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Yashin's text from prison, published in the Time magazine has stirred the pot and I would like to write a 🧡 on the subject that I've given some thought to - the difference between interests of the Russian liberal opposition and those of Ukrainians.

time.com/6254450/ilya-yashin-a-message-to-the-world-from-inside-a-russian-prison/
Yashin's text is relatively short, the basic argument being - do not blame all Russians for the war, because, in doing so, you strengthen Putin's hold of the country. This is a ubiquitous argument of the Russian liberal opposition since the beginning of the invasion.
The Ukranian side feels offended by the inaction of Russians to protest in great numbers against the war, and in turn, against the Kremlin regime. In all honesty, what we fail to see, or what we don't talk about enough is the fact that there are opposite interests involved.
Let us then explain these interests. Since the invasion began, it has become a Ukrainian interest for Russia itself to be demilitarized and dissolved (split into smaller, less dangerous states). This is what decolonization means, outside of philosophical terms.
Russian liberal opposition does not share this interest with the Ukrainians (or other nations neighboring Russia). It wants to democratize the country, but not for it to fall apart (violently or peacefully). It would accept a federalization of the country, but nothing further.
These goals, these interests, cannot be brought closer together while the war is ongoing and Russian troops are in Ukraine. Both sides will continue to struggle for their goals. The bare minimum both sides can agree upon is that they don't want to see Putin in the Kremlin.
Thus, both sides will criticize Putin, albeit for different reasons. Russian liberals for the unnecessary war and general corruption, Ukrainians because their very existence as a nation is at stake. That's why Ukrainians speak of genocide and Russian liberals do not.
For the Western expert, or even policymaker, these nuances are less relevant, they would also see Putin out of the picture, since he himself has proven that he's not willing to play by the rules (no great wars in Europe, no antagonistic empire building which excludes cooperation)
In this way, you can see Western politicians, researchers or journalists support both the Ukrainian cause and the Russian liberal opposition (Navalny, Yashin etc). This is not contradictory to them, because they see Putin as the common enemy. And in this they are correct.
We can now see that there are three interest groups, all with the common denominator of being anti-Putin. Beyond this, there are lesser or greater differences, which can come into play only after Putin is gone (and no other extremist takes power in Moscow).
Ukrainians sense this divide of the future, so they are pushing for their goals in the present. That is why Russian liberals receive a lot of flak from this side and there is no way out of this (unless Russian liberals commit political suicide and accept the dissolution of πŸ‡·πŸ‡Ί).
This isn't a football match and you're not invited to root for any of the three sides involved. The point is to understand these differences and accept them as facts. We also have very little control of the outcome. Even Western decisionmakers can't control the process.
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