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Modes of Thought
Six lectures delivered at Wellesley College, Massachusetts, & two at the University of Chicago
Preface
Importance
Expression
Understanding
Perspective
Forms of process
Civilized universe
Nature lifeless
Nature alive
The aim of philosophy
Index
Preface
Importance
Expression
Understanding
Perspective
Forms of process
Civilized universe
Nature lifeless
Nature alive
The aim of philosophy
Index
189 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1938
34 people are currently reading
1175 people want to read
About the author
Alfred North Whitehead
100 books426 followersAlfred North Whitehead, OM FRS (15 February 1861 – 30 December 1947) was an English mathematician and philosopher. He is best known as the defining figure of the philosophical school known as process philosophy, which today has found application to a wide variety of disciplines, including ecology, theology, education, physics, biology, economics, and psychology, among other areas.
In his early career Whitehead wrote primarily on mathematics, logic, and physics. His most notable work in these fields is the three-volume Principia Mathematica (1910–13), which he co-wrote with former student Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica is considered one of the twentieth century's most important works in mathematical logic, and placed 23rd in a list of the top 100 English-language nonfiction books of the twentieth century by Modern Library.
Beginning in the late 1910s and early 1920s, Whitehead gradually turned his attention from mathematics to philosophy of science, and finally to metaphysics. He developed a comprehensive metaphysical system which radically departed from most of western philosophy. Whitehead argued that reality was fundamentally constructed by events rather than substances, and that these events cannot be defined apart from their relations to other events, thus rejecting the theory of independently existing substances. Today Whitehead's philosophical works – particularly Process and Reality – are regarded as the foundational texts of process philosophy.
Whitehead's process philosophy argues that "there is urgency in coming to see the world as a web of interrelated processes of which we are integral parts, so that all of our choices and actions have consequences for the world around us." For this reason, one of the most promising applications of Whitehead's thought in recent years has been in the area of ecological civilization and environmental ethics pioneered by John B. Cobb, Jr.
Isabelle Stengers wrote that "Whiteheadians are recruited among both philosophers and theologians, and the palette has been enriched by practitioners from the most diverse horizons, from ecology to feminism, practices that unite political struggle and spirituality with the sciences of education." Indeed, in recent decades attention to Whitehead's work has become more widespread, with interest extending to intellectuals in Europe and China, and coming from such diverse fields as ecology, physics, biology, education, economics, and psychology. However, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that Whitehead's thought drew much attention outside of a small group of American philosophers and theologians, and even today he is not considered especially influential outside of relatively specialized circles.
In recent years, Whiteheadian thought has become a stimulating influence in scientific research.
In physics particularly, Whitehead's thought has been influential, articulating a rival doctrine to Albert Einstein's general relativity. Whitehead's theory of gravitation continues to be controversial. Even Yutaka Tanaka, who suggests that the gravitational constant disagrees with experimental findings, admits that Einstein's work does not actually refute Whitehead's formulation. Also, although Whitehead himself gave only secondary consideration to quantum theory, his metaphysics of events has proved attractive to physicists in that field. Henry Stapp and David Bohm are among those whose work has been influenced by Whitehead.
Whitehead is widely known for his influence in education theory. His philosophy inspired the formation of the Association for Process Philosophy of Education (APPE), which published eleven volumes of a journal titled Process Papers on process philosophy and education from 1996 to 2008. Whitehead's theories on education also led to the formation of new modes of learning and new models of teaching.
In his early career Whitehead wrote primarily on mathematics, logic, and physics. His most notable work in these fields is the three-volume Principia Mathematica (1910–13), which he co-wrote with former student Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica is considered one of the twentieth century's most important works in mathematical logic, and placed 23rd in a list of the top 100 English-language nonfiction books of the twentieth century by Modern Library.
Beginning in the late 1910s and early 1920s, Whitehead gradually turned his attention from mathematics to philosophy of science, and finally to metaphysics. He developed a comprehensive metaphysical system which radically departed from most of western philosophy. Whitehead argued that reality was fundamentally constructed by events rather than substances, and that these events cannot be defined apart from their relations to other events, thus rejecting the theory of independently existing substances. Today Whitehead's philosophical works – particularly Process and Reality – are regarded as the foundational texts of process philosophy.
Whitehead's process philosophy argues that "there is urgency in coming to see the world as a web of interrelated processes of which we are integral parts, so that all of our choices and actions have consequences for the world around us." For this reason, one of the most promising applications of Whitehead's thought in recent years has been in the area of ecological civilization and environmental ethics pioneered by John B. Cobb, Jr.
Isabelle Stengers wrote that "Whiteheadians are recruited among both philosophers and theologians, and the palette has been enriched by practitioners from the most diverse horizons, from ecology to feminism, practices that unite political struggle and spirituality with the sciences of education." Indeed, in recent decades attention to Whitehead's work has become more widespread, with interest extending to intellectuals in Europe and China, and coming from such diverse fields as ecology, physics, biology, education, economics, and psychology. However, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that Whitehead's thought drew much attention outside of a small group of American philosophers and theologians, and even today he is not considered especially influential outside of relatively specialized circles.
In recent years, Whiteheadian thought has become a stimulating influence in scientific research.
In physics particularly, Whitehead's thought has been influential, articulating a rival doctrine to Albert Einstein's general relativity. Whitehead's theory of gravitation continues to be controversial. Even Yutaka Tanaka, who suggests that the gravitational constant disagrees with experimental findings, admits that Einstein's work does not actually refute Whitehead's formulation. Also, although Whitehead himself gave only secondary consideration to quantum theory, his metaphysics of events has proved attractive to physicists in that field. Henry Stapp and David Bohm are among those whose work has been influenced by Whitehead.
Whitehead is widely known for his influence in education theory. His philosophy inspired the formation of the Association for Process Philosophy of Education (APPE), which published eleven volumes of a journal titled Process Papers on process philosophy and education from 1996 to 2008. Whitehead's theories on education also led to the formation of new modes of learning and new models of teaching.
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
August 24, 2019
Certainly, one of Whitehead's most accessible works, Modes of Thought introduces a radically new perspective on fundamental metaphysical notions which utterly upends traditional, Western philosophical presuppositions. Starting off by exploring what is truly meant by terms such as "importance", "expression" and "understanding", Whitehead elucidates on profoundly basic yet resounding insights into the very core of thought and metaphysics itself. It's rare for me to find myself excited while reading a non-fiction, philosophy tome, but after about 2/3 when his burgeoning system of thought is beginning to flower, Whitehead unravels a variety of fallacious ideas hidden in the Western preconceptions of science and modern philosophy, showing instead why process itself must be ontologically prior. Not even logic is safe from his unabashed assault.
With a clever wit, Whitehead dismantles everything science takes for granted, but rebuilds a new system bringing insight, coherence and unity into a philosophical framework that, for the 1930s, was far ahead of its time. This forgotten thinker seriously deserves a read by anyone interested in the development of Western thought, metaphysics, philosophy of science. Even (or perhaps, especially) theologians might find ideas of value here. Be warned, although more readable than most of his works, this 174 page book is an order of magnitude more dense than its page count. Although demanding of its reader in complexity, the effort put in is more than worth the value of unbridled philosophical enjoyment returned.
With a clever wit, Whitehead dismantles everything science takes for granted, but rebuilds a new system bringing insight, coherence and unity into a philosophical framework that, for the 1930s, was far ahead of its time. This forgotten thinker seriously deserves a read by anyone interested in the development of Western thought, metaphysics, philosophy of science. Even (or perhaps, especially) theologians might find ideas of value here. Be warned, although more readable than most of his works, this 174 page book is an order of magnitude more dense than its page count. Although demanding of its reader in complexity, the effort put in is more than worth the value of unbridled philosophical enjoyment returned.
July 24, 2019
The book's back cover describes this series of Whitehead lectures as the development of “brilliant new concepts of clarity and precision of statement which have since become fundamental principles of construction underlying all of the fields of modern intellectual analysis.” That’s an overstatement. Aside from Whitehead’s writing style, which is thick (particularly the first two lectures which I think the reader can profitably skip), his concepts inherently do not lend themselves to “clarity and precision.”
In fact, Whitehead writes that the highest reality is "beyond language." That reality is Plato’s world of forms. It’s Plato’s “philosophical theology.” It is a perspective that we can approach but never attain. The this-world of materiality is one of facts and partiality. It is the finiteness described by the various spheres of knowledge, particularly of science, but never goes beyond to the world of value, of “importance,” to the world of the Good. Only philosophy – philosophical activity – can pierce the veil of the material world to see its transcendent, unitary character. The philosopher, Whitehead asserts, “is always assaulting the boundaries of finitude.” The material things of this world are but expressions of the supreme reality. In contrast to science, philosophy is the attempt to see cosmic unity. All other forms of knowledge – this is what the “all of the fields of modern intellectual analysis” statement must refer to – are segmented, partial, isolated, finite fields of intellectual inquiry. They have a place to be sure, but they also need to be put into their place by philosophy. (1)
In this book, Whitehead’s philosophical worldview emerges loud and clear. Whitehead soars. He is like a modernized Plato, but better at making a case for his alternative (transcendent) world. Had he left it here, Whitehead’s perspective could be respected even if one disagrees with it. The problem though is that Whitehead, like Socrates-Plato, asserts that his transcendent world is that of the Good and Truth and that if one disagrees, it is because one is mired in the world of facts and science, and lacks proper knowledge and understanding. This is, as one can also sense from Socrates, a formula for intolerance.
(1) “In the history of European philosophic thought, in the history of great thinkers, a curious wavering can be detected….The appeal to life and motion is interwoven with the presupposition of the supreme reality as devoid of change. Changeless order is conceived as the final perfection, with the result that the historic universe is degraded to a status of partial reality, issuing into the notion of mere appearance.”
The material world, one of motion and change, is where Whitehead gets particularly fuzzy. His challenge is how to explain the causal relationship between the world of Forms and the things and events of this world. The One makes itself he says. It expresses itself through the many as a “drive towards aesthetic worth [the Good, value, importance] for its own sake.” It is a creative “appetition” for unity among diversity, an “intuition of holiness, the intuition of the sacred.”
In fact, Whitehead writes that the highest reality is "beyond language." That reality is Plato’s world of forms. It’s Plato’s “philosophical theology.” It is a perspective that we can approach but never attain. The this-world of materiality is one of facts and partiality. It is the finiteness described by the various spheres of knowledge, particularly of science, but never goes beyond to the world of value, of “importance,” to the world of the Good. Only philosophy – philosophical activity – can pierce the veil of the material world to see its transcendent, unitary character. The philosopher, Whitehead asserts, “is always assaulting the boundaries of finitude.” The material things of this world are but expressions of the supreme reality. In contrast to science, philosophy is the attempt to see cosmic unity. All other forms of knowledge – this is what the “all of the fields of modern intellectual analysis” statement must refer to – are segmented, partial, isolated, finite fields of intellectual inquiry. They have a place to be sure, but they also need to be put into their place by philosophy. (1)
In this book, Whitehead’s philosophical worldview emerges loud and clear. Whitehead soars. He is like a modernized Plato, but better at making a case for his alternative (transcendent) world. Had he left it here, Whitehead’s perspective could be respected even if one disagrees with it. The problem though is that Whitehead, like Socrates-Plato, asserts that his transcendent world is that of the Good and Truth and that if one disagrees, it is because one is mired in the world of facts and science, and lacks proper knowledge and understanding. This is, as one can also sense from Socrates, a formula for intolerance.
(1) “In the history of European philosophic thought, in the history of great thinkers, a curious wavering can be detected….The appeal to life and motion is interwoven with the presupposition of the supreme reality as devoid of change. Changeless order is conceived as the final perfection, with the result that the historic universe is degraded to a status of partial reality, issuing into the notion of mere appearance.”
The material world, one of motion and change, is where Whitehead gets particularly fuzzy. His challenge is how to explain the causal relationship between the world of Forms and the things and events of this world. The One makes itself he says. It expresses itself through the many as a “drive towards aesthetic worth [the Good, value, importance] for its own sake.” It is a creative “appetition” for unity among diversity, an “intuition of holiness, the intuition of the sacred.”
May 4, 2020
It is supposed to be the easiest-to-read book by Whitehead. It is still not easy, though. It is a critique of the of philosophy’s focus on static entities and context-free truth and emphasizes process and meaning instead. Some of the ideas are similar to Dreyfus's, Ingold and Rorty.
March 27, 2012
That book was recommended to me as the best introduction to the thought of the best British thinker of all times.
Since I don’t know more yet about Whitehead, I suppose that I am now really well introduced and, for sure, his originality, careless profundity and humor make me want to go further…
Since I don’t know more yet about Whitehead, I suppose that I am now really well introduced and, for sure, his originality, careless profundity and humor make me want to go further…
October 29, 2020
This book includes a blistering critique of science, empiricism, and formal logic. Some of my favourite passages:
'During many generations there has been an attempt to explain our ultimate insights as merely interpretive of sense impressions. Indeed this school of thought can trace itself back to Epicurus. It can appeal to some phrases of Plato. I suggest to you that this basis for philosophic understanding is analogous to an endeavour to elucidate the sociology of modern civilization as wholly derivative from the traffic signals on the main roads. The motions of the cars are conditioned by these signals. But the signals are not the reasons for the traffic. Common sense supplies this conclusion, so overwhelmingly that illustration is unnecessary.'
'Matter-of-fact is an abstraction, arrived at by confining thought to purely formal relations which then masquerade as the final reality. This is why science, in its perfection, relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific net.
Consider, for example, the scientific notion of measurement. Can we elucidate the turmoil of Europe by weighing its dictators, its prime ministers, and its editors of newspapers? The idea is absurd, although some relevant information might be obtained. I am not upholding the irrelevance of science. Such a doctrine would be foolish. For example, a daily record of the bodily temperatures of the men, above mentioned, might be useful. My point is the incompleteness of the information.'
'. . . the study of history as mere sequence wears itself out. It is a make-belief. There are oceans of facts. We seek that thread of coordination derived from the special forms of importance prevalent in the respective epochs. Apart from such interests, intrinsic within each period, there would be no language, no art, no heroism, no devotion. Ideals lie beyond matter-of-fact, and yet provide the colour of its development.'
'Of course, Plato was right and Aristotle was wrong. There is no clear division among genera; there is no clear division among species; there are no clear divisions anywhere. That is to say, there are no clear divisions when you push your observations beyond the presuppositions on which they rest. It so happens, however, that we always think within limitations.'
'The notion of a mere fact is the triumph of the abstractive intellect. It has entered into the explicit thought of no baby and of no animal. Babies and animals are concerned with their wants as projected against the general environment. That is to say, they are immersed in their interest respecting details embedded in externality. There is the merest trace of the abstraction of the detail. A single fact in isolation is the primary myth required for finite thought, that is to say, for thought unable to embrace totality.
This mythological character arises because there is no such fact. Connectedness is of the essence of all things of all types. It is of the essence of types, that they be connected. Abstraction from connectedness involves the omission of an essential factor in the fact considered. No fact is merely itself. The penetration of literature and art at their height arises from our dumb sense that we have passed beyond mythology; namely, beyond the myth of isolation.
It follows that in every consideration of a single fact there is the suppressed presupposition of the environmental coordination requisite for its existence. The environment, thus coordinated, is the whole universe in its perspective to the fact.'
'. . . scientific practice is founded upon the same characteristic of omission. In order to observe accurately, concentrate on that observation, dismissing from consciousness all irrelevant modes of experience. But there is no irrelevance. Thus the whole of science is based upon neglected modes of relevance, which nevertheless dominate the social group entertaining those scientific modes of thought. For this reason the progress of systematizes knowledge has a double aspect. There is progress in the discovery of the intricacies of composition which that system admits. There is also progress in the discovery of the limitations of the system in its omission to indicate its dependence upon environmental coordinations of modes of existence which have essential relevance to the entities within the system. Since all things are connected, any system which omits some things must necessarily suffer from such limitations.'
'[Newton] left all the factors of the system - more particularly, mass and stress - in the position of detached facts devoid of any reason for their compresence. He thus illustrated a great philosophic truth, that a dead nature can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead nature aims at nothing. It is the essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as the intrinsic reaping of value.
Thus for Newtonians, nature yielded no reasons: it could yield no reasons. Combining Newton and Hume we obtain a barren concept, namely a field of perception devoid of any data for its own interpretation, and a system of interpretation, devoid of any reason for the concurrence of its factors. It is this situation that modern philosophy fro Kant onwards has in its various ways sought to render intelligible. My own belief is that this situation is a reductio ad absurdum, and should not be accepted as the basis for philosophic speculation. Kant was the first philosopher who in this way combined Newton and Hume. He accepted them both, and his three Critiques were his endeavour to render intelligible this Hume-Newton situation. But the Hume-Newton situation is the primary presupposition for all modern philosophic thought. Any endeavour to go behind it is, in philosophic discussion, almost angrily rejected as unintelligible.'
'The universe is not a museum with its specimens in glass cases. Nor is the universe a perfectly drilled regiment with its ranks in step, marching forward with undisturbed poise. Such notions belong to the fable of modern science - a very useful fable when understood for what it is. Science deals with large average effects, important within certain modes of observation. But in the history of human thought no scientific conclusion has ever survived unmodified by radical increase in our subtleties of relevant knowledge.'
'The emphasis upon the higher sense percepta, such as sights and sounds, has damaged the philosophic development of the preceding two centuries. The question, What do we know?, has been transformed into the question, What can we know? This latter question has been dogmatically solved by the presupposition that all knowledge starts from the consciousness of spatio-temporal patterns of such sense percepta.
The study of human knowledge should start with a survey of the vague variety, discernible in the transitions of human experience. It cannot safely base itself upon simple arbitrary assumptions, such as this assumption of spatio-temporal patterns of sensa as the source of all knowledge. There is something very special about such spatio-temporal patterns, and also about arithmetic patterns. Speaking from my own frame of mind, I revolt against this concentration upon the multiplication table and the regular solids: in other words, against the notion that topology, base upon numerical relations, contains in itself the one fundamental key to the understanding of the nature of things. Surely we should start from principles which are larger, more penetrating. Arithmetic and topology are specialties.'
'The effect on subsequent European thought of this impulse from the golden age of Greece has been threefold. In the first place, the static absolute has been passed over to philosophic theology, as a primary presupposition.
In the second place, the abstractions of structure, such as mathematical notions and all notions involving ways of composition, have been endowed with an eminent reality, apart from individual compositions in which they occur.
In the third place, these abstractions of structure have been conceived as carrying, in their own natures, no reference to creation. The process has been lost.
The final outcome has been that philosophy and theology have been saddled with the problem of deriving the historic world of change from a changeless world of ultimate reality. Our whole conception of knowledge has been vitiated. The final wisdom has been pictured as the changeless contemplation of changeless reality. Knowledge in abstraction from action has been exalted. Action is thereby conceived as being concerned with a world of shadows. Plato's lecture on the 'Good', with its emphasis on mathematics as then understood, is symbolic of this attitude which has haunted philosophy.'
'During many generations there has been an attempt to explain our ultimate insights as merely interpretive of sense impressions. Indeed this school of thought can trace itself back to Epicurus. It can appeal to some phrases of Plato. I suggest to you that this basis for philosophic understanding is analogous to an endeavour to elucidate the sociology of modern civilization as wholly derivative from the traffic signals on the main roads. The motions of the cars are conditioned by these signals. But the signals are not the reasons for the traffic. Common sense supplies this conclusion, so overwhelmingly that illustration is unnecessary.'
'Matter-of-fact is an abstraction, arrived at by confining thought to purely formal relations which then masquerade as the final reality. This is why science, in its perfection, relapses into the study of differential equations. The concrete world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific net.
Consider, for example, the scientific notion of measurement. Can we elucidate the turmoil of Europe by weighing its dictators, its prime ministers, and its editors of newspapers? The idea is absurd, although some relevant information might be obtained. I am not upholding the irrelevance of science. Such a doctrine would be foolish. For example, a daily record of the bodily temperatures of the men, above mentioned, might be useful. My point is the incompleteness of the information.'
'. . . the study of history as mere sequence wears itself out. It is a make-belief. There are oceans of facts. We seek that thread of coordination derived from the special forms of importance prevalent in the respective epochs. Apart from such interests, intrinsic within each period, there would be no language, no art, no heroism, no devotion. Ideals lie beyond matter-of-fact, and yet provide the colour of its development.'
'Of course, Plato was right and Aristotle was wrong. There is no clear division among genera; there is no clear division among species; there are no clear divisions anywhere. That is to say, there are no clear divisions when you push your observations beyond the presuppositions on which they rest. It so happens, however, that we always think within limitations.'
'The notion of a mere fact is the triumph of the abstractive intellect. It has entered into the explicit thought of no baby and of no animal. Babies and animals are concerned with their wants as projected against the general environment. That is to say, they are immersed in their interest respecting details embedded in externality. There is the merest trace of the abstraction of the detail. A single fact in isolation is the primary myth required for finite thought, that is to say, for thought unable to embrace totality.
This mythological character arises because there is no such fact. Connectedness is of the essence of all things of all types. It is of the essence of types, that they be connected. Abstraction from connectedness involves the omission of an essential factor in the fact considered. No fact is merely itself. The penetration of literature and art at their height arises from our dumb sense that we have passed beyond mythology; namely, beyond the myth of isolation.
It follows that in every consideration of a single fact there is the suppressed presupposition of the environmental coordination requisite for its existence. The environment, thus coordinated, is the whole universe in its perspective to the fact.'
'. . . scientific practice is founded upon the same characteristic of omission. In order to observe accurately, concentrate on that observation, dismissing from consciousness all irrelevant modes of experience. But there is no irrelevance. Thus the whole of science is based upon neglected modes of relevance, which nevertheless dominate the social group entertaining those scientific modes of thought. For this reason the progress of systematizes knowledge has a double aspect. There is progress in the discovery of the intricacies of composition which that system admits. There is also progress in the discovery of the limitations of the system in its omission to indicate its dependence upon environmental coordinations of modes of existence which have essential relevance to the entities within the system. Since all things are connected, any system which omits some things must necessarily suffer from such limitations.'
'[Newton] left all the factors of the system - more particularly, mass and stress - in the position of detached facts devoid of any reason for their compresence. He thus illustrated a great philosophic truth, that a dead nature can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead nature aims at nothing. It is the essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as the intrinsic reaping of value.
Thus for Newtonians, nature yielded no reasons: it could yield no reasons. Combining Newton and Hume we obtain a barren concept, namely a field of perception devoid of any data for its own interpretation, and a system of interpretation, devoid of any reason for the concurrence of its factors. It is this situation that modern philosophy fro Kant onwards has in its various ways sought to render intelligible. My own belief is that this situation is a reductio ad absurdum, and should not be accepted as the basis for philosophic speculation. Kant was the first philosopher who in this way combined Newton and Hume. He accepted them both, and his three Critiques were his endeavour to render intelligible this Hume-Newton situation. But the Hume-Newton situation is the primary presupposition for all modern philosophic thought. Any endeavour to go behind it is, in philosophic discussion, almost angrily rejected as unintelligible.'
'The universe is not a museum with its specimens in glass cases. Nor is the universe a perfectly drilled regiment with its ranks in step, marching forward with undisturbed poise. Such notions belong to the fable of modern science - a very useful fable when understood for what it is. Science deals with large average effects, important within certain modes of observation. But in the history of human thought no scientific conclusion has ever survived unmodified by radical increase in our subtleties of relevant knowledge.'
'The emphasis upon the higher sense percepta, such as sights and sounds, has damaged the philosophic development of the preceding two centuries. The question, What do we know?, has been transformed into the question, What can we know? This latter question has been dogmatically solved by the presupposition that all knowledge starts from the consciousness of spatio-temporal patterns of such sense percepta.
The study of human knowledge should start with a survey of the vague variety, discernible in the transitions of human experience. It cannot safely base itself upon simple arbitrary assumptions, such as this assumption of spatio-temporal patterns of sensa as the source of all knowledge. There is something very special about such spatio-temporal patterns, and also about arithmetic patterns. Speaking from my own frame of mind, I revolt against this concentration upon the multiplication table and the regular solids: in other words, against the notion that topology, base upon numerical relations, contains in itself the one fundamental key to the understanding of the nature of things. Surely we should start from principles which are larger, more penetrating. Arithmetic and topology are specialties.'
'The effect on subsequent European thought of this impulse from the golden age of Greece has been threefold. In the first place, the static absolute has been passed over to philosophic theology, as a primary presupposition.
In the second place, the abstractions of structure, such as mathematical notions and all notions involving ways of composition, have been endowed with an eminent reality, apart from individual compositions in which they occur.
In the third place, these abstractions of structure have been conceived as carrying, in their own natures, no reference to creation. The process has been lost.
The final outcome has been that philosophy and theology have been saddled with the problem of deriving the historic world of change from a changeless world of ultimate reality. Our whole conception of knowledge has been vitiated. The final wisdom has been pictured as the changeless contemplation of changeless reality. Knowledge in abstraction from action has been exalted. Action is thereby conceived as being concerned with a world of shadows. Plato's lecture on the 'Good', with its emphasis on mathematics as then understood, is symbolic of this attitude which has haunted philosophy.'
January 3, 2020
Strangely - but pleasantly - poetic at many places.
The language used and the ideas expressed are remarkably accessible and doesn't rely on the reader having an in depth knowledge of other thinkers. That said it is extremely dense with information which hampers understanding as it is ultimately a transcribed lecture rather than a work produced specifically as a book.
The language used and the ideas expressed are remarkably accessible and doesn't rely on the reader having an in depth knowledge of other thinkers. That said it is extremely dense with information which hampers understanding as it is ultimately a transcribed lecture rather than a work produced specifically as a book.
August 23, 2014
Slipping and sliding in the muddle of Leslie Jamison's chapter, from The Empathy Exams, on Morgellons Syndrome, I came over here to remind myself of what Whitehead says about perspective. A slice of banana after too much spice. For Whitehead, I have nothing but reverence.
May 12, 2009
My undergraduate degree in philosophy focused on Whitehead. This was prior to my own conversion. While I now am quite critical of Whitehead, I acknowledge him as an import modern thinker.
August 30, 2023
Whitehead is my biggest disappoinment so far in my Philosophy readings. I've read The concept of Nature and Modes of thought, and overall I must admit that only the bifurcation of nature has had some kind of impact on me. I first wanted to read Whitehead due to Stengers and Despret; now, I don't want to ever visit him again. His prose is so boring it could put to sleep a maniac under a cocain doses. I can't really tell if it's because he's a Mathematician or because he's somewhat unable to express emotions, but this is totally unreadable. The notion of importance, really? Importance denotes a hierarchy of values, a priority, a more-important-than-other? Tell me more, fascinating! Jesus Christ...
October 16, 2023
The more I read of Whitehead the more I find our thinking resonates. I especially appreciated the first chapter of this book on the theme of "importance"; what could be more important than importance?!
February 27, 2022
I'm not sure if I still understand.
March 25, 2022
Wowzer this book is perfect
July 7, 2022
A less intelligible rehash of William James' Principles of Psychology.
October 17, 2024
Not easy. To be returned to.
December 8, 2024
a work(series of lectures) on context-free truths
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews