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The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation
How the history of technological revolutions can help us better understand economic and political polarization in the age of automation
From the Industrial Revolution to the age of artificial intelligence, The Technology Trap takes a sweeping look at the history of technological progress and how it has radically shifted the distribution of economic and political power among society’s members. As Carl Benedikt Frey shows, the Industrial Revolution created unprecedented wealth and prosperity over the long run, but the immediate consequences of mechanization were devastating for large swaths of the population. Middle-income jobs withered, wages stagnated, the labor share of income fell, profits surged, and economic inequality skyrocketed. These trends, Frey documents, broadly mirror those in our current age of automation, which began with the Computer Revolution.
Just as the Industrial Revolution eventually brought about extraordinary benefits for society, artificial intelligence systems have the potential to do the same. But Frey argues that this depends on how the short term is managed. In the nineteenth century, workers violently expressed their concerns over machines taking their jobs. The Luddite uprisings joined a long wave of machinery riots that swept across Europe and China. Today’s despairing middle class has not resorted to physical force, but their frustration has led to rising populism and the increasing fragmentation of society. As middle-class jobs continue to come under pressure, there’s no assurance that positive attitudes to technology will persist.
The Industrial Revolution was a defining moment in history, but few grasped its enormous consequences at the time. The Technology Trap demonstrates that in the midst of another technological revolution, the lessons of the past can help us to more effectively face the present.
From the Industrial Revolution to the age of artificial intelligence, The Technology Trap takes a sweeping look at the history of technological progress and how it has radically shifted the distribution of economic and political power among society’s members. As Carl Benedikt Frey shows, the Industrial Revolution created unprecedented wealth and prosperity over the long run, but the immediate consequences of mechanization were devastating for large swaths of the population. Middle-income jobs withered, wages stagnated, the labor share of income fell, profits surged, and economic inequality skyrocketed. These trends, Frey documents, broadly mirror those in our current age of automation, which began with the Computer Revolution.
Just as the Industrial Revolution eventually brought about extraordinary benefits for society, artificial intelligence systems have the potential to do the same. But Frey argues that this depends on how the short term is managed. In the nineteenth century, workers violently expressed their concerns over machines taking their jobs. The Luddite uprisings joined a long wave of machinery riots that swept across Europe and China. Today’s despairing middle class has not resorted to physical force, but their frustration has led to rising populism and the increasing fragmentation of society. As middle-class jobs continue to come under pressure, there’s no assurance that positive attitudes to technology will persist.
The Industrial Revolution was a defining moment in history, but few grasped its enormous consequences at the time. The Technology Trap demonstrates that in the midst of another technological revolution, the lessons of the past can help us to more effectively face the present.
480 pages, Hardcover
Published June 18, 2019
229 people are currently reading
2914 people want to read
About the author
Carl Benedikt Frey
4 books29 followersCarl Benedikt Frey is the Oxford Martin Citi Fellow and codirector of the Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. He is also a senior fellow at the Institute for New Economic Thinking at Oxford and in the Department of Economic History at Lund University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 77 reviews
August 7, 2020
The argument of this book can be compressed to a key point: technological change has often made life worse for most people in the short run, while eventually making everyone's life later on. The problem is that "the short run" can comprise an entire human lifetime or longer. The Industrial Revolution was a devastating regression into misery for the once-thriving and free artisan classes of England. The industrialists waged an absolutely zero-sum battle against labor, pressing every weak point and sparing nothing to sentiment. They even took to employing children as effective slave labor in their newly-mechanized plants to use as a more pliable and controllable workforce when it became possible. The old labor classes fought back, including through violence. But once outside competitive pressures led the government to side decisively with capital, the battle was lost.
It is a misconception that no one invented much until the 17th century. The difference however was that technological innovation was always public sector: for military use or the construction of infrastructure projects. The privatization of technological advance was what really transformed the planet and is still doing so. As globalization picked up steam and nations were forced into a life-or-death competition, rulers were less inclined than they'd been to slow down the gears of change in the name of stability. The Darwinian small-nations environment of Europe that existed all the way until the creation of the EU was highly conducive to allowing technologists free reign in the name of national competitiveness.
Technology wipes out jobs and constantly renovates society. There is no one there guaranteeing that it will be nice. Contrary to the upbeat propaganda, it usually isn't nice. To be clear, in the long-term AI could very well make things better for everyone as previous waves of change ultimately did. Anyone who uses a laundry machine, a dishwasher, a television or a car has the premodern equivalent of an army of servants at their disposal. No one should wish to go back to the good old days of most people doing grueling manual labor. The only problem is that the period of change is very painful. People don't live in "the long run," and the short run could literally mean several generations of general immiseration and poverty.
This book is not bad, a bit repetitive and really the crux of it is contained in the introductory essay. Frey does not expect an imminent wave of major job losses from advances in automation, but they're coming at some point. The question of how equitable the social order that emerges afterwards is based entirely on politics.
It is a misconception that no one invented much until the 17th century. The difference however was that technological innovation was always public sector: for military use or the construction of infrastructure projects. The privatization of technological advance was what really transformed the planet and is still doing so. As globalization picked up steam and nations were forced into a life-or-death competition, rulers were less inclined than they'd been to slow down the gears of change in the name of stability. The Darwinian small-nations environment of Europe that existed all the way until the creation of the EU was highly conducive to allowing technologists free reign in the name of national competitiveness.
Technology wipes out jobs and constantly renovates society. There is no one there guaranteeing that it will be nice. Contrary to the upbeat propaganda, it usually isn't nice. To be clear, in the long-term AI could very well make things better for everyone as previous waves of change ultimately did. Anyone who uses a laundry machine, a dishwasher, a television or a car has the premodern equivalent of an army of servants at their disposal. No one should wish to go back to the good old days of most people doing grueling manual labor. The only problem is that the period of change is very painful. People don't live in "the long run," and the short run could literally mean several generations of general immiseration and poverty.
This book is not bad, a bit repetitive and really the crux of it is contained in the introductory essay. Frey does not expect an imminent wave of major job losses from advances in automation, but they're coming at some point. The question of how equitable the social order that emerges afterwards is based entirely on politics.
November 25, 2019
Technology helps society to progress but causes massive and permanent disruptions to many people’s livelihood throughout history. There are 2 kinds of technology: the replacing type that makes Labor redundant, and the enabling type that makes skilled workers more productive.
1. There have always been inventors who think of smart ways to do things better. However, the industrial revolution did not happen for a Long time.
2. This is because feudal rulers feared civil unrest as machines replace Labor. So they suppressed automation. That is, until England realised that without automation it will lag behind other European countries. Frey argues that this is the main reason the Industrial Revolution happened in England. China managed to suppress automation until the 20th century and that led to a century of decline.
3. Many examples were given, such as the lamp lighters’ disappeared livelihood when oil lamps were replaced with electric ones. Unfortunately usually those people found it very difficult to get new skills and new jobs.
4. So the Luddites destroyed machines. Only when the English government sided with the industrialists did automation continued.
5. Over the past 30 years the real wage of people with poor skills had plunged. Sometimes whole industries and towns are decimated by automation and globalisation. So people become upset.
6. With AI it is likely that skilled workers will further improve their productivity, where the poorly skilled will have only lousy jobs to do.
7. Even then AI replacing Labor will take a Long time because whole new complementary support systems must be built and new skills learnt. Also angry people who lose their middle-class jobs will vote for leaders whom they think will protect them I.e. populists.
8. What can be done? Universal income costs too much. Also people actually like to work. Free preschools help the poor kids. Changing land zoning laws allow more houses to be built around cities with new jobs. Free childcare allow single parents to work and not worry.
9. If centrist governments do not do anything, the people will lose hope on them and vote for populists.
1. There have always been inventors who think of smart ways to do things better. However, the industrial revolution did not happen for a Long time.
2. This is because feudal rulers feared civil unrest as machines replace Labor. So they suppressed automation. That is, until England realised that without automation it will lag behind other European countries. Frey argues that this is the main reason the Industrial Revolution happened in England. China managed to suppress automation until the 20th century and that led to a century of decline.
3. Many examples were given, such as the lamp lighters’ disappeared livelihood when oil lamps were replaced with electric ones. Unfortunately usually those people found it very difficult to get new skills and new jobs.
4. So the Luddites destroyed machines. Only when the English government sided with the industrialists did automation continued.
5. Over the past 30 years the real wage of people with poor skills had plunged. Sometimes whole industries and towns are decimated by automation and globalisation. So people become upset.
6. With AI it is likely that skilled workers will further improve their productivity, where the poorly skilled will have only lousy jobs to do.
7. Even then AI replacing Labor will take a Long time because whole new complementary support systems must be built and new skills learnt. Also angry people who lose their middle-class jobs will vote for leaders whom they think will protect them I.e. populists.
8. What can be done? Universal income costs too much. Also people actually like to work. Free preschools help the poor kids. Changing land zoning laws allow more houses to be built around cities with new jobs. Free childcare allow single parents to work and not worry.
9. If centrist governments do not do anything, the people will lose hope on them and vote for populists.
June 30, 2021
Давно интересовался этической дилеммой автоматизации: некоторое повышение качества жизни для большинства в долгосрочной перспективе ценой катастрофических последствий для относительного меньшинства в ближней.
Эта книга исследует вопрос достаточно глубоко, чтобы продемонстрировать, что весь спектр возможных последствий внедрения нового значимого автоматизированного решения этими двумя аппроксимациями далеко не ограничивается.
Увлекательное чтение.
Эта книга исследует вопрос достаточно глубоко, чтобы продемонстрировать, что весь спектр возможных последствий внедрения нового значимого автоматизированного решения этими двумя аппроксимациями далеко не ограничивается.
Увлекательное чтение.
February 6, 2022
People have always worried about the employment effects of new technologies. Kings and emperors have long forbidden labour saving technologies, out of fear of social unrest. The Luddite revolt during the industrial revolution has even led to a moniker for anyone who is opposing new technologies on supposedly irrational grounds. And the current Artificial Intelligence boom has spawned new concerns.
Such concerns are often dismissed by technology optimists, who argue that, in the past, such concerns have always been unfounded.
Fair enough, replies Frey, but this overlooks two important points: (a) microeconomic theory shows that technology can be both labour replacing or labour enhancing; the actual effect is an empirical issue, and there are no prior grounds to assume that this will hold true in the future (b) even if technology has been mostly labour enhancing over the last two centuries, there have been episodes where it has had strong labour replacing effects - the early decades of the Industrial Revolution, where the "dark, satanic mills" destroyed the livelihoods of skilled workers, are the most obvious example. That, from 1850 on, the nature of technological progress has become mostly labour enhancing again, was of poor comfort to the workers who saw their incomes collapse 40 years earlier.
Frey's book is a meticulously researched and carefully written history of the relation between capital, technology and labour over the last two centuries. After this sweeping historical overview, Frey goes on to discuss the employment effects of Artificial Intelligence, a topic on which he has published some widely quoted (and misunderstood) papers.
Frey's key message is that technological progress has mostly benefited workers but that it would unwise to dismiss concerns about the impacts of new technologies as, well, Neo-Luddism.
This book deserves all the praise it has received at the time of publication, and is of great relevance for policy makers and their advisers. It is highly accessible without ever being simplistic.
(Note: the book was written and published before the start of the pandemic. One of the great puzzles developed economies are facing currently is a labour shortage. Truck may be worried that AI will destroy their jobs, but the biggest concerns of logistics companies is the shortage of truckers. This recent article in The Economist tries to provide some answers.
https://www.economist.com/finance-and...
Such concerns are often dismissed by technology optimists, who argue that, in the past, such concerns have always been unfounded.
Fair enough, replies Frey, but this overlooks two important points: (a) microeconomic theory shows that technology can be both labour replacing or labour enhancing; the actual effect is an empirical issue, and there are no prior grounds to assume that this will hold true in the future (b) even if technology has been mostly labour enhancing over the last two centuries, there have been episodes where it has had strong labour replacing effects - the early decades of the Industrial Revolution, where the "dark, satanic mills" destroyed the livelihoods of skilled workers, are the most obvious example. That, from 1850 on, the nature of technological progress has become mostly labour enhancing again, was of poor comfort to the workers who saw their incomes collapse 40 years earlier.
Frey's book is a meticulously researched and carefully written history of the relation between capital, technology and labour over the last two centuries. After this sweeping historical overview, Frey goes on to discuss the employment effects of Artificial Intelligence, a topic on which he has published some widely quoted (and misunderstood) papers.
Frey's key message is that technological progress has mostly benefited workers but that it would unwise to dismiss concerns about the impacts of new technologies as, well, Neo-Luddism.
This book deserves all the praise it has received at the time of publication, and is of great relevance for policy makers and their advisers. It is highly accessible without ever being simplistic.
(Note: the book was written and published before the start of the pandemic. One of the great puzzles developed economies are facing currently is a labour shortage. Truck may be worried that AI will destroy their jobs, but the biggest concerns of logistics companies is the shortage of truckers. This recent article in The Economist tries to provide some answers.
https://www.economist.com/finance-and...
April 26, 2025
ประเด็นหลักของหนังสือนี้สามารถสรุปได้สั้นๆ ว่า การเปลี่ยนแปลงทางเทคโนโลยีทำให้ชีวิตของคนส่วนใหญ่แย่ลงในระยะสั้น แม้ว่าในระยะยาวจะทำให้ชีวิตของทุกคนดีขึ้นก็ตาม
แต่ปัญหาคือ “ระยะสั้น” ที่ว่า อาจหมายถึงเวลาทั้งชีวิตของคนเจเนเรชั่นหนึ่ง หรือยาวนานกว่านั้น
โดยในหนังมือยกตัวอย่างจากการปฏิวัติอุตสาหกรรมในหน้าประวัติศาสตร์ตั้งแต่ปี 17 ที่เริ่มมีการปฏิวัติและเทคโนโลยีต่างๆ ที่เปลี่ยนแปลงชีวิตมนุษย์ ผลกระทบต่อสังคมและการยอมรับของกลุ่มคนในระดับชั้นต่างๆ
แน่นอนว่าเทคโนโลยีทำลายงานและรื้อโครงสร้างสังคมอยู่ตลอดเวลา ในนามของความก้าวหน้านี้เป็นผลลัพธ์ที่ไม่อาจเลี่ยงได้ แต่ส่วนของผลลัพธ์จะออกมาน่าพึงพอใจหรือไม่นั้น อาจจะต้องมาดูรายละเอียดกันอีกที ความจริงมักไม่สวยหรูดั่ง buzz word ที่ไว้ใส่พรีเซนเทชั่นให้กับเหล่าผู้บริหาร
เข้าใจว่าในระยะยาว AI อาจทำให้ชีวิตของทุกคนดีขึ้นจริง แบบเดียวกับเทคโนโลยีที่เคยพลิกโฉมประวัติศาสตร์ในอดีต ไม่ว่าจะเป็นเครื่องจักรไอน้ำ เครื่องซักผ้า โทรทัศน์ หรือรถยนต์ ไปจนคอมพิวเตอร์ แต่ปัญหาเดียวคือ ช่วงเวลาแห่งการเปลี่ยนแปลงนั้นเจ็บปวดแน่นอน ผู้คนไม่ได้มีชีวิตอยู่ใน “ระยะยาว” และ “ระยะสั้น” นั่นหมายถึงความยากจนข้นแค้นที่ต่อเนื่องกันหลายชั่วอายุคน และมันหมายถึงมีหลายชีวิตที่ลำบากมากกว่าตัวเลขที่ประกาศ
เล่มนี้อ่านไม่สนุกนัก แต่ก็อ่านได้เพลินๆ ไม่ยากจนเกินไป แม้เนื้อหาจะซ้ำๆ ประเด็นหลักอยู่ที่บทเกริ่นนั่นแหละ
สุดท้ายนี้แล้วคลื่นการสูญเสียงานครั้งใหญ่จากการปฏิวัติอัตโนมัติ (AI) จะยังไม่เกิดขึ้นในทันที แต่มันจะมาแน่นอน คำถามสำคัญคือ โครงสร้างสังคมที่จะก่อร่างขึ้นหลังจากนั้นจะมีความเป็นธรรมแค่ไหน และเรื่องนั้นขึ้นอยู่กับการเมืองล้วนๆ ซึ่งบอกได้เลย บัดซบแน่นอน (ในปี2025)
แต่ปัญหาคือ “ระยะสั้น” ที่ว่า อาจหมายถึงเวลาทั้งชีวิตของคนเจเนเรชั่นหนึ่ง หรือยาวนานกว่านั้น
โดยในหนังมือยกตัวอย่างจากการปฏิวัติอุตสาหกรรมในหน้าประวัติศาสตร์ตั้งแต่ปี 17 ที่เริ่มมีการปฏิวัติและเทคโนโลยีต่างๆ ที่เปลี่ยนแปลงชีวิตมนุษย์ ผลกระทบต่อสังคมและการยอมรับของกลุ่มคนในระดับชั้นต่างๆ
แน่นอนว่าเทคโนโลยีทำลายงานและรื้อโครงสร้างสังคมอยู่ตลอดเวลา ในนามของความก้าวหน้านี้เป็นผลลัพธ์ที่ไม่อาจเลี่ยงได้ แต่ส่วนของผลลัพธ์จะออกมาน่าพึงพอใจหรือไม่นั้น อาจจะต้องมาดูรายละเอียดกันอีกที ความจริงมักไม่สวยหรูดั่ง buzz word ที่ไว้ใส่พรีเซนเทชั่นให้กับเหล่าผู้บริหาร
เข้าใจว่าในระยะยาว AI อาจทำให้ชีวิตของทุกคนดีขึ้นจริง แบบเดียวกับเทคโนโลยีที่เคยพลิกโฉมประวัติศาสตร์ในอดีต ไม่ว่าจะเป็นเครื่องจักรไอน้ำ เครื่องซักผ้า โทรทัศน์ หรือรถยนต์ ไปจนคอมพิวเตอร์ แต่ปัญหาเดียวคือ ช่วงเวลาแห่งการเปลี่ยนแปลงนั้นเจ็บปวดแน่นอน ผู้คนไม่ได้มีชีวิตอยู่ใน “ระยะยาว” และ “ระยะสั้น” นั่นหมายถึงความยากจนข้นแค้นที่ต่อเนื่องกันหลายชั่วอายุคน และมันหมายถึงมีหลายชีวิตที่ลำบากมากกว่าตัวเลขที่ประกาศ
เล่มนี้อ่านไม่สนุกนัก แต่ก็อ่านได้เพลินๆ ไม่ยากจนเกินไป แม้เนื้อหาจะซ้ำๆ ประเด็นหลักอยู่ที่บทเกริ่นนั่นแหละ
สุดท้ายนี้แล้วคลื่นการสูญเสียงานครั้งใหญ่จากการปฏิวัติอัตโนมัติ (AI) จะยังไม่เกิดขึ้นในทันที แต่มันจะมาแน่นอน คำถามสำคัญคือ โครงสร้างสังคมที่จะก่อร่างขึ้นหลังจากนั้นจะมีความเป็นธรรมแค่ไหน และเรื่องนั้นขึ้นอยู่กับการเมืองล้วนๆ ซึ่งบอกได้เลย บัดซบแน่นอน (ในปี2025)
March 19, 2021
(ฟังหนังสือเสียงภาษาอังกฤษ)
ฟังเพลินๆ พอใช้ได้ เล่าประวัติศาสตร์การพัฒนาเทคโนโลยีและผลกระทบต่อสังคม เน้นอเมริกาเป็นหลัก เล่าตั้งแต่ยุคปฏิวัติอุตสาหกรรม คิดว่าหนังสือบางกว่านี้ได้สักครึ่งหนึ่ง เพราะบางตอนดูซ้ำซากเกินไป ชอบช่วงที่ผู้เขียนอธิบายว่าการใช้เครื่องจักรมากขึ้นในบางยุค เช่น หลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่สอง ไม่ได้ทำให้แรงงานต่อต้านขนาดนั้น สหภาพแรงงานในอเมริกาหลา���แห่งสนับสนุนด้วยซ้ำไป เพราะแรงงานได้ประโยชน์ เช่น เครื่องจักรเข้ามาช่วยทุ่นแรง เพิ่มผลิตภาพในหลายธุรกิจ ไม่ใช่แค่มา “แทนที่” คนงานอย่างเดียว, เทคโนโลยีอย่างเครื่องคิดเลขและอุปกรณ์ช่วยทำงานบ้านเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ช่วยให้ผู้หญิงเลิกเป็นแม่บ้านอย่างเดียว ออกมาทำงานประจำได้ แต่แน่นอน การพัฒนาเทคโนโลยี AI และระบบอัตโนมัติในยุคปัจจุบันแตกต่างจากเทคโนโลยีสมัยก่อนมาก และสร้างความเสี่ยงจริงๆ ว่าแรงงานจำนวนมากจะตกงาน
ช่วงท้ายของหนังสือที่พูดถึง AI และกลไกที่คาดกันว่าจะช่วยบรรเทาผลกระทบได้ เช่น Universal Basic Income ไม่สนุกเท่ากับช่วงแรกๆ และมีหนังสือเล่มอื่นอย่าง Rise of Robots ที่เล่าได้ดีกว่า
โดยรวม คิดว่าผู้เขียนยกตัวอย่างมาสนับสนุนข้อเสนอของตัวเองว่า “เทคโนโลยีสร้างผลกระทบต่อสังคมสุทธิเป็นลบในระยะสั้น แต่เป็นบวกในระยะยาว แต่ผลกระทบนั้นจะมากหรือน้อยขึ้นอยู่กับประสิทธิภาพของการจัดการผลกระทบระยะสั้น” ได้ค่อนข้างดี เสียแต่ยกตัวอย่างมาซ้ำซ้อนและซ้ำซากไปหน่อย ทำให้หนังสือยาวกว่าที่ควรเป็น
ฟังเพลินๆ พอใช้ได้ เล่าประวัติศาสตร์การพัฒนาเทคโนโลยีและผลกระทบต่อสังคม เน้นอเมริกาเป็นหลัก เล่าตั้งแต่ยุคปฏิวัติอุตสาหกรรม คิดว่าหนังสือบางกว่านี้ได้สักครึ่งหนึ่ง เพราะบางตอนดูซ้ำซากเกินไป ชอบช่วงที่ผู้เขียนอธิบายว่าการใช้เครื่องจักรมากขึ้นในบางยุค เช่น หลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่สอง ไม่ได้ทำให้แรงงานต่อต้านขนาดนั้น สหภาพแรงงานในอเมริกาหลา���แห่งสนับสนุนด้วยซ้ำไป เพราะแรงงานได้ประโยชน์ เช่น เครื่องจักรเข้ามาช่วยทุ่นแรง เพิ่มผลิตภาพในหลายธุรกิจ ไม่ใช่แค่มา “แทนที่” คนงานอย่างเดียว, เทคโนโลยีอย่างเครื่องคิดเลขและอุปกรณ์ช่วยทำงานบ้านเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ช่วยให้ผู้หญิงเลิกเป็นแม่บ้านอย่างเดียว ออกมาทำงานประจำได้ แต่แน่นอน การพัฒนาเทคโนโลยี AI และระบบอัตโนมัติในยุคปัจจุบันแตกต่างจากเทคโนโลยีสมัยก่อนมาก และสร้างความเสี่ยงจริงๆ ว่าแรงงานจำนวนมากจะตกงาน
ช่วงท้ายของหนังสือที่พูดถึง AI และกลไกที่คาดกันว่าจะช่วยบรรเทาผลกระทบได้ เช่น Universal Basic Income ไม่สนุกเท่ากับช่วงแรกๆ และมีหนังสือเล่มอื่นอย่าง Rise of Robots ที่เล่าได้ดีกว่า
โดยรวม คิดว่าผู้เขียนยกตัวอย่างมาสนับสนุนข้อเสนอของตัวเองว่า “เทคโนโลยีสร้างผลกระทบต่อสังคมสุทธิเป็นลบในระยะสั้น แต่เป็นบวกในระยะยาว แต่ผลกระทบนั้นจะมากหรือน้อยขึ้นอยู่กับประสิทธิภาพของการจัดการผลกระทบระยะสั้น” ได้ค่อนข้างดี เสียแต่ยกตัวอย่างมาซ้ำซ้อนและซ้ำซากไปหน่อย ทำให้หนังสือยาวกว่าที่ควรเป็น
November 13, 2019
3.5 Stars!
“In America, labour productivity has grown eight times faster than hourly compensation since 1979. Even as the American economy has become much more productive, real wages have been stagnant, and more people are out of work; consequently the labour share of income has fallen.”
I would like to have given a more in depth review of this book, but the truth is I have been battling with a couple more stinkers in between, which diverted my attention. Frey does what not enough American or any academics can do in that he writes with authority and clarity whilst remaining accessible to people who are not just fellow scholars or undergraduates.
“There is no iron law that postulate that technology must benefit the many at the expense of the few.”
Frey takes a reasoned, balanced approach, he illustrates the many great benefits that everyone has gained from the advancements in technology, less laborious or tedious manual work and better, cleaner working environments for most people in most places and that’s before we even get to the many wonderful developments in medicine.
“Only half of Americans born in 1980 are economically better off than their parents, compared to 90% of those born in 1940.”
He gives both sides of what has happened during various phases of automation, mechanisation and computerisation, with a specific emphasis on the US and draws many well reached conclusions and explanations. So overall this was a really enjoyable read and I learned a lot and I would certainly recommend this.
Want to read
May 13, 2021Good review at the Inquisitive Biologist, which you should read if you are thinking of reading the book:
https://inquisitivebiologist.com/2020...
Excerpt:
"There are two take-home messages in this book. First, whether technology is opposed depends on whether it will hit people where it hurts: their wallet. Second, as history shows, successful opposition requires the support of those in power. Without it, resistance is futile. This might seem self-evident, but what I found eye-opening is the distinction Frey makes between enabling and replacing technologies, as not all technology is the same. Enabling technology is usually a boon to workers, making them more productive or lightening physically demanding tasks. Replacing technology, however, usually meets with fierce opposition, as it makes people’s jobs redundant. As an example, where motorised vehicles were an enabling technology compared to horse-drawn wagons that improved the job of professional drivers, self-driving cars promise to be a replacing technology that could mean mass-unemployment.
These clearly formulated messages are embedded in a grand chronological narrative of technological development and its impact on human labour, providing a much-needed and mightily interesting perspective. Frey takes the reader from the agricultural revolution some 10,000 years ago through to the eve of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, which he examines in detail. This period of steam-driven mechanization and job replacement led into the Second Industrial Revolution around 1880 with the discovery of electricity. The book’s focus shifts to the experience in the United States, which emerged as a powerhouse of manufacturing. This time around there was less resistance as living conditions improved and incomes were levelled across the board. That brings us to our current era where automation has emerged as a new disruptive force and inequality has grown once again. Finally, Frey carefully considers the future, with the looming spectre of AI promising further upheaval.
...
... a question I had never considered, why did it take so long for the Industrial Revolution to happen? Consider that historically there was no shortage of technological ingenuity and technical skill. From the engineering feats of the Greeks and the Romans who were more interested in warfare than industry, through (yes, even) the Dark Ages that saw windmills and ultimately the printing press, to the many scientific discoveries and inventions of the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci was but one of many inventors who were centuries ahead of their time. We had mechanical clocks, telescopes, and barometers long before the Industrial Revolution. So why the wait? Frey convincingly argues that the answer can be given in one word.
Resistance.
This is the technological trap of the book’s title. As also shown in Sheilagh Ogilvie’s recent book The European Guilds, craft guilds shaped the economy for centuries. They looked out for their members and opposed progress, either legally or by force. Frey provides many examples of violent riots destroying early inventions. And guilds saw themselves supported by the ruling classes who feared social unrest, with royal edicts banning machines. It highlights one of the book’s central messages; that successful opposition needs the support of those in power. ..."
An interesting book. I'm surprised I'm only just now hearing about it. Well, lots of recent distractions, eh?
https://inquisitivebiologist.com/2020...
Excerpt:
"There are two take-home messages in this book. First, whether technology is opposed depends on whether it will hit people where it hurts: their wallet. Second, as history shows, successful opposition requires the support of those in power. Without it, resistance is futile. This might seem self-evident, but what I found eye-opening is the distinction Frey makes between enabling and replacing technologies, as not all technology is the same. Enabling technology is usually a boon to workers, making them more productive or lightening physically demanding tasks. Replacing technology, however, usually meets with fierce opposition, as it makes people’s jobs redundant. As an example, where motorised vehicles were an enabling technology compared to horse-drawn wagons that improved the job of professional drivers, self-driving cars promise to be a replacing technology that could mean mass-unemployment.
These clearly formulated messages are embedded in a grand chronological narrative of technological development and its impact on human labour, providing a much-needed and mightily interesting perspective. Frey takes the reader from the agricultural revolution some 10,000 years ago through to the eve of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, which he examines in detail. This period of steam-driven mechanization and job replacement led into the Second Industrial Revolution around 1880 with the discovery of electricity. The book’s focus shifts to the experience in the United States, which emerged as a powerhouse of manufacturing. This time around there was less resistance as living conditions improved and incomes were levelled across the board. That brings us to our current era where automation has emerged as a new disruptive force and inequality has grown once again. Finally, Frey carefully considers the future, with the looming spectre of AI promising further upheaval.
...
... a question I had never considered, why did it take so long for the Industrial Revolution to happen? Consider that historically there was no shortage of technological ingenuity and technical skill. From the engineering feats of the Greeks and the Romans who were more interested in warfare than industry, through (yes, even) the Dark Ages that saw windmills and ultimately the printing press, to the many scientific discoveries and inventions of the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci was but one of many inventors who were centuries ahead of their time. We had mechanical clocks, telescopes, and barometers long before the Industrial Revolution. So why the wait? Frey convincingly argues that the answer can be given in one word.
Resistance.
This is the technological trap of the book’s title. As also shown in Sheilagh Ogilvie’s recent book The European Guilds, craft guilds shaped the economy for centuries. They looked out for their members and opposed progress, either legally or by force. Frey provides many examples of violent riots destroying early inventions. And guilds saw themselves supported by the ruling classes who feared social unrest, with royal edicts banning machines. It highlights one of the book’s central messages; that successful opposition needs the support of those in power. ..."
An interesting book. I'm surprised I'm only just now hearing about it. Well, lots of recent distractions, eh?
September 21, 2019
After co-authoring a hit academic paper on the effect of automation on employment, what do you do next? Carl Frey returns with a long (and I mean LONG) book about technological unemployment. The book is indulgent in its extensive historical survey but also more than competently researched - and timely.
The book is 80% a summary of other people's research and only 20% based on Frey's own research. This is by no means a bad thing, since too many intellectuals stray beyond their field of expertise with bold declarations of scientific breakthroughs. There is nothing hubristic about Frey's account despite the long time scale and the broad strokes account. He carefully and exhaustively documents the best available literature on historical waves of industrialization and technological change. The fact-based account proceeds smoothly and mechanically - like on a Fordist assembly line - from the past to the present before modestly peering into the future.
The book never quite manages to advance a novel theoretical point beyond the unoriginal (albeit credible) point that history repeats itself and governments need to ameliorate the suffering faced by temporary losers of technological progress. Secondly, it takes too long to get anywhere. After reading it, I felt nourished but also a little... bloated. Obsessing over irrelevant technical minutiae of industrial organization seems like a waste of everyone's time. The resulting elephantine size of the book is not warranted by the slimness of the original contribution, and it feels like a mismatch for a middle brow book looking for a wide audience.
Despite these faults, Frey's tome synthesizes policy relevant material from a vast literature in a timely way that challenges several common assumptions. It is written in a modestly engaging style that is serviceable for the dry and dismal task at hand. As an assemblage of facts with a minimal layer of normative conclusions, I would recommend the book to people who are econ nerds, history nerds, or (best yet) econ history nerds.
The book is 80% a summary of other people's research and only 20% based on Frey's own research. This is by no means a bad thing, since too many intellectuals stray beyond their field of expertise with bold declarations of scientific breakthroughs. There is nothing hubristic about Frey's account despite the long time scale and the broad strokes account. He carefully and exhaustively documents the best available literature on historical waves of industrialization and technological change. The fact-based account proceeds smoothly and mechanically - like on a Fordist assembly line - from the past to the present before modestly peering into the future.
The book never quite manages to advance a novel theoretical point beyond the unoriginal (albeit credible) point that history repeats itself and governments need to ameliorate the suffering faced by temporary losers of technological progress. Secondly, it takes too long to get anywhere. After reading it, I felt nourished but also a little... bloated. Obsessing over irrelevant technical minutiae of industrial organization seems like a waste of everyone's time. The resulting elephantine size of the book is not warranted by the slimness of the original contribution, and it feels like a mismatch for a middle brow book looking for a wide audience.
Despite these faults, Frey's tome synthesizes policy relevant material from a vast literature in a timely way that challenges several common assumptions. It is written in a modestly engaging style that is serviceable for the dry and dismal task at hand. As an assemblage of facts with a minimal layer of normative conclusions, I would recommend the book to people who are econ nerds, history nerds, or (best yet) econ history nerds.
August 1, 2019
The author did a fantastic job in covering the roles technologies played in history, especially about the distinction between enabling technologies vs. worker-replacing ones. Also, AI is a very pressing topic. The author correctly pointed out that the challenges ahead lie in in the area of political economy, not in technology itself.
It seems that he tried to explained what caused the economic situation in US. No doubt, as the author demonstrated that computer revolution (and automation) has played a big role in the last several decades. However, the analysis was fatally flawed. Without discussing the economical and the philosophical theories behind it (the neo-liberal orthodoxy), the author's conclusion was way short. For example, shareholder value's ultimate importance, enthusiastic pursuing of deindustrialization and globalization. Those were made largely by choice.
NAFTA was supposed to be good for US overall, according the prevailing economists. Apparently, it created winners and losers. Were the losers helped/compensated enough (well, there's the question how much is enough)? My guess is not.
It seems that he tried to explained what caused the economic situation in US. No doubt, as the author demonstrated that computer revolution (and automation) has played a big role in the last several decades. However, the analysis was fatally flawed. Without discussing the economical and the philosophical theories behind it (the neo-liberal orthodoxy), the author's conclusion was way short. For example, shareholder value's ultimate importance, enthusiastic pursuing of deindustrialization and globalization. Those were made largely by choice.
NAFTA was supposed to be good for US overall, according the prevailing economists. Apparently, it created winners and losers. Were the losers helped/compensated enough (well, there's the question how much is enough)? My guess is not.
June 28, 2019
In a 2013 study, Frey and his Oxford colleague Michael Osborne concluded that almost half of U.S. jobs are at risk of being automated by AI and robots. In this book, Frey tells us what happened in the past when people’s livelihoods were threatened by machines.
The reader should be warned that this is a long book. Frey includes an overview of the history of technology from the 1700s till now, making some chapters feel like a condensed version of Robert Gordon’s The Rise and Fall of American Growth. It’s not a bad summary, but the best parts of this book describe how jobs and technology have collided in the past.
Here are some of Frey’s key points:
• The key distinction to make with technology is whether it assists workers with their jobs, making them more productive, or completely replaces workers, eliminating their jobs. While pattern recognition helps the dermatologist diagnose skin cancer, it doesn’t replace the dermatologist. However, speech recognition used at the drive-through at McDonald's and Taco Bell is designed to eliminate jobs. The same is true for self-driving trucks.
• Before the First Industrial Revolution, workers typically resisted any technology that would put them out of work. They usually won because the royals and landowners who held political power feared massive rebellion. Following worker riots against automatic looms in Europe, Germany prohibited the machines for 40 years. Charles I banned the casting of buckets because he didn’t want to put the traditional craftsmen out of work. Tsar Nicholas I would not even allow industrial exhibitions in order to prevent new ideas about factories from spreading.
• But during the First Industrial Revolution, which began around 1769, Britain wanted to compete economically with other countries, and British cities were competing against each other. So when the silk and cotton textile industry built the first factories and automated the spinning and weaving processes, the government protected them. Parliament passed an act that made the destruction of machines a crime punishable by death. The Luddites rioted, and more than 30 were hanged.
• Factory jobs were simplified so children could be the robots of the day. In the 1830s over half of the workers in textile factories were children. The lives of the displaced artisans suffered. They lost income, died earlier, and the height of their children would be lower, indicating malnutrition. Ultimately the new factory productivity brought Britain great wealth. But it took over 50 years for the average person to see the benefits come to them.
• The Second Industrial Revolution that took place in America beginning in the 1870s was a very different experience. Electricity, automobiles, and mass production introduced new technology into the workplace. But Frey believes most workers saw this technology as helping them, not replacing them. Wages and benefits rose for the middle class, and income inequality fell.
• Since 1980, wages for the middle class have fallen behind. Unskilled factory jobs that require only a high school diploma have either been sent abroad or automated. Frey thinks this trend will continue. Jobs that require the least education and skills are the most likely to be automated by AI and robots.
Of note, Frey does not believe we will see massive job losses anytime soon. Instead, he repeats Roy Amara’s famous adage: “We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.”
The reader should be warned that this is a long book. Frey includes an overview of the history of technology from the 1700s till now, making some chapters feel like a condensed version of Robert Gordon’s The Rise and Fall of American Growth. It’s not a bad summary, but the best parts of this book describe how jobs and technology have collided in the past.
Here are some of Frey’s key points:
• The key distinction to make with technology is whether it assists workers with their jobs, making them more productive, or completely replaces workers, eliminating their jobs. While pattern recognition helps the dermatologist diagnose skin cancer, it doesn’t replace the dermatologist. However, speech recognition used at the drive-through at McDonald's and Taco Bell is designed to eliminate jobs. The same is true for self-driving trucks.
• Before the First Industrial Revolution, workers typically resisted any technology that would put them out of work. They usually won because the royals and landowners who held political power feared massive rebellion. Following worker riots against automatic looms in Europe, Germany prohibited the machines for 40 years. Charles I banned the casting of buckets because he didn’t want to put the traditional craftsmen out of work. Tsar Nicholas I would not even allow industrial exhibitions in order to prevent new ideas about factories from spreading.
• But during the First Industrial Revolution, which began around 1769, Britain wanted to compete economically with other countries, and British cities were competing against each other. So when the silk and cotton textile industry built the first factories and automated the spinning and weaving processes, the government protected them. Parliament passed an act that made the destruction of machines a crime punishable by death. The Luddites rioted, and more than 30 were hanged.
• Factory jobs were simplified so children could be the robots of the day. In the 1830s over half of the workers in textile factories were children. The lives of the displaced artisans suffered. They lost income, died earlier, and the height of their children would be lower, indicating malnutrition. Ultimately the new factory productivity brought Britain great wealth. But it took over 50 years for the average person to see the benefits come to them.
• The Second Industrial Revolution that took place in America beginning in the 1870s was a very different experience. Electricity, automobiles, and mass production introduced new technology into the workplace. But Frey believes most workers saw this technology as helping them, not replacing them. Wages and benefits rose for the middle class, and income inequality fell.
• Since 1980, wages for the middle class have fallen behind. Unskilled factory jobs that require only a high school diploma have either been sent abroad or automated. Frey thinks this trend will continue. Jobs that require the least education and skills are the most likely to be automated by AI and robots.
Of note, Frey does not believe we will see massive job losses anytime soon. Instead, he repeats Roy Amara’s famous adage: “We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.”
November 8, 2020
A beautiful, essential book on the relationships between human beings, our all-important jobs (sources of meaning not just sustenance), technology, and public policy. It provides an extraordinarily complete and detailed account of what our collective experience has been so far. What a generous and great-hearted soul Carl Frey must have!
December 2, 2019
This is a detailed book on the relationship between technology emergence, how they are resisted or adopted and the eventual benefit to society if it occurs. The book’s aim is to draw lessons from the past as we ponder how AI and automation will impact work, employment, and prosperity. For anyone interested in the history of technology and its role in the improvement of our lives, this is a wonderful read. Neither are the prescriptions novel and nor does the author profess that they will surely work. This tentativeness is a relief, rather than a fault since it avoids trivializing the issues at hand with too quick an answer. But the book is deep in analysis of a prolonged period while being specific enough on many technologies that have left a lasting impact. The books cover the Roman period, the middle ages, and all the industrial revolutions. The value is in the extraction of the main causes, not in offering any uncovered and unexpected ideas. Hence my short summary of this noncontroversial but useful book risks not giving it its due. Rich examples and lucid prose make this an engaging read for the most part. Some aspects that stood out for me are below (in no logical order or scope).
- We have accepted enabling technologies and rejected replacing technologies.
- Technology’s impact on the ruling class (especially in Europe) played a key role in paving a path for it or not. This is covered wonderfully, especially in how those in power felt that technologies need to be allowed and nurtured for their country to compete in an increasingly global economy.
- Each of these technologies and their growth are covered well - agriculture, printing press, steam power, automobiles, electricity, automation, and I am sure I miss a few.
- Electricity had a significant impact on the American household (and other countries), their work, freeing up of women’s time and their subsequent entry into the workforce.
- The advent of automobiles and how it opened up new needs and possibilities and eventually boosted the economy.
- The relationship between technology emergence, creation of new economic opportunities, need for new skills and their development and economic prosperity. Deftly and in detail, he draws how the enabling technologies take a different path from replacing technologies.
- The emergence of the middle class, their congregation in cities, them being treated as a voting block to be wooed (compared to the agricultural workers who have been displaced). He also has some interesting ideas on big cities vs. small cities, racial history of unions and its impact. Some of his ideas provide an alternate (not contradictory) angle to the issues that Francis Fukayama addressed in Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (my earlier review here - https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...#).
He urges us to take that threat posed by AI and automation seriously. His recommendations include education, deeper engagement by policymakers and subsidies like earned income credit. His policy prescriptions are tame and hint (whether knowingly or not) that while history can help us prepare, it does not provide sure answers.
- We have accepted enabling technologies and rejected replacing technologies.
- Technology’s impact on the ruling class (especially in Europe) played a key role in paving a path for it or not. This is covered wonderfully, especially in how those in power felt that technologies need to be allowed and nurtured for their country to compete in an increasingly global economy.
- Each of these technologies and their growth are covered well - agriculture, printing press, steam power, automobiles, electricity, automation, and I am sure I miss a few.
- Electricity had a significant impact on the American household (and other countries), their work, freeing up of women’s time and their subsequent entry into the workforce.
- The advent of automobiles and how it opened up new needs and possibilities and eventually boosted the economy.
- The relationship between technology emergence, creation of new economic opportunities, need for new skills and their development and economic prosperity. Deftly and in detail, he draws how the enabling technologies take a different path from replacing technologies.
- The emergence of the middle class, their congregation in cities, them being treated as a voting block to be wooed (compared to the agricultural workers who have been displaced). He also has some interesting ideas on big cities vs. small cities, racial history of unions and its impact. Some of his ideas provide an alternate (not contradictory) angle to the issues that Francis Fukayama addressed in Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (my earlier review here - https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...#).
He urges us to take that threat posed by AI and automation seriously. His recommendations include education, deeper engagement by policymakers and subsidies like earned income credit. His policy prescriptions are tame and hint (whether knowingly or not) that while history can help us prepare, it does not provide sure answers.
January 2, 2020
If a technology destroys some jobs, it will make more jobs elsewhere. This was true for the past hundred years in the US during the Second Industrial Revolution, but it wasn't true in England during the First Industrial Revolution. And it looks like advances in AI will cause displacement and unemployment and not an abundance of new jobs.
This book served as a good overview of the past four hundred years of technological change and gave good vignettes of what worker's lives were like in different periods. The main theses are as follows.
There are two types of technologies, labor-replacing and labor-augmenting. Throughout history, technology was assumed to be labor-replacing and so was opposed by elites to prevent social upheaval by those put out of work. (e.g. Roman emperors executed some inventors for this reason.) Then, trade led to more wealth and therefore political power among the merchant classes and interstate competition meant that technological progress was necessary for military and political strength.
The British state supported the introduction of labor-replacing technologies and sent more troops to quell the Luddite riots than they did against Napoleon. These first technologies hollowed out the middle class by replacing skilled artisans by child labor. Then, machines became more complex and semi-skilled labor became more valuable and average wages finally started to increase after 5-8 decades of stagnation.
The second industrial revolution also required semi-skilled labor and led to average wages following productivity increases and a broad increase in the size of the middle class.
Unfortunately, since the 1970s and the computer revolution and now with the rise of AI, semi-skilled middle class jobs are again being automated or globalized away leading to a hollowing out of the middle class (as in the beginning of the first industrial revolution.)
The main conceptual idea from the book is a quadrant with labor-replacing and labor-augmenting on one side and a high or low supply of skilled workers from the education system on the other.
The first industrial revolution was labor replacing. Then it became labor-augmenting and there weren't enough skilled laborers so labor's wages increased. Then the supply of skilled laborers increased and their wage premium went away, but their wages tracked productivity increases.
Now, we have labor-augmenting technologies that are only accessible by the highly skilled and our education system cannot produce enough supply, leading to high wage premiums for the skilled. And labor-replacing technologies are removing middle-class jobs for the semi-skilled.
Overall, this book gave me a great frame work to understand the broad forces of technological progress and their effects on society and gave me strong arguments to be worried about the near term future.
This book served as a good overview of the past four hundred years of technological change and gave good vignettes of what worker's lives were like in different periods. The main theses are as follows.
There are two types of technologies, labor-replacing and labor-augmenting. Throughout history, technology was assumed to be labor-replacing and so was opposed by elites to prevent social upheaval by those put out of work. (e.g. Roman emperors executed some inventors for this reason.) Then, trade led to more wealth and therefore political power among the merchant classes and interstate competition meant that technological progress was necessary for military and political strength.
The British state supported the introduction of labor-replacing technologies and sent more troops to quell the Luddite riots than they did against Napoleon. These first technologies hollowed out the middle class by replacing skilled artisans by child labor. Then, machines became more complex and semi-skilled labor became more valuable and average wages finally started to increase after 5-8 decades of stagnation.
The second industrial revolution also required semi-skilled labor and led to average wages following productivity increases and a broad increase in the size of the middle class.
Unfortunately, since the 1970s and the computer revolution and now with the rise of AI, semi-skilled middle class jobs are again being automated or globalized away leading to a hollowing out of the middle class (as in the beginning of the first industrial revolution.)
The main conceptual idea from the book is a quadrant with labor-replacing and labor-augmenting on one side and a high or low supply of skilled workers from the education system on the other.
The first industrial revolution was labor replacing. Then it became labor-augmenting and there weren't enough skilled laborers so labor's wages increased. Then the supply of skilled laborers increased and their wage premium went away, but their wages tracked productivity increases.
Now, we have labor-augmenting technologies that are only accessible by the highly skilled and our education system cannot produce enough supply, leading to high wage premiums for the skilled. And labor-replacing technologies are removing middle-class jobs for the semi-skilled.
Overall, this book gave me a great frame work to understand the broad forces of technological progress and their effects on society and gave me strong arguments to be worried about the near term future.
December 26, 2019
Although well-written and broadly informative, this book is a bit of a disappointment for some potential readers who wish to gain greater insight into the nature of technology driven income/wealth-inequality, and want something more than a mere synthesis of current thinking on the matter. What this book does well however, is outline historical facts, and narratives around those facts, that suggest that technology does not ispos-factor lead to societal inequality, and there have been at least one well-defined period in recent history (coinciding with the “30 glorious years” in the United States), where technology roughly coincided with the rise of living conditions for a ⅓ to plurality of the population.
The text is partitioned into fifths, with the first slice being dedicated to the vast history of ‘pre-industrial’ production, a subject that merits several volumes in itself, is reduced to less than a hundred pages of commentary on the ‘stagnation’ in life-quality experienced by most peoples of the world prior to the implementation of early mechanization. Effectively, this section is a historical description of the exponential nature of technology, that though initially small in effect, it’s impact from the mid-1800s to now will be several orders of magnitude more profound than it was in the last 4000-years of human history.
I’m unconvined by this narrative, as if one accepts the conceit of the exponential nature of the iterative improvements of technology by some “efficiency”, it is a tautology that looking at the state of previous iterations in hindsight (or backwards) will always look less profound than the current state-of-the-art. What needs to be understood is what was the nature of the base-state previously, and how marginal advancements moving forward improved or changed those societies that implemented them. However, such an analysis would quickly go beyond the scope of any book who’s subject was not centered on that topic specifically. A good short book on pre-historical development is “Against the Grain”, written several years prior by James Scott.
The meat of the book however is reserved for the second, third, and fourth fifths of the book, which covers the span of time from the industrialization and the factory systems of the late 1800s and early 1900s, to the start of post-industrialization, post the late 70s and 80s. The author does a good job accounting the ebbs and flows of technology-driven inequality through the roughly 100 years of this period, showing how the interrelationship between society, organized-labor, and the state initially resulted in a stagnation of technology in England, and how the state eventually backed away from organized-labor, in favor of industrialist and capitalist, which led to the flourishing of state-led industrial policy, which was replicated across the Western world, in the early 20th century, and eventually in the developing world post the Cold War.
While elucidating this era, the author has some interesting commentary on the relationship between science and technology, and whether one is truly a function of the other. He concludes they not so tightly intertwined. Noting that much of the established science to drive the engineering applications of the industrial era were already known 100 years prior, and it was only when the “demand” for such improvements were materialized, often by large state-supported agents, were mechanical-efficiency improving technologies developed, and implemented, to a wide-degree. This observation has wider implications on the heretofore competitive debate between “free marketers” and various detractors within the gradient of centralized-policy proponents.
The author proceeds to describe how the fruits of that industrialization came to improve the lives of the so-called middle class up until the recent era, mostly through implementation of scale-production augmented by new technologies, as well as the permeation of new engineered products via that scale-production. All of this should be well-known to the basic reader on these issues, which is why many readers will be disappointed in the text. Though, obviously well-researched, and expansive in scope, it provides little new insights on the matter, and virtually no novel solutions on how to ameliorate the technology-driven-inequality, most western societies are now facing.
For serious readers in this topic, this book may serve at best, a “jumping off point” to other more specialized books. For instance, the book “A Century of Wealth in America” provides a much more in-depth analysis on the nature of inequality, and it’s dynamics, mostly through a detailed study of CPS and other basic econometric data, and although lacking in overall-narrative (whether this inequality is technology or other driven), it serves as a good foundation to build informed thought on the subject. Likewise, “The Great Leveler”, though very much narrative-driven, provides analysis on mostly non-technology driven forces of inequality, making argument that technology and/or policy are unproven and/or weak tools to ameliorate societal inequality. Though I’ve not read it yet, I suspect another book “The Rise and Fall of American Growth” will help fill the gap in detail on the nature of American growth during the 20th century, as well as offer detailed data-driven commentary on technologies impact on the labor market, and how it has contributed to the divorce of total-factor productivity in the aggregate-level with important individual-level indicators like mean income, and macro-indicators like unemployment/labor-engagement metrics.
Thus, we come to the heart of the matter with respect to this book, that it’s deficiency is not really that it is poor researched or poorly written, but that the subject matter is a bit too big for any author to have hoped to chew in one volume alone. Further, the challenge-at-hand, is a “wicked one”, which has not yet been solved. This is all again avoiding the largest elephant in the room, that many of these sorts of books have published as a reaction to the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and the subsequent re-emergence of ethno-nationalism across the Western world. Whether this trend can be solved by addressing material-declines in individual wealth/income, or not, is a topic for another book entirely, and one that is only briefly touched upon by this book. Indeed, even the matter of international trade, specifically the rise of China and it’s impact on labor is fairly underserved in this topic, as the author (perhpas rightly) concludes that it’s impact going-forward is mostly “baked in the cake” and is a declining factor with respect to domestic inequality vis-a-vis technology and the coming of intelligent agents in the production/development chain. A topic that the author only briefly covers towards the last fifth of the book, and not sufficiently.
Overall, the book is an adequate initial read for someone who wants to understand broadly what factors may have contributed to the recent political turmoil we are witnessing. However, many of the issues like contemporary technology-driven inequality, as well as how other factors interact with this technology impacts effective inequality experienced by a nation, will be better served with dedicated tome(s) on those subjects. An argument could be made that understanding the history of technology's impact on society can help modern people to craft solutions for today, except this book does not delve deeply enough on that history to offer enough fodder for that kind of ideation. Conditional recommend for those who want an introduction on technology-driven inequality, from a pre-computing standpoint.
The text is partitioned into fifths, with the first slice being dedicated to the vast history of ‘pre-industrial’ production, a subject that merits several volumes in itself, is reduced to less than a hundred pages of commentary on the ‘stagnation’ in life-quality experienced by most peoples of the world prior to the implementation of early mechanization. Effectively, this section is a historical description of the exponential nature of technology, that though initially small in effect, it’s impact from the mid-1800s to now will be several orders of magnitude more profound than it was in the last 4000-years of human history.
I’m unconvined by this narrative, as if one accepts the conceit of the exponential nature of the iterative improvements of technology by some “efficiency”, it is a tautology that looking at the state of previous iterations in hindsight (or backwards) will always look less profound than the current state-of-the-art. What needs to be understood is what was the nature of the base-state previously, and how marginal advancements moving forward improved or changed those societies that implemented them. However, such an analysis would quickly go beyond the scope of any book who’s subject was not centered on that topic specifically. A good short book on pre-historical development is “Against the Grain”, written several years prior by James Scott.
The meat of the book however is reserved for the second, third, and fourth fifths of the book, which covers the span of time from the industrialization and the factory systems of the late 1800s and early 1900s, to the start of post-industrialization, post the late 70s and 80s. The author does a good job accounting the ebbs and flows of technology-driven inequality through the roughly 100 years of this period, showing how the interrelationship between society, organized-labor, and the state initially resulted in a stagnation of technology in England, and how the state eventually backed away from organized-labor, in favor of industrialist and capitalist, which led to the flourishing of state-led industrial policy, which was replicated across the Western world, in the early 20th century, and eventually in the developing world post the Cold War.
While elucidating this era, the author has some interesting commentary on the relationship between science and technology, and whether one is truly a function of the other. He concludes they not so tightly intertwined. Noting that much of the established science to drive the engineering applications of the industrial era were already known 100 years prior, and it was only when the “demand” for such improvements were materialized, often by large state-supported agents, were mechanical-efficiency improving technologies developed, and implemented, to a wide-degree. This observation has wider implications on the heretofore competitive debate between “free marketers” and various detractors within the gradient of centralized-policy proponents.
The author proceeds to describe how the fruits of that industrialization came to improve the lives of the so-called middle class up until the recent era, mostly through implementation of scale-production augmented by new technologies, as well as the permeation of new engineered products via that scale-production. All of this should be well-known to the basic reader on these issues, which is why many readers will be disappointed in the text. Though, obviously well-researched, and expansive in scope, it provides little new insights on the matter, and virtually no novel solutions on how to ameliorate the technology-driven-inequality, most western societies are now facing.
For serious readers in this topic, this book may serve at best, a “jumping off point” to other more specialized books. For instance, the book “A Century of Wealth in America” provides a much more in-depth analysis on the nature of inequality, and it’s dynamics, mostly through a detailed study of CPS and other basic econometric data, and although lacking in overall-narrative (whether this inequality is technology or other driven), it serves as a good foundation to build informed thought on the subject. Likewise, “The Great Leveler”, though very much narrative-driven, provides analysis on mostly non-technology driven forces of inequality, making argument that technology and/or policy are unproven and/or weak tools to ameliorate societal inequality. Though I’ve not read it yet, I suspect another book “The Rise and Fall of American Growth” will help fill the gap in detail on the nature of American growth during the 20th century, as well as offer detailed data-driven commentary on technologies impact on the labor market, and how it has contributed to the divorce of total-factor productivity in the aggregate-level with important individual-level indicators like mean income, and macro-indicators like unemployment/labor-engagement metrics.
Thus, we come to the heart of the matter with respect to this book, that it’s deficiency is not really that it is poor researched or poorly written, but that the subject matter is a bit too big for any author to have hoped to chew in one volume alone. Further, the challenge-at-hand, is a “wicked one”, which has not yet been solved. This is all again avoiding the largest elephant in the room, that many of these sorts of books have published as a reaction to the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and the subsequent re-emergence of ethno-nationalism across the Western world. Whether this trend can be solved by addressing material-declines in individual wealth/income, or not, is a topic for another book entirely, and one that is only briefly touched upon by this book. Indeed, even the matter of international trade, specifically the rise of China and it’s impact on labor is fairly underserved in this topic, as the author (perhpas rightly) concludes that it’s impact going-forward is mostly “baked in the cake” and is a declining factor with respect to domestic inequality vis-a-vis technology and the coming of intelligent agents in the production/development chain. A topic that the author only briefly covers towards the last fifth of the book, and not sufficiently.
Overall, the book is an adequate initial read for someone who wants to understand broadly what factors may have contributed to the recent political turmoil we are witnessing. However, many of the issues like contemporary technology-driven inequality, as well as how other factors interact with this technology impacts effective inequality experienced by a nation, will be better served with dedicated tome(s) on those subjects. An argument could be made that understanding the history of technology's impact on society can help modern people to craft solutions for today, except this book does not delve deeply enough on that history to offer enough fodder for that kind of ideation. Conditional recommend for those who want an introduction on technology-driven inequality, from a pre-computing standpoint.
January 11, 2022
This is a fine history of the impact technology had had through the ages on the working people of the world and their economic and material circumstances. The author also covers current and future projected impact of automation and AI on society with focus on the workforce. There are articles regularly appearing that attempt to do the same thing, but one is well served to take the time to read this very well researched study on the subject. I recommend it as well written and extremely relevant to understand the tumultuous politics, economics, and societal disruption that is impacting everyone on the planet. The analysis of our tragic American populist movement and the previous President is particularly captivating.
March 22, 2020
Alati, kui kuskil räägitakse tehisintellekti leviku ja automatiseerimisega kaasnevatest probleemidest, tuletab mingi rahustav hääl meelde, et tööstusrevolutsiooni ajal olid rahval samad mured, aga, vaat, hästi läks ja tänapäeval oleme tehnoloogilise arengu tõttu kõvasti rikkamad kui 18. sajandil. See on õige. Ent enne üldise heaolu saabumist kannatas mitu tööliste põlvkonda kõvasti langenud elamistingimuste all. Frey ei tegele hirmutamisega, vaid toob argumenteeritult välja, miks tööturu muutumistega kaasnevad hirmud ei lahene iseenesest ning väärivad erilist ühiskonna tähelepanu. Teda tasub kuulata.
July 30, 2022
A thorough and important book, should be mandatory reading for any economic policymaker of the 21st century. Frey guides us through the history of the relationship between automation and jobs, showing, ultimately, that strong government intervention is necessary to smooth out the adoption of new technologies that, ultimately, will help future generations to enrich.
December 12, 2020
technology history
March 17, 2024
A Decent Book for the Novice but not for the Knowledgeable
This book presents a high-level historical account of technological advancement and its impact on
employment alongside factors related to political economy that have historically prevented the introduction and advancement in labor impacting technologies (i.e. primarily labor and high levels of government administration fearing the detrimental impacts on labor by the introduction of such technologies). With respect to the book's discussion of the historical development and introduction of labor-saving technology, most of this is relatively basic. Most of this, at least in this reviewer's opinion, should be known to those who have studied the field. Hence the book is really geared towards an audience not very knowledgeable in the field.
The book's real (and novel) contribution is its discussion of the antagonism between the introduction of technological labor-saving machinery, on the one hand, and forces that have historically prevented the introduction and advancement of such technology. The author shows how, in the 1700s and 1800s, for example, labor, craft unions, the nobility and high-level government officials were very apprehensive of this technology and many times did their best (successfully) to prevent its introduction. By the mid-1800s, however, the genie was out of the bottle and nations, in order to win their perpetual race against each other, had to settle for the widespread use of this technology. During the 1800s much of this had a very detrimental impact on large portions of the workforce. They were decimated. Eventually though the benefits came to exceed these costs. This took a very long time, lasting from the early 1800s through the late 1800s in most nations.
From, roughly the 1930s-1970s, labor replacing technology was different, in terms of its impact on Labor replacement, than during the 1800s.It was more of a labor complementing technology than labor replacing. Hence it lifted all boats with little trade-off between labor and machinery (or its owners to be more exact). This capital also increased wage rates and enabled a middle blue-collar workforce to come into existence. Thus, there was little political opposition to it. In fact, labor was very supportive of its introduction and utilization.
In the post 1980s, however, technology started to replace, on a net basis, large portions of the blue-collar workforce. This cohort was put out of work by this technology and forced into lower paid occupations. This has continued through today at an ever more accelerating rate. This threatens the introduction of more technology thanks to the voting power of this group, at least in the author's opinion. The author also posits that the "college educated" have not been impacted detrimentally by this technology but, instead, have benefited from it and will continue to benefit from it. This is unlike other authors, such as Martin Ford in his "March of the Machines•, who believe that technology will also have a seriously detrimental impact on the white collar classes too. Dr. Frey does not even consider this, however. A very serious flaw in his book.
In the conclusion of his book Dr. Frey presents a number of policies that can provide useful to ease the pain of labor and hence reduce the political opposition of it to the introduction of more labor replacing technologies. Among his list is included more education (especially at the pre-school level), assistance to labor to move from depressed regions to those with lower unemployment and the elimination of many occupational licensing schemes that decrease labor mobility (i.e. Hair salon licensing) for example. Nearly all of these are quite weak. They ignore the multi-million-dollar question of how many jobs technology will leave for humans relative to the workforce seeking employment. The author apparently believes that the technology-labor nexus will work out in much the same way it did in the 1800s (i.e., plenty of initial pain but eventually being overcome by increased demand for labor). Unfortunately no evidence, other than wishful thinking, is presented to support this contention.
A superior analysis of the topic is Martin Ford's book. He is an engineer in venture capital in the field and provides a far better and pessimistic view. He is of the view that technology will permanently eliminate the demand for large portions of the workforce. Ford's solution is not so much to tinker with many of the policies that Dr. Frey recommends (he says many of them will help) but to instead introduce the much more radical concept of a minimum guaranteed income. On the positive side, this can deal with the issue of permanent large-scale unemployment (something that Dr. Frey's policies cannot). On the negative side it will necessitate that the winners are willing to give up large shares of their gains to make this possible. Considering human history, having faith that they do is not very realistic. Many would probably prefer a Pinochet or Franco (and the loss of the type of parliamentary democracy that is universal) rather than universal parliamentary democracy and the requisite sacrifices.
This book presents a high-level historical account of technological advancement and its impact on
employment alongside factors related to political economy that have historically prevented the introduction and advancement in labor impacting technologies (i.e. primarily labor and high levels of government administration fearing the detrimental impacts on labor by the introduction of such technologies). With respect to the book's discussion of the historical development and introduction of labor-saving technology, most of this is relatively basic. Most of this, at least in this reviewer's opinion, should be known to those who have studied the field. Hence the book is really geared towards an audience not very knowledgeable in the field.
The book's real (and novel) contribution is its discussion of the antagonism between the introduction of technological labor-saving machinery, on the one hand, and forces that have historically prevented the introduction and advancement of such technology. The author shows how, in the 1700s and 1800s, for example, labor, craft unions, the nobility and high-level government officials were very apprehensive of this technology and many times did their best (successfully) to prevent its introduction. By the mid-1800s, however, the genie was out of the bottle and nations, in order to win their perpetual race against each other, had to settle for the widespread use of this technology. During the 1800s much of this had a very detrimental impact on large portions of the workforce. They were decimated. Eventually though the benefits came to exceed these costs. This took a very long time, lasting from the early 1800s through the late 1800s in most nations.
From, roughly the 1930s-1970s, labor replacing technology was different, in terms of its impact on Labor replacement, than during the 1800s.It was more of a labor complementing technology than labor replacing. Hence it lifted all boats with little trade-off between labor and machinery (or its owners to be more exact). This capital also increased wage rates and enabled a middle blue-collar workforce to come into existence. Thus, there was little political opposition to it. In fact, labor was very supportive of its introduction and utilization.
In the post 1980s, however, technology started to replace, on a net basis, large portions of the blue-collar workforce. This cohort was put out of work by this technology and forced into lower paid occupations. This has continued through today at an ever more accelerating rate. This threatens the introduction of more technology thanks to the voting power of this group, at least in the author's opinion. The author also posits that the "college educated" have not been impacted detrimentally by this technology but, instead, have benefited from it and will continue to benefit from it. This is unlike other authors, such as Martin Ford in his "March of the Machines•, who believe that technology will also have a seriously detrimental impact on the white collar classes too. Dr. Frey does not even consider this, however. A very serious flaw in his book.
In the conclusion of his book Dr. Frey presents a number of policies that can provide useful to ease the pain of labor and hence reduce the political opposition of it to the introduction of more labor replacing technologies. Among his list is included more education (especially at the pre-school level), assistance to labor to move from depressed regions to those with lower unemployment and the elimination of many occupational licensing schemes that decrease labor mobility (i.e. Hair salon licensing) for example. Nearly all of these are quite weak. They ignore the multi-million-dollar question of how many jobs technology will leave for humans relative to the workforce seeking employment. The author apparently believes that the technology-labor nexus will work out in much the same way it did in the 1800s (i.e., plenty of initial pain but eventually being overcome by increased demand for labor). Unfortunately no evidence, other than wishful thinking, is presented to support this contention.
A superior analysis of the topic is Martin Ford's book. He is an engineer in venture capital in the field and provides a far better and pessimistic view. He is of the view that technology will permanently eliminate the demand for large portions of the workforce. Ford's solution is not so much to tinker with many of the policies that Dr. Frey recommends (he says many of them will help) but to instead introduce the much more radical concept of a minimum guaranteed income. On the positive side, this can deal with the issue of permanent large-scale unemployment (something that Dr. Frey's policies cannot). On the negative side it will necessitate that the winners are willing to give up large shares of their gains to make this possible. Considering human history, having faith that they do is not very realistic. Many would probably prefer a Pinochet or Franco (and the loss of the type of parliamentary democracy that is universal) rather than universal parliamentary democracy and the requisite sacrifices.
August 10, 2021
The book reviewed the social economical and technological landscape from the invention of agriculture to the rise of AI. It described technology's role in shaping the economic life (increased or vanished incomes, forced occupational and geographical migration, wealth distribution etc.). The author also showed how over the long run industrial revolution created prosperity for society while the immediate consequences were devastating for large portion of the population.
The author argues that the trends we see in current stage of automation mirrors the trends from industrial revolution:
1 fear for AI's power to steal jobs and destroy livelihood and leave people in the backwaters of the streams of progress is on the rise
2 the political divide and fragmentation that challenges the fabric of liberal democracy is growing,
3 the number of population deprived of its sense and usefulness (which is a perfect setup for an American Hitler according to the writer) due to mismatch of skills is increasing.
To avoid the same mistakes and the possible violence/riots, we need to manage the immediate term with some possible interventions (e.g. education , upgrade workforce, universal income).
These are some notes I want to keep from the book:
"for most of human history, there was no wealth and no inequality. The age of inequality began with the Neolithic revolution. It was only after the invention of agriculture that food could be stored, land could be owned, and individuals could accumulate a surplus of significance--which in turn introduced the concept of property rights and a political structure to uphold those rights"
Why is Schumpeterian growth largely absent in the pre-industrial era?
"the simple answer is that technology creativity is a prerequisite for growth but not sufficient condition. Technical ideas need to be translated into reliable blueprint and prototypes, which in turn need to find an application in production to have any impact on productivity and prosperity."
"the pre industrial era did not suffer from a shortage of imagination, it suffered from a shortage of realization. Leonardo Davinci made drawings of hundreds of inventions but he made hardly any effort to turn them into functioning prototypes"
"the close collaboration between scientist and engineers for directing an idea toward the right application was very rare in preindustrial times"
"labor saving technologies make economic sense only if capital is relatively cheap compared to labor.
Why didn't China have industrial revolution until very late?
"In China, the guilds persisted much longer and had almost unrestrained control over their crafts. They were more powerful thank their European counterparts, and they used their power to forcefully restrain the introduction of worker-replacing technology on regular basis."
"The lack of competition in China meant that industrialization had to wait another two hundred years, until China became integrated into the world economy. At the conclusion of the first opium war in 1842, the British opened five so-called treaty ports for carrying out foreign trade in China. By the closing years of the world war 1, their numbers had increased to almost one hundred. The competition introduced by foreign trade made China's technological backwardness only to apparent and in the early twentieth century many labor saving technologies from the west were imported."
What will likely happen during this early stage of adoption of AI?
"Harnessing the mysterious force of electricity required a complete reorganization of the factory and the switch to unit drive as the organizing principle took plenty of experimentation - so the productivity gains of electrification did not show up until 1920. Similar trajectory for computer led productivity growth in 1990s...
the trajectory of AI adoption is likely to mirror -- the adoption will not only require improvement in the technology itself but significant complementary investment and plenty of experimentation to explore its full potential. During this phase, history tells us, the economy goes through an adjustment process with slow productivity growth"
The author argues that the trends we see in current stage of automation mirrors the trends from industrial revolution:
1 fear for AI's power to steal jobs and destroy livelihood and leave people in the backwaters of the streams of progress is on the rise
2 the political divide and fragmentation that challenges the fabric of liberal democracy is growing,
3 the number of population deprived of its sense and usefulness (which is a perfect setup for an American Hitler according to the writer) due to mismatch of skills is increasing.
To avoid the same mistakes and the possible violence/riots, we need to manage the immediate term with some possible interventions (e.g. education , upgrade workforce, universal income).
These are some notes I want to keep from the book:
"for most of human history, there was no wealth and no inequality. The age of inequality began with the Neolithic revolution. It was only after the invention of agriculture that food could be stored, land could be owned, and individuals could accumulate a surplus of significance--which in turn introduced the concept of property rights and a political structure to uphold those rights"
Why is Schumpeterian growth largely absent in the pre-industrial era?
"the simple answer is that technology creativity is a prerequisite for growth but not sufficient condition. Technical ideas need to be translated into reliable blueprint and prototypes, which in turn need to find an application in production to have any impact on productivity and prosperity."
"the pre industrial era did not suffer from a shortage of imagination, it suffered from a shortage of realization. Leonardo Davinci made drawings of hundreds of inventions but he made hardly any effort to turn them into functioning prototypes"
"the close collaboration between scientist and engineers for directing an idea toward the right application was very rare in preindustrial times"
"labor saving technologies make economic sense only if capital is relatively cheap compared to labor.
Why didn't China have industrial revolution until very late?
"In China, the guilds persisted much longer and had almost unrestrained control over their crafts. They were more powerful thank their European counterparts, and they used their power to forcefully restrain the introduction of worker-replacing technology on regular basis."
"The lack of competition in China meant that industrialization had to wait another two hundred years, until China became integrated into the world economy. At the conclusion of the first opium war in 1842, the British opened five so-called treaty ports for carrying out foreign trade in China. By the closing years of the world war 1, their numbers had increased to almost one hundred. The competition introduced by foreign trade made China's technological backwardness only to apparent and in the early twentieth century many labor saving technologies from the west were imported."
What will likely happen during this early stage of adoption of AI?
"Harnessing the mysterious force of electricity required a complete reorganization of the factory and the switch to unit drive as the organizing principle took plenty of experimentation - so the productivity gains of electrification did not show up until 1920. Similar trajectory for computer led productivity growth in 1990s...
the trajectory of AI adoption is likely to mirror -- the adoption will not only require improvement in the technology itself but significant complementary investment and plenty of experimentation to explore its full potential. During this phase, history tells us, the economy goes through an adjustment process with slow productivity growth"
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 27, 2020
This isn't the best book I've read all year, but it's certainly the most important one. For those who enjoyed Piketty's Capital will love this one. Instead of capital's role in creating inequality, Frey examines how technology shapes labor and thus the whole economy. It's not quite as technical as Capital, but it certainly isn't a casual read. A salvo of statistics greet you upon turning the first page, but they are deftly presented and clearly explained. To be honest, I'm skeptical of economists generally, mostly when they stray too far away from history and data, and start devising grand, unifying theories. Thankfully, Frey seems similarly skeptical of economists predictive ability and elects to focus almost entirely on history. Nobody can totally abstain from inference, of course, but one can refrain from superimposing meaning on an otherwise meaningless corpus of facts and trends.
Highlights and key insights:
- Marx and Engels were right in a limited sense, but were ultimately proven wrong by technologies ability to raise most boats eventually. I'm sympathetic to Marx, I think he was a proper genius after-all, but he was too myopic (aren't we all?) and failed to foresee that technology guided by the winds of capitalism could indeed improve people's well-being in a meaningful and direct way. The period he calls "Engels Pause" is generally considered the classical years of the industrial revolution (~1820s) did witness an immense amount of suffering on all fronts. As Frey says himself, boats were lifted eventually, but three generations of British boats sunk in the meantime.
- Crucial difference between enabling and replacing technologies in determining whether widespread unemployment will take place
- How the "short" and "long" term are different and related all at the same time. Sometimes you deal with them separately, other times you look at them together. Much of failure in prediction and accurate diagnosis of present issues emanates from an inability to differentiate between the two. Understanding this relationship is absolutely crucial to any economic analysis -- but it's very hard and requires a deft touch.
- Henry Ford created modern American. I mean, I knew this guy was important, but wow was he fucking instrumental in forging the modern American and world order. And his impact was largely positive, at least viewed through the lens of equitable economic growth.
- Last chapter is the best one where he outlines potential policies paths for an AI future. His previous chapter on AI was lackluster, but this one was not -- full of nuanced recommendations and admonitions about potential mechanisms (ie. UBI, regulation, zoning, education etc.)
Highlights and key insights:
- Marx and Engels were right in a limited sense, but were ultimately proven wrong by technologies ability to raise most boats eventually. I'm sympathetic to Marx, I think he was a proper genius after-all, but he was too myopic (aren't we all?) and failed to foresee that technology guided by the winds of capitalism could indeed improve people's well-being in a meaningful and direct way. The period he calls "Engels Pause" is generally considered the classical years of the industrial revolution (~1820s) did witness an immense amount of suffering on all fronts. As Frey says himself, boats were lifted eventually, but three generations of British boats sunk in the meantime.
- Crucial difference between enabling and replacing technologies in determining whether widespread unemployment will take place
- How the "short" and "long" term are different and related all at the same time. Sometimes you deal with them separately, other times you look at them together. Much of failure in prediction and accurate diagnosis of present issues emanates from an inability to differentiate between the two. Understanding this relationship is absolutely crucial to any economic analysis -- but it's very hard and requires a deft touch.
- Henry Ford created modern American. I mean, I knew this guy was important, but wow was he fucking instrumental in forging the modern American and world order. And his impact was largely positive, at least viewed through the lens of equitable economic growth.
- Last chapter is the best one where he outlines potential policies paths for an AI future. His previous chapter on AI was lackluster, but this one was not -- full of nuanced recommendations and admonitions about potential mechanisms (ie. UBI, regulation, zoning, education etc.)
July 3, 2022
I first heard of Carl Benedikt Frey's work from a working paper with Michael Osborne, "The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation", which was later published in 2017 in the journal Technological Forecasting and Social Change. The paper was promptly misread, and soon click-bait titles spread about how 47% of the work force was vulnerable to losing their jobs to technology-induced automation. The paper is subtler than that - 47% were relatively vulnerable, and that the prospect of job loss was not inevitable.
Frey's economic work discusses the relationship between technology, employment, and income. To be more specific, the effects of technology on increasing or reducing employment, and then how that can effect income distribution and income inequality. Technology can be "labor-enabling", which creates new areas of employment, and "labor-replacing", which does the opposite. Where technology increases unemployment, this in turn causes workers to resist.
Frey makes the broad comparison that the current wave of automation and computer technology, which is labor-replacing, is similar to the effects of the First Industrial Revolution. For almost a century, Frey notes that there was no increase in real wages, and many professions were soon threatened. Now, I do have to wonder if technological change is the major cause of social unrest - I am not in any sense an expert on late 18th or early 19th century England, but there may be other causal factors here - food shortages, increased population growth, trade laws? How widespread was factory employment anyway? How many Luddite protests were there compared to every Peterloo?
There is another group of caveats I have, and that is with the more familiar story about AI and automation replacing jobs here. First - what other technologies can affect employment? I don't know the answer to this one. Second - what other factors can affect employment in the United States? After the pandemic, unemployment hit a record low of 3.6% as of May 2022. Would the aging population, levels of immigration, or the social safety net have anything else to do with it? Third - are AI and automation labor-enabling jobs as much as they are labor-replacing?
But while I've just listed a long list of caveats, and more or less continued to worry about how close any historical comparisons can be for economics, I do sincerely appreciate the data and analytical work that Frey brought together for this study. I don't know the answers, but I can say he asks interesting questions.
Frey's economic work discusses the relationship between technology, employment, and income. To be more specific, the effects of technology on increasing or reducing employment, and then how that can effect income distribution and income inequality. Technology can be "labor-enabling", which creates new areas of employment, and "labor-replacing", which does the opposite. Where technology increases unemployment, this in turn causes workers to resist.
Frey makes the broad comparison that the current wave of automation and computer technology, which is labor-replacing, is similar to the effects of the First Industrial Revolution. For almost a century, Frey notes that there was no increase in real wages, and many professions were soon threatened. Now, I do have to wonder if technological change is the major cause of social unrest - I am not in any sense an expert on late 18th or early 19th century England, but there may be other causal factors here - food shortages, increased population growth, trade laws? How widespread was factory employment anyway? How many Luddite protests were there compared to every Peterloo?
There is another group of caveats I have, and that is with the more familiar story about AI and automation replacing jobs here. First - what other technologies can affect employment? I don't know the answer to this one. Second - what other factors can affect employment in the United States? After the pandemic, unemployment hit a record low of 3.6% as of May 2022. Would the aging population, levels of immigration, or the social safety net have anything else to do with it? Third - are AI and automation labor-enabling jobs as much as they are labor-replacing?
But while I've just listed a long list of caveats, and more or less continued to worry about how close any historical comparisons can be for economics, I do sincerely appreciate the data and analytical work that Frey brought together for this study. I don't know the answers, but I can say he asks interesting questions.
May 28, 2025
If you want to read a book on a relatively narrow but important topic, and that topic is the history of labor, material conditions, and societal shifts during the first two industrial revolutions, with an outlook on what AI might bring next - this is the book for you.
It’s dry in a good way: clearly structured, logically argued, filled with illustrative examples and stories but without unnecessary “fun facts.” I came away feeling thoroughly informed on industrialisation, innovation, automation and the difference between job-replacing and job-augmenting technologies.
Here are my main (roughly summarized) takeaways:
1. The transformation of labor driven by AI technologies can be seen in parallel to the patterns from the first and second industrial revolutions. We know that technology boosts productivity and likely raises overall living standards, but workers typically lose out in the short and medium term, sometimes for decades. Today, the middle class alongside the working class is increasingly vulnerable and stands to lose most in this technological leap.
2. Progress is inevitable as history has shown, and trying to halt it is likely futile. The real challenge is political, not technological: how to regulate it, and how to address the social consequences of job erosion. The author proposes several actions: improving early childhood education to reduce opportunity gaps for future generations, removing barriers to job switching and retraining, providing tax cuts and credits to workers whose jobs were automated, supporting mobility between low- and high-tech regions and reforming zoning laws that prevent people from moving to cities where jobs are concentrated.
After reading this book, I’m less anxious about losing my own job to AI and more concerned that governments around the world may not be up to the task of managing this transition.
It’s dry in a good way: clearly structured, logically argued, filled with illustrative examples and stories but without unnecessary “fun facts.” I came away feeling thoroughly informed on industrialisation, innovation, automation and the difference between job-replacing and job-augmenting technologies.
Here are my main (roughly summarized) takeaways:
1. The transformation of labor driven by AI technologies can be seen in parallel to the patterns from the first and second industrial revolutions. We know that technology boosts productivity and likely raises overall living standards, but workers typically lose out in the short and medium term, sometimes for decades. Today, the middle class alongside the working class is increasingly vulnerable and stands to lose most in this technological leap.
2. Progress is inevitable as history has shown, and trying to halt it is likely futile. The real challenge is political, not technological: how to regulate it, and how to address the social consequences of job erosion. The author proposes several actions: improving early childhood education to reduce opportunity gaps for future generations, removing barriers to job switching and retraining, providing tax cuts and credits to workers whose jobs were automated, supporting mobility between low- and high-tech regions and reforming zoning laws that prevent people from moving to cities where jobs are concentrated.
After reading this book, I’m less anxious about losing my own job to AI and more concerned that governments around the world may not be up to the task of managing this transition.
June 8, 2025
Well... this was an interesting read to some extent. The thesis - that technologies cause progress for all, but that proper management is needed during the transition, to not leave people in poverty - is well argued overall.
It is very much a work of the liberal/democratic establishment, and very much not interested in rocking any boats, but keep them on an even keel, steadily flowing toward ever growing GDP and the end of history.
The AI revolution is taken as inevitable and desirable, as rejecting it would obviously lead to stagnation - the doom scenario of our current culture. No comrades, we must ever grow, ever grow!
It is argued that people don't settle to work less, even if they could lead decent lives doing so... And then argued that poverty runs rampant... it is strange that!
There is no pondering here, about causes and effect, about desirable and thriving, about alternative approaches or visions of working life.
It is a book written by and to the conservative-disruptive class. The economists and policy makers that have settled themselves with 'this is all there is'. Of the okay-class, that force their power on us all through sheer lack of fantasy.
Let's rejoice in the policy-tools suggested to reduce joblessness to ~8% rather than ~10%. Let us savor in the whiff of 1,73% added GDP growth, as a new GPT is blessed upon us.
Or maybe the historic experiences cannot be extended to whatever is thrown at us next? Maybe automation will not follow the logic of the industrial revolution or the computerization? Maybe the long 20th century has automated the working and middle class out of power. What Frey continually says, but never addresses directly, is that 'people' has become a problem for 'society'. We are no longer needed for progress and growth. What shall we do with these poor dispensable suckers?
Well - it's a book by an economist.
It is very much a work of the liberal/democratic establishment, and very much not interested in rocking any boats, but keep them on an even keel, steadily flowing toward ever growing GDP and the end of history.
The AI revolution is taken as inevitable and desirable, as rejecting it would obviously lead to stagnation - the doom scenario of our current culture. No comrades, we must ever grow, ever grow!
It is argued that people don't settle to work less, even if they could lead decent lives doing so... And then argued that poverty runs rampant... it is strange that!
There is no pondering here, about causes and effect, about desirable and thriving, about alternative approaches or visions of working life.
It is a book written by and to the conservative-disruptive class. The economists and policy makers that have settled themselves with 'this is all there is'. Of the okay-class, that force their power on us all through sheer lack of fantasy.
Let's rejoice in the policy-tools suggested to reduce joblessness to ~8% rather than ~10%. Let us savor in the whiff of 1,73% added GDP growth, as a new GPT is blessed upon us.
Or maybe the historic experiences cannot be extended to whatever is thrown at us next? Maybe automation will not follow the logic of the industrial revolution or the computerization? Maybe the long 20th century has automated the working and middle class out of power. What Frey continually says, but never addresses directly, is that 'people' has become a problem for 'society'. We are no longer needed for progress and growth. What shall we do with these poor dispensable suckers?
Well - it's a book by an economist.
May 23, 2021
What does technological progress mean for the future of work? That's the question Carl Benedikt Frey set out to answer.
Through a historical analysis of the Industrial Revolution and the 20th century, Frey identifies trends and applies them to our current day and the future. And I'm not really one to critique that methodology, nor can I find any glaring faults in Frey's historical recap of technology from the steam engine to AlphaZero.
But what I do find kinda strange is how Frey interprets his findings.
I'm sure that the the periodes from 1880-1929 and from 1945-1980 saw massive increases in both automation, wages and employment, but considering these periods as unavoidable ebbs and flows related to technology.
On several occasions Frey cites Thomas Piketty (brave choice, I will admit), but at no point does Frey even acknowledge Piketty's conclusions about abovementioned periodes being historical outliers rather than historical trends. I'm not saying that Frey has to agree with Piketty, but ignoring arguments that goes against your conclusion is not a good look, especially when you acknowledge the man who's the biggest proponent of those counterarguments.
I do also take some issues with Freys conclusions, as they more so take the route of transforming the existing system, rather than diagnosing the system itself. Essentially, this comes off as 300 pages of someone telling you that a system of governance is terribly flawed, but a few tweaks could make it amazing.
Through a historical analysis of the Industrial Revolution and the 20th century, Frey identifies trends and applies them to our current day and the future. And I'm not really one to critique that methodology, nor can I find any glaring faults in Frey's historical recap of technology from the steam engine to AlphaZero.
But what I do find kinda strange is how Frey interprets his findings.
I'm sure that the the periodes from 1880-1929 and from 1945-1980 saw massive increases in both automation, wages and employment, but considering these periods as unavoidable ebbs and flows related to technology.
On several occasions Frey cites Thomas Piketty (brave choice, I will admit), but at no point does Frey even acknowledge Piketty's conclusions about abovementioned periodes being historical outliers rather than historical trends. I'm not saying that Frey has to agree with Piketty, but ignoring arguments that goes against your conclusion is not a good look, especially when you acknowledge the man who's the biggest proponent of those counterarguments.
I do also take some issues with Freys conclusions, as they more so take the route of transforming the existing system, rather than diagnosing the system itself. Essentially, this comes off as 300 pages of someone telling you that a system of governance is terribly flawed, but a few tweaks could make it amazing.
March 18, 2020
A strong review of the literature of the impact of technology on labor. The books goes to length to explain how tech can have a different impact whether it is augmenting or labor replacing. It combines a review of specific technologies with an analysis of the social and political conditions of the times to explain both the violence (or lack of) and the unemployment patterns during the different phases of the industrial revolution up until this century. The main weakness in such an effort in inability to dwell on details which are mostly relegated in the references. I was also hoping Frey would get into own research in more details particularly his studies of automation and his findings that 47% of jobs are at risk. He describes contrarian views in the endnotes rather than the main text and I feel missing an opportunity to enlighten the readers about how economic studies arrive to their conclusions. At some times the books feels too much like it is drawing from secondary and tertiary studies rather than have the author deploys his own arguments, but I do hope future books will be better in this respect. Also given the author is not a historian, this is expected to some extent, though the greats economist have often also been very keen students of history. All those fields are related, economics, history, politics, all must mesh together to tell a coherent story, often underlined by philosophical unspoken assumptions. Critical reading in such times means reading closely but also widely across topics, from both general as well as specialized books and this book does definitely well in the general category dealing with technology and its impact.
July 4, 2025
This bold, but interesting, book uses history to asses the current risks from AI, ML and robotics. Frey uses the distinctive between replacing and enabling technologies to asses the record of mass adoption of automating technologies since c.1700. He argues that in the period of the classic Industrial Revolution there was a state backed roll-out of worker-replacing technologies that caused mass unemployment: working-class living standards did not recover for a generation. The Luddites were right to protest about what was happening.
From the 1870s the situation changed: there was another expansion of automation, but most technologies were worker-enabling, supporting employment. This trend continued into the 1970s. He makes a good observation here: there were no 'Luddites' in this period, something historians have generally ignored as a research question.
Since the 1980s, we moved back to a period of worker-replacing automation with a sustained loss of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in both industry and services. His view on the coming wave of automation is very much 'the juries out': some currently popular jobs, such as driving, could be under-threat.
Although I knew a fair amount about the historical sections, I still found this an interesting analysis. It also left me more pessimistic about the near future. Even so there are some obvious issues. The section on the Luddites misunderstands some key details and context. More importantly, the analysis only looks at the Britain and then USA. It doesn't look at technology across larger regions, let alone the world economy as a whole. Consequently, it doesn't consider the role of globalisation and de-globalisation. This is a particular problem with the discussion of the post-1970s, as there are rival interpretations blaming off-shoring for the decline of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in Western industry. Frey never really considers that the overall level of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the world economy may have held steady, or even increased.
The final chapter consists of policy recommendations. Here I felt Frey rowed back from the pessimism of much of his earlier analysis. Some of proposals are sensible, but they are also very conventional. The big emphasis he puts on improving human capital formation, as been an objective of all governments in North America and Europe since the 1990s. Doubling-down on education will appear to some like flogging a dead horse at this point.
From the 1870s the situation changed: there was another expansion of automation, but most technologies were worker-enabling, supporting employment. This trend continued into the 1970s. He makes a good observation here: there were no 'Luddites' in this period, something historians have generally ignored as a research question.
Since the 1980s, we moved back to a period of worker-replacing automation with a sustained loss of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in both industry and services. His view on the coming wave of automation is very much 'the juries out': some currently popular jobs, such as driving, could be under-threat.
Although I knew a fair amount about the historical sections, I still found this an interesting analysis. It also left me more pessimistic about the near future. Even so there are some obvious issues. The section on the Luddites misunderstands some key details and context. More importantly, the analysis only looks at the Britain and then USA. It doesn't look at technology across larger regions, let alone the world economy as a whole. Consequently, it doesn't consider the role of globalisation and de-globalisation. This is a particular problem with the discussion of the post-1970s, as there are rival interpretations blaming off-shoring for the decline of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in Western industry. Frey never really considers that the overall level of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the world economy may have held steady, or even increased.
The final chapter consists of policy recommendations. Here I felt Frey rowed back from the pessimism of much of his earlier analysis. Some of proposals are sensible, but they are also very conventional. The big emphasis he puts on improving human capital formation, as been an objective of all governments in North America and Europe since the 1990s. Doubling-down on education will appear to some like flogging a dead horse at this point.
Read
December 5, 2019We are at the time of year where I have started reading the books that I will do in my Winter technology policy seminar. I never do the same books twice and I almost always have not read the books before I choose them. This year the theme of the seminar is Technology: Friend or Foe? We are reading two books, The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation by Carl Benedikt Frey and The Age of Surveillance Capitalism by Shoshana Zuboff. (The syllabus for the seminar is here.)
I confess to a certain nervousness when I start to read the books. Is the book a good read? Will it blog well? (Students write blog posts which we discuss as we work our way through the books.) I am in the middle of The Technology Trap right now, and I highly recommend it. We live in an age of technology and there is increasing concern about whether we are making the right choices in how technology shapes our daily lives. That makes this a particularly good time to get a historical sense of how the role of technology has changed over time in different societies. The Technology Trap is an excellent starting point to building that background and should serve the seminar well as we head into a discussion of surveillance capitalism.
— Randal C. Picker, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law
I confess to a certain nervousness when I start to read the books. Is the book a good read? Will it blog well? (Students write blog posts which we discuss as we work our way through the books.) I am in the middle of The Technology Trap right now, and I highly recommend it. We live in an age of technology and there is increasing concern about whether we are making the right choices in how technology shapes our daily lives. That makes this a particularly good time to get a historical sense of how the role of technology has changed over time in different societies. The Technology Trap is an excellent starting point to building that background and should serve the seminar well as we head into a discussion of surveillance capitalism.
— Randal C. Picker, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law
May 11, 2024
A little economic history and how technological changes have changed our social, political and economic life.
The book begins by talking about technology from the bronze age to artificial intelligence. I learned about technology and what has happened at the time of its adoption, such as in the industrial revolution.
A generation, or sometimes two, including the children who spent their lives and experiences when the industrial revolution began. I imagine poor people in Manchester, Lancaster and many others. Today they are beautiful and quiet places. Is it worth all the sacrifice? For us yes, but for others sometimes not.
The fact is that technology, if not handled well, especially artificial intelligence, will cause disappointment, despair and sadness in all those who cannot adapt and train themselves to achieve new tasks in the digital age.
And the populist trend is also present: prohibiting progress. This is the only one that turns out to be the poorest and has reached the end of world progress (as López did in Mexico and Trump did in the EU).
Excellent reference for this book. If you are interested in politics and economics, I recommend it.
The book begins by talking about technology from the bronze age to artificial intelligence. I learned about technology and what has happened at the time of its adoption, such as in the industrial revolution.
A generation, or sometimes two, including the children who spent their lives and experiences when the industrial revolution began. I imagine poor people in Manchester, Lancaster and many others. Today they are beautiful and quiet places. Is it worth all the sacrifice? For us yes, but for others sometimes not.
The fact is that technology, if not handled well, especially artificial intelligence, will cause disappointment, despair and sadness in all those who cannot adapt and train themselves to achieve new tasks in the digital age.
And the populist trend is also present: prohibiting progress. This is the only one that turns out to be the poorest and has reached the end of world progress (as López did in Mexico and Trump did in the EU).
Excellent reference for this book. If you are interested in politics and economics, I recommend it.
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