the way one talks about and predicate of fictional characters has an analogy in perceptual objects. You can also use an implicit qualifier of limiting predication to perceptual objects not to be confused with the objects they are perceived of. That interpretation of perceptual objects would be an out and out interpretation. One can at that level say the sense data getting larger, dimmer, closer etc. Of course this interpretation of the sense data is to be distinguished from what the object really looks like. If you are orbiting around Venus in a starship, you perceive what Venus really looks like. Kripke also talks about what the object looks like to the perceiver "now." It seems the borderline between what the sense data looks like starts to blur with what the object really looks like when the perceiver is at a distance close to visible distance such that Venus no longer looks like a speck. The talk of the distinction between image and object starts to break down
In the fifth lecture, Kripke introduces his famous semantic reference/speaker's reference distinction. This distinction was presented in this lecture series to show vacuous names can have reference even before the famous essay with the same title was published in 1977. He introduced it to solve Donnellan Referential/Attributive distinction by showing in referential use, if a definite description does not match the referent, the speaker's reference is still the referent he thought that fits the description even if the referent did not kill Smith or Smith died by accident. Such a condition is only a situation where the speaker's reference does not match the semantic reference of the words of the definite description. Kripke is promoting a linguistic version of Occam's razor: semantic ambiguity is not to be introduced beyond necessity. Kripke's semantic reference/speaker's reference distinction is a pragmatic notion that applies to any language to distinguish meaning/reference. If a semantic ambiguity is further introduced to solve these cases, the approach is extraneous and proliferate senses necessarily. In sum Donnellan distinction of two uses is no more than a notion that can be explained by whether a definite description is used as a description or used to refer by description but the meaning of the description contingently picks out the referent.
In the sixth lecture, Kripke addresses negative existential statements. He does not recommend to treat things that don't exist as fictional characters or under some ontology of fictional characters he develops. First, when one suggests Moses or Napoleon never existed, one does not mean they are fictional characters. Someone might have written some fictional account of Napoleon but that does not mean Napoleon is a fictional character. Even if historical accounts of his exploits were wrongly attributed to Napoleon, that still does not mean Napoleon is fictional. Second, even if the extended use of language for the ontology of fictional characters were not introduced, one can still make negative existential statement such as Hamlet does not exist. In that usage , it means Hamlet as a person does not exist, not that the fictional character Hamlet does not exist. Shakespeare created the fictional character and it surely exists. Kripke thinks a good way to deal with negative existential is to say such singular existential statement does not express a true proposition. "Holmes exists" or "Giraffes lives in the arctic" does not express a true proposition while "Holmes does not exist" or "Giraffes don't exist in the Arctic" would express true proposition.
In the first lecture, Kripke spares no time and offers an analysis that shows Russell-Frege theory of proper name (hereafter RFP), which champions proper names as definite descriptions, would come up incorrect if applied to proper names used in fictional discourse. In RFP, a proper name picks out a referent in virtue of some properties or predicate that are instantiated in that referent. For any given narrative, fictional or not, a proper name picks out a referent in virtue of the properties associated with the referent. "Moses" means the person who led the Israelites out of Egypt. This account would be incorrect if applied to fiction. First it wrongly assume uniqueness by suggesting proper name means "the thing satisfying the properties in the story" since many things can satisfy the properties suggested. Second it mistakenly predicts if anything satisfies the properties attributed to the referent, the thing really exists and is no longer a story. Third, RFP wrongly suggests if nothing fits a story about a referent that a name refers, the referent does not exist. If stories about Moses aren't quite right, it does not mean Moses did not exist. Kripke proposed a "Pretense Principle" to characterise proper names in fiction. Proper names in fiction only pretend to be names that pick out the fictional characters. They are "pretended names". The propositions in which they occur are pretended propositions. His account can accommodate a RFP view of proper name or his Millian view.
In the second lecture, Kripke shows RFP analysis is even more problematic in modal context. If "Moses" is just a definite description for the man who led the Israelites out of Egypt, it would erroneously suggest Moses did not exist if he did not lead the Israelites out of Egypt but did live while someone else led the Israelites out of Egypt. Further, RFP offers dubious alternatives of how one should understand the modal proposition that "it is possible that there was not a unique person who led the Israelites out of Egypt". But a better understanding of that proposition is "There is in fact one unique person who led the Israelites out of Egypt but he might not have existed under some circumstances." The latter, if using Kripke's rigid designator view, would accommodate that unique person being Moses but might not have existed, or, Moses existed but was not that unique person. Kripke then examines modal considerations of fictional names such as "Sherlock Holmes", "unicorn", and "dragon". Though someone who did the things of Holmes and might have existed during that period, it is not the same as suggesting the unique fictional character Holmes existed. In the same way, though something that looks like a unicorn might have existed, it is not the case that the fictional creature of unicorn might have existed. It is a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology. Fictional names remain fictional or pretended names. They don't pick out real things that could have existed. Kripke's approach seems to draw a modal distinction between possible worlds and fictional worlds. Fictional worlds are pretended worlds, not possible worlds. Holmes as a fictional character remains a fictional character in other possible worlds that uses the fictional name Holmes. If there is someone in some possible who did what Holmes did, he is not a fictional character in that world. If he is named Holmes too, the fictional character that resembles him is purely coincidental as disclaimer in a movie.
In the third lecture, Kripke develops an ontology of fictional characters that allows us to predicate properties of or to attribute actions to characters. How should one think of the expressions "Hamlet thinks" or "Hamlet soliloquies". One just has to add the implicit qualifier "in the story" to make "Hamlet soliloquies" or "Hamlet is melancholy" to be true according to the story. Again Kripke is using his pretense principle. "Hamlet thinks" is expressing a pretended proposition according to the story. Using a "in the story" qualifier to talk of properties or attribute actions to characters avoid saying contradictory things such as Hamlet soliloquies but he does not exist.
In terms of fictional ontology, Kripke sees fictional characters as abstract entities in virtue of the product of the actual activity of writing plays, novels, and telling stories. He sees it having the same parallel of a nation being an abstract entity in virtue of people's activity. This John Locke lecture series was delivered in 1973 before the notion of institutional facts was developed , especially seen in Searle's work. There are many abstract objects in institutional establishment such as nation, government, contract, ball games, laws, constitutions, chess games etc. Fictional characters and their activities would have a main difference as abstract entities from a nation or a contract in the real world. The latter are institutional "facts" while fictional world entities aren't facts but pretended things in the story as Kripke would say. Bringing Kripke's approach to today's apparatus, one can also use Barwise and Perry's situation semantics or Recanati's domain of discourse to index fiction world as a situation or a domain of its own and assign fictional entities to fictional situation or fictional domain.
In the fourth lecture, Kripke applies his semantics of fictional entities to perceptual verbs discussed by Austin, Ayer, and Moore. In perception, when we talk about perceptual experience and the sense data we perceive, it is a talk about that experience and that data, and not necessarily applying to the referent that that the sense data represents. If Venus is only perceive like a speck in the sky, the talk of the speck about it getting brighter, dimmer, closer, fainter etc, it is a characterisation about the image or data, not Venus. Kripke suggests the way one talks about and predicate of fictional characters has an analogy in perceptual objects. You can also use an implicit qualifier of limiting predication to perceptual objects not to be confused with the objects they are perceived of. That interpretation of perceptual objects would be an out and out interpretation. One can at that level say the sense data getting larger, dimmer, closer etc. Of course this interpretation of the sense data is to be distinguished from what the object really looks like. If you are orbiting around Venus in a starship, you perceive what Venus really looks like. Kripke also talks about what the object looks like to the perceiver "now." It seems the borderline between what the sense data looks like starts to blur with what the object really looks like when the perceiver is at a distance close to visible distance such that Venus no longer looks like a speck. The talk of the distinction between image and object starts to break down
In the fifth lecture, Kripke introduces his famous semantic reference/speaker's reference distinction. This distinction was presented in this lecture series to show vacuous names can have reference even before the famous essay with the same title was published in 1977. He introduced it to solve Donnellan Referential/Attributive distinction by showing in referential use, if a definite description does not match the referent, the speaker's reference is still the referent he thought that fits the description even if the referent did not kill Smith or Smith died by accident. Such a condition is only a situation where the speaker's reference does not match the semantic reference of the words of the definite description. Kripke is promoting a linguistic version of Occam's razor: semantic ambiguity is not to be introduced beyond necessity. Kripke's semantic reference/speaker's reference distinction is a pragmatic notion that applies to any language to distinguish meaning/reference. If a semantic ambiguity is further introduced to solve these cases, the approach is extraneous and proliferate senses necessarily. In sum Donnellan distinction of two uses is no more than a notion that can be explained by whether a definite description is used as a description or used to refer by description but the meaning of the description contingently picks out the referent.
In the sixth lecture, Kripke addresses negative existential statements. He does not recommend to treat things that don't exist as fictional characters or under some ontology of fictional characters he develops. First, when one suggests Moses or Napoleon never existed, one does not mean they are fictional characters. Someone might have written some fictional account of Napoleon but that does not mean Napoleon is a fictional character. Even if historical accounts of his exploits were wrongly attributed to Napoleon, that still does not mean Napoleon is fictional. Second, even if the extended use of language for the ontology of fictional characters were not introduced, one can still make negative existential statement such as Hamlet does not exist. In that usage , it means Hamlet as a person does not exist, not that the fictional character Hamlet does not exist. Shakespeare created the fictional character and it surely exists. Kripke thinks a good way to deal with negative existential is to say such singular existential statement does not express a true proposition. "Holmes exists" or "Giraffes lives in the arctic" does not express a true proposition while "Holmes does not exist" or "Giraffes don't exist in the Arctic" would express true proposition.
November 10, 2019
'Holmes does not exist, but in other states of affairs, he would have existed.'
40 years of waiting to see the official publication of a book. (from 1973 to 2013). I couldn't overcome my temptation and read the written copy of the lectures. But the thrill of this great print and Kripke's re-reading is nothing that is stale or repetitive, boring, excitement is permanent. We are talking about one of the most important living philosophers and logicians.
The author of the book is a stranger genius. To me, reading this book was as exciting as reading Kripke's previous major book: Naming and Necessity. Genius in reasoning, amazing examples, beautiful prose, clarity of expression, elegance and unparalleled precision.
This book is, in fact, the written form of John Locke's lectures, the reputation of "John Locke's Lectures" and invites the most important contemporary philosophers in analytic philosophy. Kripke was the youngest of these most important philosophers: five years old.
Already in the book "Naming and Necessity" (which is also the written form of the lectures), Kripke had put forward arguments against the "Frege-Russell theory". And at the end of "Naming and Necessity," it provides an alternative theory of reference to proper names (= causal theory of reference). A serious problem with Kripke's theory is that the interpretation that Frege-Russell's theory of "empty names" gives seems to be better than "causal theory of reference". Kripke argues in his first lecture that "empty names" cause trouble for any theory.
Kripke himself stated in the preface that his most important contribution is "the ontology of fictional and mythical characters."
"Probably the most substantial contribution of the lectures was the
ontology of fictional and mythical characters, conceived of as abstract objects whose existence depends on the existence or non-existence of various fictional or mythological works."(p. x)
One important aspect of Kripke is the distinction between "fictional character" "fictional fictional character." Hamlet is a fictional character and Gonzago is a fictional fictional character.(p. 73)
There are many other important things in the book, such as the discussion of "negative existential" sentences, which are very difficult.
40 years of waiting to see the official publication of a book. (from 1973 to 2013). I couldn't overcome my temptation and read the written copy of the lectures. But the thrill of this great print and Kripke's re-reading is nothing that is stale or repetitive, boring, excitement is permanent. We are talking about one of the most important living philosophers and logicians.
The author of the book is a stranger genius. To me, reading this book was as exciting as reading Kripke's previous major book: Naming and Necessity. Genius in reasoning, amazing examples, beautiful prose, clarity of expression, elegance and unparalleled precision.
This book is, in fact, the written form of John Locke's lectures, the reputation of "John Locke's Lectures" and invites the most important contemporary philosophers in analytic philosophy. Kripke was the youngest of these most important philosophers: five years old.
Already in the book "Naming and Necessity" (which is also the written form of the lectures), Kripke had put forward arguments against the "Frege-Russell theory". And at the end of "Naming and Necessity," it provides an alternative theory of reference to proper names (= causal theory of reference). A serious problem with Kripke's theory is that the interpretation that Frege-Russell's theory of "empty names" gives seems to be better than "causal theory of reference". Kripke argues in his first lecture that "empty names" cause trouble for any theory.
Kripke himself stated in the preface that his most important contribution is "the ontology of fictional and mythical characters."
"Probably the most substantial contribution of the lectures was the
ontology of fictional and mythical characters, conceived of as abstract objects whose existence depends on the existence or non-existence of various fictional or mythological works."(p. x)
One important aspect of Kripke is the distinction between "fictional character" "fictional fictional character." Hamlet is a fictional character and Gonzago is a fictional fictional character.(p. 73)
There are many other important things in the book, such as the discussion of "negative existential" sentences, which are very difficult.
April 19, 2024
Deserves to be considered a classic. It is a shame however that Kripke does often not address seriously his critics. It is not that case that nobody would be willing to read a 500 + pages book written by him, addressing his critics in detail, diving into the literature that was sparked by N&N. RIP
March 26, 2023
Just stop after N&N
May 26, 2025
wins the award for the most unsatisfying ending!
September 26, 2018
The lecture is Kripke’s metier. Not pretending to be a meticulous scholar, Kripke’s transcribed and edited lectures record thinking live with a definite but loose trajectory. The only way to survive this and his other main works is to get fully engaged in his dialectic (sorry), taking the time to follow his arguments. In a nutshell Reference and existence ultimately leads to a comprehension of the metaphysics of fiction and the varieties of fictional reference.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews